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Abstract
This thesis examines challenges caused by global cyberspace, which continues to undermine the
ability of regulatory instruments aimed at cyber security and deterring cybercrime so that digital
assets including those associated with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are protected. Progress in
information and communication technology (ICT) has brought about both challenges and
opportunities for mankind. While ICT has enabled seamless communication on cyberspace, it
has also made every phenomenon, positive or negative on cyberspace possible. The good side of
ICT is the endless opportunities provided to harness multiple features and capabilities of
associated technologies while its side effect being the enormous security challenge on
cyberspace.
Legal and policy frameworks are needed to help mitigate cyber security threats and safeguard
digital assets against such threats while promoting the benefits of ICT. To this end nations
attempt to regulate cyberspace within their territories, but may quickly find out that issues on
cyberspace are both global and national at the same time, and as such not fully controllable at
national levels only. If nations cannot fully regulate ICT and cyberspace, this will have negative
implications for digital investor’s assets in their territories as well. That is investor’s information
assets may not be adequately safeguarded by means of national legal instruments. This
dissertation seeks to analyze the question as to whether it is entirely possible for nation-states to
address the multifaceted challenges introduced by cyberspace with appropriate national legal and
policy frameworks alone to protect digital investments.
This dissertation argues that, on the one hand, nations are behind in providing proper regulatory
coverage for cyberspace, while, on the other hand, existing regulations have largely been
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unsuccessful in containing cyber security threats primarily due to complications caused by the
ubiquitous global presence of cyberspace per se. Consequently, investor’s digital assets are more
susceptible to unauthorized access and use, or destruction, all of which cannot be fully accounted
for with currently available legal or technical means. There is a strong indication that digital
investor assets demand more protection efforts from both investors and forum nations alike
compared to what is needed to protect and promote traditional FDI.
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Chapter One
Introduction

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)1 can take place in both manufacturing (goods) and services;
however, recent trends indicate that FDI is increasingly shifting towards services2. Changes in
international business environments coupled with the emergence of physically and
geographically unconstrained digital economy3 have brought about rapid growth in doing service
oriented international business4. FDI in services now accounts for more than sixty percent5 of the
overall worldwide FDI activities.

1

Defined as: “…[A]n investment involving a long-term relationship, and reflecting a lasting interest and
control, of a firm or individual from one country in another”, see Richard D. Smith, Foreign Direct
Investment and Trade in Health Services: A review of the literature; in Social Science & Medicine 59,
pages 2313–2323, at 2315 (2004). Usually distinguished from portfolio investment which, unlike FDI,
does not entail management control over the investment activity; see Leon E. Trakman, Foreign Direct
Investment: Hazard or Opportunity? The George Washington Int’l L. Rev. [Vol. 41], 5 (2009).
2
FDI in services accelerated not only in terms of size but in terms of location due to competitive
pressures caused by factors; such as, rise in cost of labor and improved conditions within FDI
destinations, see the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Information
Economy Report, Science and technology for development: the new paradigm of ICT, 123 (2007-2008);
see also the UNCTAD: World Investment Report - The Shift Towards Services, UN, NY, 97 (2004).
Meanwhile, the trends in service FDI has a bit slowed down, FDI flows in financial industry being the
hardest hit, due to the global financial meltdown since 2010; see UNCTAD, Non-Equity Modes of
International Production and Development, at xii (2010).
3

Digital economy is the new kind of economy that converges computing and communications technology
on the internet, as well as other networks to enable the flow of information that stimulates e-commerce
and vast organizational changes. For more on the concept , definition, and emergence of digital economy,
see Georgios Zekos, Foreign Direct Investment in a Digital Economy, European Business Review, Vol.
17 No. 1, pp. 52-68, 62 (2005).

4
See Lilach Nachum & Srilata Zaheer, MNEs in The Digital Economy? ESRC Centre for Business
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 236 (June 2002).
5
See Rashmi Banga, Foreign Direct Investment in Services: Implications for Developing Countries, AsiaPacific Trade and Investment Review Vol. 1, No. 2, at 55 (November 2005).
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Today there are various IT-enabled6 services being offshored in the form of either conventional
outsourcing or Captive Center7 (foreign investor retains operational control). The Captive Center
- also known as Offshoring service FDI or simply Offshoring FDI8, where the foreign investor
provides, especially technology-intensive services through opening an overseas branch or in the
case of a multinational corporation – through a directly controlled subsidiary, is the focus of this
research. Offshoring service FDI includes IT and IT-enabled services or IT-enabled business
processes9; such as, reading X-ray images of patients (Tele-radiology)10, processing financial
data, Research and Development (R&D), and testing, building, and maintaining software for
customers, as well as call centers supported by application systems maintaining customer data11.
While advance in ICT and the Internet has made Offshoring much more feasible and cost
effective, the Internet with its inherently insecure building block, the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) stack12, has also introduced a new set of technical challenges

6

Meaning - a business process usually involving information technology and provided by usually IT
TNCs (for digital IT services) or non-IT TNCs which “use the Internet and networked information
technology to deliver their commercial service products”, see Catherine L. Mann, International Trade in
the Digital Age: Data Analysis and Policy Issues; Testimony Subcommittee on International Trade,
Customs, and Global Competitiveness of the Senate Committee on Finance, 1 (November 2010).
7
Involves an ‘FDI-type’ offshore activity where the client retains control over the business process
including management due to intellectual property concerns and the need to control end to end business
process, inter alia, see Sudin Apte, Shattering the Offshore Captive Center Myth, Forrester Research, Inc.,
5 (2007).
8
As used in the 2004 UNCTAD report, see UNCTAD (2004), supra note 2, at 213; But literary sources
do not always differentiate this as ‘Offshoring FDI’ and Offshoring service FDI’ although there is an
important difference, i.e. the former includes production oriented IT related investment, whereas the latter
is limited to service FDI in IT or IT-related engagements.
9
See Aspray et al., The Economics of Offshoring, in Globalization and Offshoring of Software, A Report of
the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Job Migration Task Force, ACM 0001‐0782/06/0200, at
20 (2006).
10

See Kalyanpur et al., Inter-organizational E-Commerce in Healthcare Services - The Case of Global
Teleradiology,1 (2006).
11
For more categories of offshored services, see UNCTAD (2004), supra note 2, at 151.
12
Unfortunately, any new technology tends to bring with it not only “blessings”, but “curses” too (as
Professor Okeke put it) and this is not limited to ICT, but all other products of science and technology;
9

of securing information. Thus, cyber security13 and information protection have become the new
frontiers of policy and regulations for regulators14. The Internet and e-commerce which have
inherent global characteristics have resulted in new legal challenges15 for domestic lawmakers
and international legal communities. Not only digital communications among general public and
businesses, but critical infrastructures that are vital for public safety and national security depend
on the Internet and cyberspace16. This reliance has made the largely unregulated Internet and
cyberspace a good target for cyber terrorists and hackers. In fact, the Internet not only attracted
such illicit actors, but it has provided them with the tools necessary17 thereby making all kinds of
Cyber-attacks including Cyber-terrorism the reality. Due to the nature of the Internet, cyber-

such as, biotechnology, atomic energy, etc, exhibit these dual characteristics, see Christian N. Okeke,
"Science, Technology and the Law", Lectures & Speeches, Paper 2, at 42f (1992); Also available at:
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/lectures/2, (last visited October 16, 2011). Also see Kelly A. Gabel,
Cyber Apocalpyse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyber Terrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction
as a Deterrent, 19 (August 14, 2009); Also available at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452803, (last
visited January 10, 2012).
13
Defined by the ITU’s Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Recommendation X.1205 as
“the collection of tools, policies, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best
practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization
and user’s assets”; available on:
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/chapter_2.html, (last visited October
12, 2011).
14
See Sushil K. Sharma, Socio-Economic Impacts and Influences of E-Commerce in a Digital Economy,
in the Digital Economy: Impacts, Influences, and Challenges, at 2 (2005).
15
See GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER LAW: TEXT AND CASES 301 (2000).
16
For some it denotes the separate space created by the Internet (though sometimes synonymous with the
Internet per se) – see Vishnu Konoorayar, Regulating Cyberspace: The Emerging Problems and
Challenges; Cochin University Law Review, 413 (2003). For others (and this approach is more plausible);
however, it is a “global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information systems infrastructures including the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers”, see Committee on National Security
Systems (CNSS), National Information Assurance (IA) Glossary, CNSS Instruction No. 4009, at 22
(April 26, 2010). The Internet itself is a network of networks utilized by cyberspace as it resides partially
on the Internet as well, unlike somewhat confusing definition provided by Folsom, who limits the Internet
to be just a gateway to cyberspace, see Thomas C. Folsom, Defining Cyberspace (Finding Real Virtue in
the Place of Virtual Reality), Tulane Journal of Technology & Intellectual Property, Vol. 9, at 77 (2007),
also available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350999, (last visited December10, 2011).
17
See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber Apocalpyse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyber Terrorism and Using
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, at 24 (August 14, 2009), also available at: SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452803, (last visited Dec. 25, 2011).
10

terrorism has posed concerns becoming one of the most significant threats to national and
international security18. Thus the security of the Internet and cyberspace is a high priority for
governments, businesses, and the public alike.

Not only do a lot of cross-border transactions for Offshoring service FDI take place over the
Internet whereby such transactions are easily exposed to possible cyber attacks, but also the same
FDI business process provides opportunities for host country or foreign personnel to access and
mishandle critical investor information. Such information may include sensitive customer data
(e.g. personal and credit card information), intellectual property, and financial data. Information
and technology being used to process or handle this information (information system) can easily
be exposed to unauthorized parties and misused while in transit over a network (e.g. logistics of
procured hard- and software19, as well as online data transfer to a server location or otherwise
exchanging data by means of e-commerce), being processed overseas, and/or at rest in an
investor’s overseas facility. Investor’s sensitive information, especially when it is made available
on the public network (the Internet), is vulnerable to attacks. Its security will heavily depend on
the safety and integrity of data networks20 being utilized to connect to the Internet both at host
and home country locations.

18

Id. at 2.
Erwin van Zwan, Security of Industrial Control Systems, in ISACA Journal Volume 4, at 4 (2010).
20
The World Bank Group, Cyber Security: A New Model for Protecting the Network in International Policy
Framework for Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure: A Discussion Paper Outlining Key Policy
Issue, 2 (July 2006).
19
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The Internet has not only made a faster information transfer possible anywhere in the world, but
it has also been effective in masking the Internet user community thereby providing
“unprecedented opportunities for anonymous perpetration”21 of illegal acts. This anonymity
coupled with the global nature of the Internet has been a challenge for legal community and so
the investor has to deal with attribution and jurisdiction issues. Jurisdictional issues in FDI
disputes are nothing new; however, the problem with lack of consistency and consensus on what
suffices to assert jurisdiction, for instance, whether or not a mere existence of a website justifies
a jurisdiction22 is unique to IT Offshoring service FDI. Jurisdictional issues along with the
problem of the anonymity that makes identification of the source (attribution23) of damage in
cyberspace nearly impossible24 are relatively new and peculiar to FDI in IT-enabled services.
This thesis will argue that individual forums and jurisdictions have not been successful in coping
with legal issues emanating from the global cyberspace or the Internet that has no national
boundaries25. Yet clearly a regulation whether it is national, regional, or international per se
cannot solve the problem partly because of conflict in legal systems26. It is, thus, anticipated that
no plausible, adequate, and universally applicable rules or policy framework can be achieved
anytime soon.

21

GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER LAW: TEXT AND CASES 302 (2000).
Richard Johnston and Ken Slade, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Dispute Resolution in International
E-Commerce, Boston Bar Association: International Arbitration Committee, 15 (January 2000).
23
See Kendra Simmons et al., Cyberspace Security and Attribution, in National Security Cyberspace
Institute (NSCI), 2 (July, 2010).
24
See GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER LAW: TEXT AND CASES 321 (2000).
25
Joanna Kulesza, Internet Governance and the Jurisdiction of States: Justification of the Need for an
International Regulation of Cyberspace, 1 (December 2008).
26
See Mohamed S. Abdel, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Issues and Solutions, 7 (2006).
22
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Attracting FDI in the form of Offshoring is among the key components in many developing
countries’ national initiative to improve national economic development. A relevant study
indicates that such initiative has been impacted by factors such as level of economic
development27, nature of legal and policy frameworks, and level of sophistication in technology,
especially ICT. The willingness of foreign investors (mostly transnational companies) to do
business in developing countries still depends on some level of sophistication in terms of service
industries and skilled labor, inter alia, on the host side unless the host has abundant natural
resources that can easily be exploited and a large local market size for higher demand28.

This research will find that some of these countries, Sub-Saharan nations in particular, may still
have not only very weak legal systems with little or no consideration for cyberspace security, but
also inefficient service sectors with not much of sophistication in applying information and
communication technology. These weaknesses could have adverse effects on their efforts to
attract service FDIs. Majority of countries in SSA do not have laws specifically dealing with
electronic commerce (e-commerce), privacy, and data security. One of the reasons may have
been the fact that these countries also have very immature ICT infrastructure to support
cyberspace and e-commerce that would have pushed regulator actions for privacy and data
security over cyberspace. Digital divide, the gap between ICT ‘haves and have-nots’29, between
these countries and those in the west is highly visible, and especially future advance in e-

27

See Marc Proksch, Selected Issues on Promotion and Attraction of Foreign Direct Investment in Least
Developed Countries and Economies in Transition, at 4.
28
S. Ibi Ajayi et al., Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Origins, Targets, Impact and
Potential, African Economic Research Consortium, 12 (2006).
29
See Assafa Endeshaw, Intellectual Property and the Digital Divide, JILT, 1 (2008).
13

commerce is expected to widen this gap30. Therefore, as it can be expected, the use and influence
of digital economy in many of the Sub Saharan nations is very minimal. The weakness in overall
ICT infrastructure and legal frameworks for protecting cyberspace in general and investor data in
particular may have, thus, an additional discouraging effect on Offshoring IT-based services.

It has become clear in many respects that investment promotion efforts won’t be effective
without concluding appropriate BITs. BITs and multilateral instruments like the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have been very instrumental in providing
for ADR options31. Apart from BITs and multilateral treaties, the municipal law, particularly the
investment law, should provide dependable legal frameworks for a fair treatment of foreign
investors within the jurisdiction of a host state and stipulate alternatives for dispute settlement.
Therefore, not only concluding BITs with ADR clauses, but enacting investment legislations
which provide for a legal framework in re potential disputes related to or arising out of
investment undertakings is crucial as the analysis in the case study presented in the last portion
of the thesis will reveal.

30

See Sushil K. Sharma, Socio-Economic Impacts and Influences of E-Commerce in a Digital Economy,
in the Digital Economy: Impacts, Influences, and Challenges, 5 (2005).
31
Id. at 1.
14

Chapter Two
Global Nature of Cyber Security Issues: Regulatory Challenges for Protecting Systems, Data,
and Privacy

I.

Introduction

Offshoring service FDI that deals with IT-enabled32 mode of business process involves digital
assets, which can be processed, stored, or transferred over cyberspace using the Internet across
national boundaries. These assets include digital data and information technology that processes,
stores, and transfers the data. Not only has the advance in Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) and the Internet made Offshoring possible for any service business far more
than ever before, but this advance has brought about plenty of challenges for national regulators.
The Internet is both global and national in nature as some aspects of it may be controlled and
regulated within a national boundary, while some other aspects are international and as such not
necessarily governed by national laws and policies. The characteristics that make the Internet
global and services such as e-commerce that use the Internet and become global by very nature
of using this infrastructure have complicated the ability of existing national regulations to cover
every aspect of cyber-based transactions. The Internet poses security threats due to flaws in its

32

For its definition, see Catherine L. Mann, Offshore Outsourcing and the Globalization of U.S. Services:
Why Now, How Important, and What Policy Implications? - In the United States and World Economy, at
281 (undated).
15

building block, TCP/IP stack33. These flaws have introduced technical challenges of dealing with
cyber security. The security threats posed by the Internet and all services that use the Internet
have become, thus, an added challenge for domestic law and policy makers34, who attempt to
promulgate laws and provide policies for protecting information and systems on cyberspace.

National laws and policies have faced with an added problem of not being able to apply existing
traditional regulations on cyberspace due to a multitude of factors. Meaning traditional laws
cannot deal with new challenges created by cyberspace because of practical difficulties35
including jurisdictional plurality, legal vacuum36, technical difficulties, exorbitant cost of
persecution, as well as attribution.

Many jurisdictions have attempted to provide policies and regulations to deal with cyberspace in
general. But a few of them have regulations and policies dealing with e-commerce security and
also to some extent addressing the protection mechanisms of digital investment, in particular.
Any attempt to regulate the Internet fails chiefly because a sovereign power cannot impose rules
on other governments without expecting conflict, for the Internet is technically and economically

33

Kelly A. Gable, Cyber Apocalpyse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyber Terrorism and Using
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, at 19 (August 14, 2009), also available at: SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452803 (last visited Dec. 25, 2011).
34
Sushil K. Sharma, Socio-Economic Impacts and Influences of E-Commerce in a Digital Economy, in
the Digital Economy: Impacts, Influences, and Challenges 2 (2005).
35
Vishnu Konoorayar, Regulating Cyberspace: The Emerging Problems and Challenges, Cochin
University Law Review, 424 (2003).
36
Id.
16

global37. Besides, divergent national policy orientation and other factors; such as, tax
differentials38 make it harder to regulate the Internet and standardize policy requirements across
Nation-states. This chapter investigates existing laws and policies of a few jurisdictions (both
from host and home states’ stand point) to see what has been regulated or not. In particular, we
look at whether or not the provided regulatory norms are sufficient to address possible data
protection issues emanating from cyber security flaws for an offshore investor. Too much or too
little regulation may negatively affect Offshoring, rather than help promote it. Thus, this chapter
further analyzes cyber security related laws and policies of certain jurisdictions, which have
either too strict39, too lax, or contain too many loopholes.
Moreover, the global nature of cyberspace has proven to be an enormous challenge involving
multiple legal systems for legal community and the offshore investor alike. The investor now has
to deal with issues of attribution40 and jurisdiction absent agreed upon forum by means of a valid
choice of law clause41. Jurisdictional issues in FDI disputes are nothing new; however, the
problem with lack of consistency and consensus on what suffices to assert jurisdiction, for

37

Christoph Engel, The Role of Law in the Governance of the Internet, Preprints aus der Max-PlanckProjektgruppe: Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, 8 (Bonn 2002).
38
Catherine L. Mann, International Trade in the Digital Age: Data Analysis and Policy Issues;
Testimony for Subcommittee on International Trade, Customs, and Global Competitiveness of the Senate
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instance, whether or not a mere existence of a website justifies a jurisdiction42 makes the
problem peculiar to FDI in IT-enabled services.

II.

FDI in Services Sector: IT Enabled Services and the Need for Securing Investor’s Data

and Information Systems.

A.

FDI in IT and IT-Enabled Offshore Services, and the Role of Electronic

Commerce

1.

Foreign Investment in IT and IT-Enabled Services – Offshoring

a)

What is Offshoring Anyways?

Before attempting to define Offshoring in general and Offshoring service FDI in particular, it is
important to describe outsourcing as this appears to cause some confusion. Outsourcing refers to
sending work by one company or organization to be done by another organization43. Outsourcing

42

Id. at 5.
Aspray et al., Offshoring, The Big Picture, The Economics of Offshoring; in Globalization and
Offshoring of Software, A Report of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Job Migration
Task Force, 2, ACM 0001-0782/06/0200 (2006).
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involves legal arrangements; such as, sub-contracting with external entities, regardless of
location, for providing goods and services to supplement or replace internal efforts44. Offshoring,
on the other hand, is considered an outgrowth of outsourcing efforts45 and, thus, a recent
phenomenon, and more likely an outcome of the expansion in 1990s46 of international ICT
solutions as part of the overarching outsourcing arrangement. Offshoring refers to the location or
place outside the national boundaries where the outsourced work is done. With respect to
location, of course, offshore conventionally means overseas, i.e. across the oceans; such as,
Europe (not including Canada and Mexico though these lie across the U.S.-borders as well).
Most outsourcing, in the case of the U.S., occur within the United States, but since there is also
outsourcing by U.S. companies taking place outside the U.S., especially in countries like India,
the term Offshoring may have come about. Some classify Offshoring into two based on
geographical distance between the client and vendor47: offshore outsourcing (for U.S. clients,
this would include countries like China and India) and near-shore outsourcing (to include Canada
and Mexico in the case of U.S. clients). Yet, there is a shift in the most recent application and
understanding of these terms as can be seen below under section (b). Hence, the difference
between Offshoring and outsourcing will no longer be significant and will not always be based
on just geographical distance, location, or oceanic landscape. Rather, the focus, with respect to
overseas outsourcing in general, is on whether the overseas outsourcing engagement involves a
significant control shift in the management of the outsourced operations. The question, thus, will
be whether such an operation is a conventional offshore outsourcing for services provided by an
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external vendor or captive center/captive Offshoring for in-house or internally controlled
operations abroad. And depending on the analyses of key factors that determine the nature of
outsourced operations, the concept of ‘Offshoring service FDI’ becomes a subset of Offshoring
in general and captive Offshoring in particular.

b)

The Difference between Conventional Outsourcing & Offshoring

FDI

There are technical differences among the sometimes interchangeably used terms: Outsourcing,
offshore outsourcing, Offshoring, and captive Offshoring. Outsourcing means in general sense
transferring organizational functions to a third party, where the party can perform the assigned
functions within or across-borders. The latter is referred to as offshore outsourcing. As stated
earlier, Offshoring refers to a geographical location/distance beyond national borders where the
work is done regardless of who manages or performs the actual work. Offshoring, thus,
combines all out and in-sourced activities abroad, and comes in a variety of flavors, but the
vendor controlled (conventional48) offshore outsourcing and captive Offshoring described below
are the two most common ones. Offshore outsourcing involves a scenario where the management
responsibility for the delivery of outsourced service shifts to an external vendor based in a
foreign country. The client in conventional offshore outsourcing concludes a contract with an
offshore vendor, which could be an overseas based firm operating from the forum or a
Transnational Company (TNC) operating in the forum. The client can establish relationship with

48

Id. at 5.
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such vendors for certain fees either through a direct relationship with the offshore vendor/TNC
or through a partner organization engaged in channeling work to offshore contractors49.
Captive center also known as captive Offshoring can be qualified as Offshoring service FDI
involving an FDI scheme, where a foreign affiliate organization carries out Offshoring
investment while its operating decisions are dictated by the sourcing organization50 (e.g. a parent
corporation at the home country). Captive Offshoring by definition involves FDI because the
client company, often a TNC, is engaged in a self controlled offshore operation and that in a
country other than its home country. So the key difference between conventional offshore
outsourcing and Offshoring service FDI is the management control over operational decision
making process of the outsourced efforts in the globally sourced operation. Captive centers strive
to benefit from both cost-cutting and management control strategies based on an in-sourcing
model51, rather than outsourcing.
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Yes

c)

The Need for E-Commerce and its Security in Offshoring

The involvement of computer networks and use of e-commerce in the FDI business process is of
course not without consequences. Just as e-commerce faces security threats everyday due to the
increasingly complex cyber attacks and cyber crimes that affect all businesses, service FDI using
e-commerce faces similar threats. Organizations engaged in e-commerce continue to have cyber
attacks from both in and outside of the organization. And the e-commerce security issues have
similar security implication for Offshoring service FDI as well since Offshoring service FDI
transactions in the Internet era involve use of e-commerce one way or another for trading or
exchanging services. The various cyber attacks (e.g. computer virus, male-ware caused by
unauthorized Internet usage by employees, and denial of services) continue to wreak havoc ecommerce infrastructure and cause substantial financial losses regardless of the nature or purpose
of the e-commerce’s use. These types of attacks require more than a single type of technology to
counteract them thereby complicating the level of efforts and sustained damages.
While basic security issues of e-commerce remain the same for the most part as in all other
business models facing information systems security threats, e-commerce is particularly
susceptible to threats affecting online transactions. That is because e-commerce relies entirely on
the functionality of the Internet and web browsers, both of which pose various security threats.
The major issue with e-commerce is establishing trust and unfortunately there are plenty of
security threats inhibiting this trust52. E-commerce transactions often involve online exchange of
sensitive personal and financial information. A malware caused by a cyber attack known as
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Ramanan R. Ramanathan; E-business: Trust Inhibitors, ISACA, JournalOnline, 1 (2008).
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‘man-in-the-browser’53, for instance, is among the many threats faced by users via web
browsing. Man-in-the-browser attack is especially a serious threat for users browsing ecommerce sites. Such attacks often take place using a malware that in turn uses social
engineering methods. Social engineering involves certain tricks by which users are easily
persuaded or prompted via pop-ups to install software updates containing malicious code (e.g. a
Trojan horse which presents itself as a useful program while in reality it can cause damages).
The malware can activate itself and steal user credentials. Once credentials like credit card or
bank information is compromised, it becomes easier for the hacker to steal financial resources
and access proprietary information with a possible consequence of financial loss, as well as
privacy issues.

For example, a user connects to a web server at a vendor site to buy some product. The user has
to complete certain forms required to finalize the transaction. These forms may require the user
to include personal and financial information including personally identifiable information
(PII)54. A single PII, e.g. social security number (in the U.S.), or combination of PII can be used
to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as full name, biometric records, etc.
What are the security concerns that could arise in a situation like this?
First, from the user’s point of view, it is difficult for the user to know that the web server is
owned and operated by a legitimate vendor. Secondly, the user cannot know with some certainty
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See SafeNet, Inc, Understanding Man‐in‐the‐Browser Attacks and Addressing the Problem, 6 (2010).
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This includes social security number, user’s physical/home address and phone, and other information;
such as, driver’s license number that can easily and uniquely identify the user as such.
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that the Web page and form contain some malicious codes or executable files. Finally, there is no
way for the user to tell if the Web server will collect this information and distribute/sell it to
unauthorized third parties.
From the vendor’s point of view, there is no way the vendor knows that the user’s identity is who
he/she says who he/she is or he/she will not attempt to break into the Web server and make
changes on the site or do some other malicious act on the back end. The identity issue arises
because on “the Internet, the sender of information cannot necessarily be presumed to be who he
or she is”55. There is no way the vendor will be sure that the user will not try to disrupt the server
by making it unavailable to others through a denial of service (DoS) type of attack.
On the other hand, both parties cannot know the network connection they are using for the
transaction is free from eavesdropping by a third party who can listen and record the transaction
and steal valuable information. Nor may both sides know their information exchange is free of
alteration by a middle man.
So there is a need to implement tools and mechanisms which should ensure network security,
authentication, authorization, auditing, and non-repudiation during an e-commerce transaction to
ensure trustworthiness56.
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B.

Security Risks for Digital Assets in Offshoring

1.

Types of Risks in Offshoring

When it comes to risks, of course, there are many types of risks associated with Offshoring
service FDI. In terms of risk target, one can broadly categorize Offshoring service FDI risks into
three. First, there are risks directly impacting the Offshoring firm itself or its financial assets.
Secondly there are those affecting individuals (employees and third party victims). These could
include threats against individuals in the form privacy violation and loss of life, as well as
financial wellbeing. Finally, there are those threatening national security and economic welfare
of nations.
Few of these risks are unique to Offshoring per se, while many others are generic in nature and
common to all FDI57. Generic risks range from socio-economic and political incidents to those
emanating from individual investment projects mainly abroad but affecting nation-states. In
terms of IT and IT-enabled service offshoring, some consider two broad aspects of security risks:
one associated with loss of control over business process – outsourcing risks; and secondly, risks
associated with computer systems – systems intimacy risk58. All the same, control over business
process is not limited to outsourcing. Investor controlled Offshoring (FDI) can entail business
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process control risks as well, which may be caused by factors affecting management control.
These factors could include changes in legal, political, and socio-economic environments or legal
barriers causing hidden cost of offshore contracting, litigation, and issues in international trade,
tariff, as well as taxes. Thus, the overall risk factors affecting Offshoring service FDI can be
categorized as those affecting management control and business process (e.g. legal concerns),
and those directly or indirectly emanating from computer and communication security weakness.
Computer or data communication risks are primarily information systems security risks. An
Offshoring IT business process is especially susceptible to these kinds of risks due to the
distance in data communication involved and the diversity of computer networks that relay
sensitive information back and forth. The longer the chain of communication or the more
complex and diverse the networks involved are, the more susceptible and vulnerable to attacks
the communication becomes between two points on cyberspace59. There are many kinds of data
communication related risks associated with IT Offshoring business model. Among some of the
specific risks associated with IT Offshoring primarily are loss of control over network
perimeters, non-controllable data communication channels that may be vulnerable to network
attacks, and conflicting policies or incompliance with standards and protocols, just to name a
few.

2.

59

What Needs Protection?

Id at 6-2.
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a)

Software, Hardware, Data, and Information Systems

From an Offshoring investor’s point of view, there are types of investor assets that may be
subjected to threats of all kinds. These assets can generally be divided into tangible and
intangible assets. In terms of computer security and associated threats; however, these assets can
be narrowed down to just software, hardware, data or information, and information systems
owned or operated by the investor. Nonetheless, seen from a different angle, what can be
considered an investment asset could sometimes depend on what is specified on an investment
agreement (bilateral or multilateral), or other instruments that have been ratified by home and
host states, with which the investor has FDI deals. If a bilateral investment agreement (BIT), for
instance, specifically lists types of assets covered under the agreement and, thus, protected by the
BIT, and assuming digital assets are explicitly included or implied in the text, then the investor’s
digital assets are protected. This does not necessarily mean that the investor has no other means
for protection absent such protection mechanism provided under whatever BITs the investor’s
home country may have with a forum. The investor may still have additional instruments; such
as, the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for dispute resolution
in addition to applicable host and home country investment related regulations. If the ICSID
center is used, tribunals could apply international standards in determining what should be
considered protected as an investment asset. This means absent specifics in investment law or
agreements as to what is considered investment asset, international minimum standards will
allow the investor to seek remedies and recover from loss of intangible assets including computer
systems and sensitive information. Meanwhile, most BITs include general statements using
28

phrases like ‘all assets’, e.g. a BIT between Ukraine and Denmark60, in which case it can be
argued that the phrase ‘all assets’ includes digital assets.
Nonetheless, in terms of an Offshoring service FDI, the three broad categories: hardware,
software, and data maybe common to most IT Offshoring investment assets. But the big
difference lies in the importance and types of information needing protection. In other words,
there can existence a shift in terms of importance from one information type specific to a certain
business environment to another depending on business objective. This depends on the business
process or type of Offshoring service engagement. If an investor is engaged in developing
software, for instance, the bulk of data may involve software products and protection of this
software with regard to intellectual property could be more important than other types of
information in the business process. For investor dealing with e-commerce, again, though, the
business process entails IP rights, protecting e-commerce transactions and client data (financial,
privacy, and so forth) both legally and by means of information security mechanisms becomes
very important.
As stated earlier, categories of software, hardware, and information heavily depend on the nature
of business process. They can be classified as those that support or are part of the business
process and those that are products of the business process. So, information or data types (e.g.
software program design and instruction) involved in the business process need information
security protection as much as those data types that are results of the process, e.g. software
program.
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The occasional blur in terminology makes it worthwhile to describe a little more in detail the
three most common categories of investor’s digital (software, data) and non-digital (computer
and communication hardware) assets in IT offshoring mentioned above. Software, depending on
the nature of a business activity, could be any program or application system owned or operated
by the investor to support the Offshoring business process - may include back-end and front-end
systems (enterprise and web application, database systems, and operating systems or servers) and
network appliances. Hardware can be any tangible platform used to host or house systems and
software modules supporting the Offshoring business. This can also include devices supporting
networks and telecommunication but owned by investor. It can include outsourced hardware that
supports the business as long as the investor has contractual rights to control the security of the
outsourced equipment. For the purposes of the information security, the focus is only on the
hardware that hosts, processes, stores, transmits, or houses valuable information belonging to the
offshore investor or its clients.
While the third category for the purpose of relevance here consists of data, in any business
process involving IT and IT-enabled services, there is another important set of assets:
information system that equally needs information security protection. Information system is
defined as a ‘discrete set of information resources (people, technology, processes) organized for
the collection, processing, maintenance, use, dissemination, or disposition of information’61.
Hence as information systems are involved in processing, storing, and transmitting data, there is
the need to protect them as much as the data itself. That is because information system is a
container and media for information or data.
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Meanwhile, data and information are sometimes interchangeably used despite an important
difference. Data is a subset of information in an electronic format62 and is the lowest level of
abstraction, whereas, information is the next level. Data in computing can be anything in its
primitive form of abstraction, e.g. image, number, symbol, character, etc. that can be stored,
processed, or transmitted in digital format on a computer. Information is defined as data
organized in such a manner as to be useful and relevant for business decisions63. As applied in
the field of information systems, information in unorganized state is referred to as data, whereas,
such data becomes information when organized to be meaningful. For an investor, such data
could be any raw text, measurement, and codes in digitized format. But when this digital data is
organized in some meaningful manner, for instance, to be an executable software code, then it is
information.
Information that can and needs to be secured using information technology, for an investor, thus,
may include anything valuable and meaningful in the FDI business process that resides in an
electronic format. By being able to be processed, stored, or transmitted by a computer system,
this information, thus, takes a digital form of asset for the investor.
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b)

Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability of Sensitive Digital

Assets

The three important aspects of protecting both information and information system, also known
as security states or objectives as defined by Federal Information Processing Standard 199 (FIPS
199)64 are confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). Confidentiality (privacy) is keeping
private or sensitive information from being disclosed to unauthorized entities or processes65.
Integrity is the ability to protect data from being altered or destroyed in an unauthorized or
accidental manner. Availability objective ensures the ability of a person or a program to gain
access to the data in a timely manner when needed66. FIPS 199 describes the nature of loss of
each of the triage or the security impact when the objectives are not met while Federal
Information Systems Management Act (FISMA) defines the three security objectives as
summarized in the following table 67.
.
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Security
Objective

Vulnerability
Examples
FISMA Definition

FIPS 199 Definition
(for Network based
attacks)

Preserving authorized
restrictions on information
access and disclosure,
Confidentiality
including means for
protecting personal privacy
and proprietary information…

Eavesdropping
A loss of
confidentiality is the
unauthorized
disclosure of
information.

Passive Wiretap
Mis-delivery
Traffic flow analysis
Cookie
Active wiretap

Integrity

Impersonation

Guarding against improper
information modification or
destruction, and includes
ensuring information nonrepudiation and
authenticity…

A loss of integrity is
the unauthorized
modification or
destruction of
information.

Falsification of
message
Noise
Website defacement
DNS attack
Transmission failure
Component failure

Availability

A loss of availability
is the disruption of
access to or use of
information or an
information system.

Ensuring timely and reliable
access to and use of
information…

Connection flooding
e.g. ping of death
Traffic redirection
DNS attack
DDoS attack

Table 2: Summary of Sample Vulnerabilities & Information System Security Objectives
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NIST’s CIA objectives have been expanded recently, where the revised model includes nonrepudiation and authenticity, which are also adopted by the International Standards Organization
(ISO). Nonetheless, others disagree with this revision arguing the two additions still are either
not comprehensive enough to cover security states that may be missing or misplaced in the
original concept68. The descriptors, CIA, as originally defined by NIST represent the security
state of information not the source of an action or the action itself.
One of the most recent approaches has proposed a new model to include utility, possession, and
authenticity (originally rejected).69. The new model adds possession to the confidentiality
definition to account for an unauthorized observation (e.g. shoulder surfing)70. The NIST’s
definition of confidentiality protects against disclosure but NIST did not specifically consider
counteracting violations through observation via e.g. espionage. This, this aspect of a potential
security breach was not considered to be explicitly defined as a component of the confidentiality
objective. The new model also requires availability to include utility since information assets
when available in a non-useable state arguably are of no use or importance for the stakeholder71.
Therefore, protection of the availability objective in a narrower sense per se may not suffice to
meet the information protection needs of the stakeholder. The information asset has to be
available or accessible in a useful format.
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3.

Cyber Attacks Potentially Impacting Offshoring Transactions

a)

Infringement of Copyrighted Content

Technical or non-technical attacks common on cyberspace today can vary depending on source
or target. Their frequency varies as well. Proprietary information like copyright as a target of
such attacks is one of only few examples (selected based on relevance to Offshoring) discussed
in this section. Attacks targeting intellectual property rights (IPR) or causing infringements of
intellectual property in general and copyright in particular can be considered as one of the most
frequently occurring category of cyber attacks today. In terms of relevance to Offshoring, it can
be argued that the level of exposure for intellectual property contents to possible infringement
through IT and IT-enabled Offshoring continues to rise. The IT service Offshoring business
model is more inclined to make intellectual property assets available electronically and that
online sometimes on the Internet due to its intensive use of IT resources thereby making this
business process a target for IP infringement. Providing better protection of IP to investors or
outsourcing clients in IT Offshoring is more difficult primarily for two reasons. First, many
nations either do not recognize or respect IP rights and regulations provided by other countries
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like the U.S.72 and even if they recognize, they have very lax enforcement mechanism in their
territories. Secondly, the IP asset can be stolen in most cases due to lack of cyber security
mechanism on their network or system that enables an involuntary sharing of this asset. And this
type of theft is even more prevalent and easier on larger sets of networks, the Internet or
cyberspace for the apparent reason that the Internet is the weakest link in data communication.
For example, a software code made available for an Offshoring facility can be accessed by
unauthorized party either during transmission via the Internet or while residing on the onshore or
offshore facility network.
When it comes to copyright protection of software itself; however, the legal system appears to
still grapple with the interpretation of the law. The copyrights law was originally enacted to
enable protection of paper-based expression of ideas. The software program consists of
algorithm (could be concept/ idea) and the statements of the program (lines of the code). There is
no clear legal precedent at least from the U.S. point of view in terms of whether the U.S.
copyrights law should apply to algorithm. That is because it is still unclear if algorithm should be
considered not just idea but copyrightable material. The algorithm of the code based on the
current interpretation of the U.S. copyright law may not be protected because copyright law
applies to only the expression (only statements in this case)73. Thus copying the entire code but
not implementing the idea, the algorithm, seems to be protected.
Nonetheless, the software program code in the hypothetical case above can be copied in its
entirety and that is protected at least under the U.S. copyright law and also as a literary work
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under the Berne Convention74, as well as the copyright treaty of the WIPO, which extends Berne
Convention to include computer software. The methods and tools used by hackers to access the
code depend on the location or state the software finds itself. Man-in-the middle attack and
network sniffing are good examples of network based methods used by hackers that can result in
data theft resulting thereby also in a possible copyright infringement. Regardless of tools or
methods used, stolen IP data is not only consumed by hackers but copied and redistributed to
others thereby causing an influx of unfair use of copyrighted materials. Studies find that younger
generations are operating online overwhelmingly ignorant of any copyright laws75. This has
resulted in international trends involving an influx of illegal copying of digitized copyrightable
materials. Such actions are sometimes termed as piracy. That can be attributed to the existence of
much more capable tools for copying and transporting of electronic data including technologies
like peer-to-peer sharing. Copying music from a CD used to require a disc burner and so
normative control of copyright infringement through such copying was relatively easier. Thanks
to rapid changes in technology, MP3 has allowed friends to share music among each other very
easily. Suddenly, this type of sharing seems not like copying and, thus, people (mostly young)
tend to think it is not a copyright infringement at all. The dramatic reduction of costs in
computation spurred availability of digital content in an unlimited proportion, which in turn has
encouraged unlimited access to this content for both legitimate and illicit purposes76. Thus,
piracy has become an epidemic in itself and a prevalent way of infringing copyright, and as such
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a challenge for owners and legal community. There is some disconnect among legal, social, and
technical norms, as some argued, that needs to be addressed with some sort of non-legal
recourse77. Without such non-legal means, the day to day copyright infringement by young
people cannot culminate anytime soon. Many users think that they are almost entitled to
download digital content (music, films, software, broadcasting, books). From the U.S. users’
perspective, the ‘fair use’ doctrine, which is already blurry,78 is not understood among many
people let alone younger generation. The fair use statute of Section 107, 17 USC states four
limitation factors, but those factors are said to contradict to each other when applied79 and could
lead to an unfair outcome. The new digital networked world enables young generation not just
to copy and consume other’s works but to utilize their skills and manipulate those materials for
further innovation. Indeed, in the digital age, any copyright infringement claim against such
innovative use is bound to trigger a fair use defense. The attempt to balance the rights of
copyright owners and users through the ‘fair use’ doctrine (first developed through case law80)
continues to be debated. But there is no doubt that a reasonable use of copyrighted materials
would allow tech-savvy users to explore and exploit the fastest growing sophistication of
technology and create new products. And such free innovation can only be possible if the first
factor, the purpose and character, in the U.S. Copyright Act is more liberally applied in an
expanded manner as long as the main goal is not to use the material itself for commercial
purposes.
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On the international arena, the diversity of legal systems and multitude of varying interpretations
make things more complicated. While there are some similarities in a few legal systems, in part
as a result of some minimum standards set by multilateral treaties; such as, WIPO’s copyright
treaty81 and TRIPS82 agreement, there are stark differences in conceptual implementation and
enforcement. So the somewhat broadly interpreted U.S. statutory fair use exception and the
Australian ‘fair dealing’ approach, just to name a few, differ in terms of enforcing the copyright
laws83. IP protection is still a gray area in legal systems of many other nations84, and of course
such an imperfect protection has a negative effect on Offshoring FDI decision. One can also see
similar effects on investment promotion, i.e. from a forum’s perspective, lack of IPR protection
discourages potential investors, as well as hampers technology transfer thereby defeating in some
cases all other FDI promotion efforts. Technology transfer is negatively impacted because firms
with technology vulnerable to imitation are generally reluctant to let a free flow of technology
transfer in an attempt to limit any leak in knowledge to competing firms. Thus, there is a need for
an investor to closely examine IP protections afforded to the investor’s digital assets by any
forum before making an Offshoring move.
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On the potential impact side, the overall economic effects of IP infringement can be
immeasurable from the owner’s perspective, not to mention the high cost of litigation. The cost
of infringement just for U.S. businesses is in billions every year85.

b)

Cyber Espionage and Attacks Targeting Critical Assets

Western governments and private sector in technologically advanced parts of the world have
spent years building information infrastructure, more aptly known as ‘information highways’.
More focus had been on the interoperability, ease of access, as well as use, and to some extent
also speed. Information highways were built with openness and communication efficiency in
mind, but less so on the security side. Security was never an essential attribute of this at least
initially. The fact that security was not built into such infrastructure from the outset has made
lots of network infrastructures as they exist today vulnerable to today’s cyber attacks. These
networks rely on TCP/IP protocols for communication, which has inherent weaknesses. Critical
assets; such as, complex financial systems and networks, e.g. clearing houses for national and
international banking transactions, rely on use of such networks. The U.S. Federal Reserve
system known as Fedwire, for instance, processes transactions worth trillions of dollars daily86. If
the weakness of the TCP/IP based networks used by such important financial systems is
exploited by attackers, one can only imagine the consequences on financial systems both
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nationally and globally. The Internet uses the same infrastructure and, thus, is also vulnerable in
the same ways as many network infrastructures currently in place within national boundaries.
Both government and private sector information systems are at risk due to this weakness. Critical
assets owned by governments and private sector can be equally exposed to more potent threats;
such as, information warfare87 or cyber espionage, which could result in cyber attacks that can
debilitate critical system operations. Cyber espionage is a potential attack using cyberspace as a
tool that can be based on various motives, but could also be orchestrated by a foreign
government targeting either another government (e.g. information warfare) or a corporation for
economic espionage. A target could also be proprietary business information in an offshore
undertaking. The real possibility for corporations to lose trade secrets with dramatic economic
consequences through economic or electronic espionage was recognized early on by the U.S.
congress, which promulgated another cyber security type of law, the Economic Espionage Act
(EEA) which became law in 1996. The law was supposed to deter the rising tide of loss of
corporate IP due to international and domestic economic espionage88. The Taxol (an anti cancer
drug) case89, which was the first case to be adjudicated under the EEA legislation, underscores
the importance of such legislation in the information age. The EEA criminalizes theft of trade
secrets with the intent to primarily benefit foreign governments, though its second part deals with
generic reasons. However, the Taxol case shows that such espionage does not always occur to
benefit foreign governments. It benefits private businesses as well. Theft of proprietary
information can occur online or offline through traditional means of espionage. Clearly firms,
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especially those active in cross-border business undertaking are vulnerable to such attack that
can take place through theft of sensitive electronic information by means of exploiting computer
and network security. Electronic form of espionage is easy to commit and hard to detect or
prosecute for that matter. Even when the victim is aware that the sensitive information was
disclosed, it is hard to pinpoint the perpetrator as discussed elsewhere due to problems of
attribution on cyberspace. Parties committing such a crime on cyberspace can easily escape
undetected due to the very nature of the cyberspace that promotes, as well as enables anonymity.
Worse, the information owner may not be aware at all that its trade secrets have been stolen. Due
to the degree of sophistication in hacker tools, especially used by more orchestrated sources like
electronic espionage, losing information on cyberspace may not always be obvious. So an
espionage act can take place without detection and the victim may not know anything about it.
Not surprisingly, more and more governments around the globe are engaged in cyberspace
activities nowadays that range from filtering network traffic, especially the Internet, to
espionage, to actively interfering in other nations’ affairs and networks with a DoS type of
attacks. Governments have realized the potential of cyberspace for using it as a weapon for
political pressures and economic gains. They see the ease of manipulating cyberspace to spy on
their own citizens and others. Thus, they continue to exploit more features and tweak other
workarounds with technology tools yet to unleash even more potentials in this regard. The
increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks involving government sources have led to the use of the
term ‘information warfare’. While it is now clear that governments already not only spy on each
other but also attack one another, it seems likely that at some point in the near future there would
be a more serious and aggressive forms of such attacks, as well as defensive measures that could
result in what one could aptly refer to as the ‘information world war’.
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Furthermore, a GAO’s report to Congress has raised additional concerns about Offshoring IT
related works such as software development in general90. The main concern is that developing
software in offshore locations, especially when the work is done on behalf of a U.S. government
agency; such as, DoD could pose a threat to national security and critical infrastructure. Critical
IT-based military systems using Commercial off-the Shelf (COTS) products could become
dependent on developer who could be directly or indirectly associated with a foreign hostile
nation or terrorist. Nothing could prevent a developer with an illicit intent from sharing
government information it accesses with foreign hostile governments. The concern also is that
COTS products developed in a foreign location by either foreign contractor or an Offshoring
U.S. investor abroad could include malicious code embedded in the application system by a
malicious programmer. Once used on government systems or networks, such an embedded code
(‘hidden features’91) in a piece of software or application system could be triggered anytime
during its life-cycle to perform unintended actions. Such actions can occur on classified or
unclassified data, where the actions manipulate sensitive government information or even impact
functionality of critical military weapons. Attacks against critical infrastructure can go beyond
this and may cripple civilian infrastructure such as transportation and financial systems, not to
mention loss of human life. So such attacks are more concerning because the impact could be
far-reaching. The concern is heightened as computers nowadays perform far more critical tasks,
where mistakes can cause financial turmoil, accidents, or in extreme cases loss of human life.
Bottom-line, a cyber attack may target the offshoring business setting itself or originate through
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the Offshoring business process but its target can be any critical assets owned by both
government and private sector, while its impact can be severe affecting life and properties of all
kinds.

c)

Cyber Attacks Targeting Personal Privacy

Personal data of millions of people are widely available over cyberspace, exposed to individuals
who would make an illicit use of such information. Due to its tendency to frequently utilize
international communication networks and the Internet for cost effective data transfer, an IT
service Offshoring generally may expose sensitive data in similar ways making data incursion a
possibility. Such data includes PII belonging to employees and customers. Personal privacy
maybe protected by law and its violation may result in prosecution. However, it is better to avoid
privacy from becoming a legal issue in the first place. One way to do that is by protecting
personal data; such as, PII not to be disclosed or accessed in an unauthorized manner. The
majority of personal privacy issues arise due to inadequate or insecure handling of personal data
by a custodian (e.g. an Offshoring investor). Regrettably, individuals (employees or customers)
have almost no control over their information maintained by the custodian. From the perspective
of the data custodian, securing PII may be achieved by implementing appropriate security
mechanisms on the systems or networks that deal with such data. But this depends on who
controls what or which network and may get more complicated in cases where the custodian uses
third party networks or storage area networks (SANs) over which the custodian has no control.
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The disclosure risks become even greater when increasingly distributed networks are used or
when such use involves the latest outsourcing option known as cloud computing92 that promotes
leveraging shared resources, inter alia. Greater flexibility for availability and the need for cost
cutting drive the interest for many firms including those in Offshoring business model. There is a
clear opportunity and benefits for Offshoring firms to take advantage of both the various
deployment models of cloud (public, private, and hybrid) on the one hand, and the service
models (infrastructure, software, and operating system based clouds) on the other93 . One of the
biggest concerns with cloud computing is that shared resources may expose company owned
personal information to third parties without consent or accidentally94. The fact that the cloud
software, infrastructure, or platform may involve a large pool of diverse users, can put the
individual users at a heightened risk for potential data leak. Faster dissemination of such data to
everyone on the cloud, as well as beyond becomes the possibility. Cloud services may be used by
clients that do not limit the availability and use of social media, personal Webmail, and other
publicly available sites. This can be a concern as attacks like those utilizing social engineering
can negatively impact the security of the client with a possible spill-over effect on the underlying
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platform, and eventually on the cloud services accessed95 other customers. Generally, those using
private cloud models have more control over their data, and, thus, lower risks compared to those
using economies of scale type public cloud computing.

On the other hand, the perception for privacy vastly differs from country to country and the same
is true when it comes to protection of personal privacy. For example, there is no clear distinction
between privacy and personal data, though they are not the same. Thus, both end up sometimes
being used interchangeably. Conceptually, both could be independent from each other in some
respects. For instance, breach of some personal data may not necessarily result in breach or
invasion of privacy, and vice versa. Although both concepts have some overlaps, generally,
privacy can be broader compared to personal data and has long been recognized by states that do
not even have data protection rules96. That being said, the definition of privacy or rights of
personal privacy may not be the same around the world. This could be attributable to variances
in cultural and legal settings. Possible breach of privacy that can be considered illegal or even
have punitive consequences in one forum can be a minor ethical offence in another, and so on.
Difference in legal regimes across the globe is nothing new but some countries have not only
laws addressing personal privacy but they do so in much stricter terms. The EU and Canada have
such strict data privacy laws that are comprehensive and far-reaching in some respects with
possible negative repercussions on Offshoring97. The reason for possible impacts of such laws
on Offshoring transactions is that at least in some cases Offshoring business model is
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underpinned by personal data that needs to be processed, transmitted and stored. Stricter rules
like the ones provided by the EU can impact in particular business processes dealing with
personal data98. While EU’s privacy law restricts business’s right to use consumer data for
marketing purposes and as a result said to be consumer friendly, the U.S. privacy laws essentially
leave businesses free in this regard99 thereby providing consumers with little protection.
Consequently, consumer’s private data tend to be readily available for businesses under the U.S.
privacy regulation, while that is not the case under the data protection laws of the E.U. This
means consumer’s data is less likely to be accessed through network incursion and stolen by
illicit users under the E.U. laws in comparison with the U.S. legal regime.

Meanwhile, attacks, especially cross-border intrusions against privacy and identity have been on
the rise again due to the proliferation of the international ICT. This implies that there is much
greater need for offshoring investors to implement more resilient information security
mechanisms to protect PII and other customer data. Such precautionary measures benefit both
compliance with strict data protection laws and help avoid legal liabilities for data breach caused
by lax security measures.
Incursions against personal privacy and data result in not only identity theft that has come to be
one of the most prevalent consequences of stolen PII, but some cases involve loss of personal
dignity or shame. There are even incidents where fraud victims end up being falsely accused of a
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crime or labeled as a fugitive100. Therefore, the impact of loss of personal data is not limited to a
mere stolen identity with some negative financial outcomes which could certainly be severe and
incalculable at times, but invasion of privacy could carry negative consequences for victims both
legally and socially.

d)

Credit Card Fraud and Identity Theft

ICT has changed the landscape of the crime commission profoundly. It has provided the tools
and mechanisms that the criminals can easily access and use. For instance, cybercriminals can
now use fake websites in a hacking method called phishing101 that looks almost identical to e.g. a
local bank’s website to lure unsuspecting bank customers and capture credit card information to
eventually steal financial resources. Such criminals would use spoofed emails or IP addresses to
impersonate the originator or worse install a Trojan horse or spyware102 on a victim’s computer
that can perform much more harvesting on the computer without the victim’s knowledge. All of
this can be initiated via a spam email directing the victim to do different things including a visit
to the sham website so that the perpetrator behind the email in turn will intercept credentials and
dig into more useful information of the unsuspecting victim.
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Nowadays much of private information or PII is part of public records or even if that is not the
case, a lot of custodians like credit bureaus make it much easier for potential intruders to harvest
and use such personal information for illicit purposes. Technology contributes to this by
providing the tools but ultimately people or firms responsible for protecting their customers’ data
negligently or intentionally ease the access. This was the case in California, where a woman (not
even as an employee) downloaded credit information of hundreds of perspective tenants with a
click of a button103. But it was the credit bureau that never checked whether the woman fulfilled
at least a simple ‘need to know’ access test. Even more concerning are cases involving internal
threats, where employees with full access privileges to customer data turn their backs on their
employer and device a plan to defraud customers. This situation is better exemplified in the case
R v Thompson104, where a criminal lawsuit was brought in England against a former bank
employee, a computer programmer, in Kuwait for obtaining property by deception. Evidence
proved that he utilized his programming skills to create a script that instructed the banking
system to make money transfers from accounts belonging to the bank customers. Again this is
another example of how rampant insider threat can be. It shows how computer systems can be
abused by unscrupulous power-users like a programmer or system administrator when no
restrictions are built into the system for auditing, limiting unauthorized escalation of privileges,
and disallowing certain transactions.
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Credit card fraud is another global epidemic that both individuals and financial
institutions/businesses currently face105. A study conducted by the Verizon Risk team revealed
that the records from compromised payment cards (data in those cards) is the number one hacked
data and data breach incidents (representing about 96% of all records stolen and 78% of all
incidents).106 This can be evidenced with the two largest incidents of data breach in the same
year, 2011, which involved an unauthorized access and stealing of credit card information from
two big companies107. It can be witnessed from these incidents that stealing records related to
payment cards is the most lucrative criminal activity for hackers108. Hackers break into computer
systems operated by businesses and steal credit card numbers of consumers by accessing
databases and downloading information for later use through impersonation, e.g. ID theft. These
hackers even manufacture counterfeit cards to defraud businesses, and buy and sale this

105

Identity theft the number one incident for individuals (about 11.7 million individuals affected in 2008)
caused by stolen credit card information as a statistical report by the United States Department of Justice
Bureau of Justice Statistics showed, available at: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit08.pdf, (last
visited June 6, 2011).
106
See a study conducted by the Verizon risk team with cooperation from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
and Dutch High Tech Crime Unit, 2011 Data Breach Investigations Report, 50 (2011), also available at:
http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/2011/04/19/2011-data-breach-investigations-report-released/,
(last visited October 12, 2011). The cost of data breach skyrocket in 2011 – more than $130 billion for
U.S. companies already as of July 2011, see The Cost of Cybercrime at CNNmoney.com:
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/technology/1107/gallery.cyber_security_costs/, (last visited July 20,
2011).
107
Several firms were affected during 2011 but Sony and Citigroup are the two most prominent
organizations falling victim to huge data compromise as of June in 2011. Citi announced on June 16,
2011 that hackers stole credit card information of its customers (over 360 thousand customer accounts);
see CNN news available at:
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/27/technology/citi_credit_card/index.htm?iid=H_T_News, (last visited
June 16, 2011); see also a CNN report regarding the massive data breach on Sony, where tens of millions
of credit card numbers were stolen from the three Sony gaming systems, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/10/technology/sony_hack_fallout/index.htm?iid=EL, (last visited May 22,
2011)
108
Around $2.7 million just from Citigroup’s data breach; see the report supra note 240, available at:
http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/27/technology/citi_credit_card/index.htm?iid=H_T_News, (last visited
June 16, 2011); see also The Cost of Cybercrime at CNNmoney.com:
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2011/technology/1107/gallery.cyber_security_costs/, (last visited June 17,
2011).
50

information through channels established for this purposes known as “carding forums”109.
Lacking computer security safeguards have already exposed many businesses to such attacks
where credit card information of millions of customers have been stolen causing unprecedented
sums in financial loss in most cases through identity theft110. The study by the Verizon team also
indicated that in terms of attack methodology, hacking ranks number one followed by use of
malware functionality (e.g. spyware, key-logger, etc.), of which key-logger accounts for the
majority of malware attacks111. The majority of hacking takes place through use of malware that
exploits backdoors on computer systems left open for maintenance purposes. Backdoors are
utilized to install spyware, disable security controls, and send data back to external
destinations112. The magnitude of these breaches and lost assets witness how vulnerable data is
at both big and small company data centers, and how sophisticated, as well as versatile attack
methodologies can be. Citigroup, one of the major firms mentioned above that fell victim to such
109
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data breach, later stated that its customers would lose nothing113. But in reality the hacked data
carries the risk of further identity related issues for customers affected. Such data ends up being
bought and sold through carding and thus there won’t be an end for possible liability lawsuits to
the organizations losing customer data. The breaches that already took place may continue to
haunt these organizations and it doesn’t seem there is a way out from this mess anytime soon.
For those already affected and others, this could be a good lesson to rethink about their security
approaches and point in the right direction instead of just a simple maneuver often using the
press in an attempt to control damage. This will more likely force them to revisit and overhaul
data security mechanisms they may have in place, and avoid further breaches through
implementing compliant and resilient safeguards utilizing standards; such as, that of the Payment
Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). Statistics compiled after data breaches on
affected organizations showed some correlation between non-compliance with the PCI DSS and
the level or frequency of data breaches114. Computer systems lacking recommended controls can
easily be a target and misused by both external hackers and internal users alike, who strive to
satisfy whatever criminal intentions these perpetrators may have at a cost of both businesses and
consumers. Strict application of separation of duties, in addition to adherence to the PCI DSS can
guard transactions in financial systems against such attacks and can be a good control tool
against internal threats; such as, rogue employees.
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As for the root cause of negligence in handling personal data, there seem to be two factors at
play. There is security lax by data custodians, which contributes to data breaches and there is the
legal framework that mends or breaks security requirements. Data security requirement backed
by law can result in better safeguards while lack of such legal environment will contribute to
poor handling of personal data or worse some laws create an environment where personal data
may be bought and sold as commodity. Some legal systems treat private information or data like
property. In those legal systems, e.g. the U.S., property rights extend to data, meaning data can
be bought and sold like a property115. So there is a data owner who once gains ownership to
personal data can sell the data to third parties who could in turn misuse the information. Since
property is an alienable right, once data is owned by another party or sold, the subject’s right to
data is lost. So extending property laws to data may benefit businesses, but leaves the data
subject in the dark in many respects. More dangerous situation is the fact that intermediaries such
ISPs are by default well positioned to be able to dig much deeper into customer information,
gather all about the customer, get hacked, sell, or use that information for profit. Arguably ISPs
actually use much more intrusive tools or algorithms than cookies to collect data (both personal
and business) of their customers and track the customers’ behavior, Internet usage that becomes
powerful and valuable information. Anything they collect along with the billing information they
already have and own per the U.S. law becomes the best data mine for use on the market. They
are said to use deep packet inspection that allows them to not only record email addresses but
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even sift through email contents as well116. All of this makes such companies a target for data
hackers on the one hand and marketers on the other. Hackers need this data for purposes of either
personal use, i.e. to take advantage of it through ID theft and credit card fraud, or to provide it
for sale. Marketing firms seek such data to apply data mining tools, which analyze this data to
determine customer needs, as well as wants to better customize advertising offers for products
and services. In all of these, the data subject may be left with very limited options to be able to
salvage whatever can be done to control damage. Only when integrity is in question via credit
reporting, may such limited options exist for U.S. consumer through the Fair Credit Reporting
Act of 1970117. For integrity issues, the Fair Credit Reporting Act affords the subject to limit
damage caused by incorrect credit reporting through redress, access, and enforcement options.
This law allows the data subject to view credit reports and if incorrect, to request correction, or
utilize any other possible enforcement tools to minimize further effects.

Moreover, with regard to harm resulting from stealing financial data, the impact is not limited to
loss of financial assets or personal injuries. While loss of a credit card information and ID theft
as a possible consequence of that lead to a multitude of long and short term economic and
financial consequences including tarnished credit, even loss of jobs, and so on, there may be an
additional damage not related to property or personal injury. Fraudulent transactions involving
credit card and identify theft can lead to loss in commercial context unrelated to personal injury

116

Richard M. Marsh, Jr., Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: A New Approach to Protecting
Personal Privacy on the Internet, 15 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 543, at 547 (2009).
117
Aspray et al.., supra note 9, at 195.
54

or property damage, also referred to as ‘pure economic loss’118. But courts are generally reluctant
to allow such claims in tort cases basically following the common law tradition. The common
law approach does not seem to allow recovery of economic loss where a plaintiff suffers neither
physical harm nor property damage. In the Martel Building Ltd. v. Canada119 case, the court
adopted some taxonomy of test steps in an attempt to ensure that its decision favoring the
plaintiff did not create an unbridled wave of inappropriate lawsuits and indeterminacy of
liability, inter alia120. This court, by recognizing the possible consequence of such expansion,
disallowed a compensation for pure economic loss. A different conclusion or not setting a
standard for filtering legitimate claims by the court could have set a precedent for an unlimited
number of liability seekers, as well as a quantum of damages, especially those caused by
distributed chain reaction attacks like DDoS.

4.

Cybercrime: Problems with Attribution and Prosecution

a)

What Constitutes a Cybercrime?
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Not all attacks on cyberspace warrant investigation or allocating already overwhelmed law
enforcement resources for prosecution since not all attacks qualify as a crime per se. But whether
to qualify any given cyber based attack as a crime will depend on a criminal system and its legal
norms to define such a crime. Regardless, an attack which is considered non-criminal in one
jurisdiction might be viewed otherwise in another. Legal systems all over the world attempt to
deal with cyber born criminal activities one way or another. Some even create certain categories
for such crimes which include cyber trespass, cyber violence, and cyber obscenity121 while others
consider any motive aimed at conducting fraud, ID theft, and copyright infringement using
computers as cybercrime. But more important is how a cyber attack considered a crime can be
prosecuted by the state that represents the victim’s interest and in which jurisdiction the
perpetrator is brought to justice.
In regards to terminology, it is important to note that there is a frequent use of ‘computer crime’,
‘cybercrime’, and ‘internet crime’ synonymously, and sometimes imprecisely, although these
terms do not necessarily mean the same thing. But for many, the important characteristic of such
crime regardless of the term used is the fact that cyberspace (which includes the Internet) is used
as a tool for crime commission. Thus, any criminal act that is possible because the actor exploits
the capabilities available on the Internet and its technology in terms of speed, connectivity,
anonymity, and absence of geographical boundary to elude a timely adjudication can qualify as a
cybercrime. Based on this definition, the use of the term ‘computer crime’ may be a misnomer
since even defining particularly computer itself precisely has been difficult for law makers122.
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That is because computer technology is used in many things and computer technology as well as
its usage evolves faster, thus, making it hard to limit the scope of its definition in legal terms. So
trying to define computer born or related crimes under the label ‘computer crime’ is more
confusing compared to use of the term ‘cybercrime’ as the latter denotes the relation of such act
to cyberspace more precisely. And the above definition is better suited for the term cybercrime
not computer crime. Of course many legal systems attempt to enumerate each individual act on
cyberspace and describe as well as define those. So one can see such attempts within a few
criminal law regulations around the globe, many of which identify and categorize criminal
conducts and sanction them, albeit, in varying degrees, as well as define each conduct123.

b)

Technical Problems of Attributing Cybercrime

For purposes of a cybercrime, attribution is an attempt to figure out who is attacking whom and
where the attack is originated from on cyberspace. The location where the attack is originated
from may be physical (a geographical destination in a given jurisdiction) or logical (an IP
address). Attribution involves determining the identity of the attacker and the ability to respond

123

Most legal regimes and some updated penal codes now include and criminalize certain conducts as
cybercrime. These include ID theft, phishing, cyber espionage, spam, etc, whereas the Council of Europe
Convention on Cyber‐crime of 2001 categorizes cybercrimes into four, while leaving rooms for extension
by signatories: (1) offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems; (2) computer‐related offences, (3) content‐related offences; (4)offences related to
infringements of copyright and related rights; see
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm, (last visited June 16, 2011).

57

appropriately against the actual place that the attack is originating from124. So the originator’s
identity could be anything. It could be a user account on a system, but it might also be an
intermediary such as a government agency which backs an attack.
But neither identifying the perpetrator nor pinpointing the location with some certainty is easy in
cyberspace given the complexity of the Internet infrastructure and anonymity afforded by it.
The current Internet architecture allows anonymity with no standard provisions for traceability.
The following scenario illustrates the technical challenges faced today in achieving attribution. A
denial of service attack disabled dozens of government and commercial web-sites125. But no one
knew for sure who was behind the attack. Some blamed government sources from two different
countries while others suggested it could have come from any sources as the attack was
unsophisticated. It was much later determined that the attack actually came from a town in
England126. In spite of the trace-back as far as that, though, the investigators were not able to
pinpoint the real perpetrator in person. The TCP/IP architecture which is the backbone of
internetworking allows anonymity of nodes and users on the network. The anonymity is
accomplished through the fact that the TCP/IP layer uses packet-switching, where data is
transported along the remaining layers and other hubs in chunks called packets. To make things
worse, each of other layers adds its own information piece to every packet and forwards the
slightly changed/enhanced data to the next destination (remaining layers, various routers, and so
on). Finally the packets coming from different directions and routers are assembled into a
meaningful format (text, graphics, executable program, virus, etc.) at destination and presented
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to the target. Any attempt to trace-back such packets encounters the challenge of going through
each and every hub where the packets went to and got re-routed, thus, making the whole
endeavor time consuming, not to mention further challenges. Such additional challenges exist,
for instance, if there is a need for physical searches and seizures, which may be relevant under
circumstances, for system log review at those hubs or ISP data centers. The matter of searches
and seizures gets worse adding to the dilemma when the hubs involve cross-jurisdictional
destinations or foreign unfriendly nations. And attackers know that and are constantly exploiting
such routing problems127. For simplicity TCP/IP is designed to use IP addresses which can be
traced if used in static state. Meaning tracing may be possible if the IP addresses are not
dynamically provisioned to various modems within the ISP. Of course, tracing IP addresses back
may be successful only if the log is available and accessible. Even then, locating the IP record
won’t be the end of the story since the IP address used to initiate the attack may not be attributed
to its owner (real user of the machine) with certainty due to possible spoofing128. By spoofing the
source IP or impersonating someone else, the attacker can even place a false flag implicating an
otherwise innocent individual or another source like a foreign government and leave an
investigator grapple with the unknown. Moreover, many ISPs do not even keep system log of IP
and user specific activities for an extended time due to the sheer volume of often overwhelming
daily information communication.129 Whether ISPs are required to divulge information of their
customers is another question, which was answered in the positive at least by one court in
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Recording Industry Assoc. of America v. Verizon Internet Services130. ISPs and similar
intermediaries have become more valuable for law enforcement simply because it is more
efficient to analyze user activity from these gateways, instead of looking for mostly dispersed
individual cyber criminals. Intermediaries provide centralized activity gateways that can be used
to plan and implement cost effective investigatory and enforcement mechanisms131.

In any case, the preceding sample incident clearly demonstrates how difficult it is technically to
attribute criminal responsibility online. The reality is that attackers with adequate technical skills
can remain anonymous at will and continue to evade criminal prosecution or to avoid
responsibility in civil litigation.
The question of how to resolve the problem of attribution on cyberspace is a much debated topic,
but whether to use much more intrusive techniques and tools to ease attribution has also become
more controversial. In other words, attribution maybe made easier using some combination of
technology and cooperation, but of course any technical breakthrough making attribution easier
comes with a tradeoff for privacy advocates. In countries like the U.S., many wary citizens could
find it a violation of freedom of expression and privacy. One group, Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF), in particular takes the quest for freedom of speech and privacy on cyberspace
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to a whole new level by enforcing user rights on digital world through not only an active
advocacy for the freedom of the Internet itself, inter alia, but does so through litigations132.
Besides, non-attribution ensures some anonymity for international political dissidents as well,
just to name a few benefits. Therefore, any technical fix for attribution challenges will most
likely be in collision course with the needs of freedom seekers, as well as demands from freedom
advocates around the world, within the Internet community in particular. Furthermore, just like
there are plenty of tools that attempt to block and filter the net traffic, or counter anonymity
problems133, there seems to be also no shortage in technical tools that can enable such anonymity
or circumvention, some of which are open source and available for free134. The anonymity tools
such as Tor135 takes advantage of the existing TCP/IP architecture and TCP/IP already has an
inherent capability to work against a trace-back. But neither anonymizers (circumvention tools)
nor filtering methods are absolute as any of these methods can be broken if sufficient amount of
resources are invested. So as there are always some ways to get around anonymizers and those
which try to counteract such capabilities, the fight between these methods seems to have been set
off most likely for an unending battle. Therefore, the problem surrounding investigation and
attribution of cyber attacks will not seem to be resolved by technical means alone anytime soon.
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c)

The

Need

for

International

Cooperation

in

Investigating

Cybercrime

Attribution is not just technically challenging but cross-border cyber related incidents have
resulted in international legal dilemma with respect to jurisdiction (both civil and criminal),
investigation, and enforcement. As stated elsewhere, diversity in legal frameworks, differences
in security standards, and only sporadic prosecution of cyber security breaches at various forums
are already a challenge for protecting consumers in cross-border transactions. Proscriptions
without the ability to prosecute a perpetrator have no deterring effect136. And the differing views
in dealing with cyber security actually exacerbate the situation. Such diversity will only help
undermine international attempts to fight against all sorts of cyber corruption. Yet despite all
these differences, there is a growing consensus demanding international cooperation and
collaboration that should make a successful identification and adjudication of criminals more
realistic and possible137. Countries have a predisposition to assume the responsibility of
regulating and enforcing laws of all facets of life including those that could help ensure
international cyber security in their territories. Because of this, some contend that there should be
international norms that define such “national responsibility for quelling cyber conflict that is
originating from, or conducted via, that nation’s territory”138. Improving attribution mechanisms
will deter cyber attacks as attackers know that they are less likely to evade prosecution. Aside
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from technical capabilities, enhancing attribution will only be possible through cooperation in
enforcement despite variances in approaches and underlying legal systems across national
boundaries.
Some parts of the world have more robust domestic laws and enforcement mechanisms relevant
to computer crimes that could be used to facilitate attribution endeavors. Yet there are other parts
of the globe, which are only just beginning to try to catch up with technology born criminal
aspects of their legal system while there are still others that are in the dark with no functioning
legal systems let alone anything meaningful is happening in the cyberspace front.

Meanwhile there is neither a common understanding nor standard approaches in regards
implementing cyber security controls that make such accountability possible. For example, the
ability for after the fact auditing of security incidents relies on the capability of monitoring,
logging events, data storage, and information sharing, all of which should be in place following
some standard. In fact ISPs that come in contact with much of the cyberspace traffic and have the
ability to enable security audit are not legally required to keep information on such traffic. Nor
are countries required to abide by any international legal norm to maintain/store and protect
cyber security events to facilitate possible e-discovery or evidence seeking in the event there is a
cyber attack. No universally binding international norm (hard law) requires or for that matter no
soft law urges nations in specific terms to subject their citizens to cyberspace related attribution
process. In light of international cooperation, for instance, multilateral legal norms could be
crafted, which mandates victims to demand a state to authorize physical search and seizure on
personal computers of the citizens in other nations for purposes of cyber forensic. To date, while
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such cooperation has been seen to be arranged through a handful bilateral agreements139,
universally applicable cyber security related multilateral agreements have not come to light yet.
One notable exception of a multilateral instrument with regard to facilitating investigation is the
cybercrime treaty signed by the U.S., Canada, Japan, and 22 European countries140. This treaty
will allow investigation and prosecution of major cybercriminal activities within countries which
are parties to the convention. Though this treaty constitutes a major step in the right direction at
least in promoting cooperation and facilitating attribution, it won’t suffice to cover the vast
majority of the world cyberspace community. Cyber criminals can use various routes and
stepping stones around the globe, not to mention their ability to impersonate an innocent party’s
identity, to launch attacks. When such multiple nodes at multiple jurisdictions are used, it
becomes much harder to resolve identity and the crime in question.
EU’s Data Retention Directive is another example of multinational legal instruments. This
directive lays out requirements for communications network providers to retain traffic and
location data for six months at a minimum to enable the investigation, detection, and prosecution
of serious crimes. The directive has; however, encountered a stiff resistance from national
sources both in terms of technical and legal challenges regarding its implementation141. This
legislation came into effect as a direct consequence of the aftermath of the series of terrorist
attacks in the U.S. and Europe between 2001 and 2005. Meanwhile, this directive clearly shows
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a departure from the EU’s protectionist approach for consumer with its more stringent Data
Protection Directive of 2002. The Data Retention Directive, while being a sort of ‘blanket’ data
retention requirement as indicated in S. and Marper v. United Kingdom142, reflects a
contradictory stance in itself with regard to the EU’s own position in data protection. Inevitably,
the retention policy has become controversial due to a possibly severe interference with
fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, it is a beginning of an acknowledgment for the need to
facilitate transnational crime investigation with the help of e-discovery.

d)

The Applicability of the State Responsibility Doctrine to

Cybercrime

In the absence of new international universal legal norms for cyber security, the questions arise
as to (a) if the existing international treaties could assist in determining the state’s obligation to
cooperate in cyber crimes regardless of the state’s own laws, and (b) whether duties and
obligations of state under the public international law can apply to cyberspace related cases
involving the citizens of that state.
To address these questions, first it is necessary to look into the rationale behind the basic
principle of the state responsibility itself. A state is responsible for internationally wrongful
actions that can be imputable to it one way or another. States responsibility is often accepted if
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an obligation can be established for the state. This is, meanwhile, a generally accepted principle,
which has been adopted into the International Law Commission (ILC) draft code. Imputability
under Chapter II of the ILC draft statute is often possible when state agents act on behalf of the
state and this is consistently the case, especially in human rights abuses (murder, torture, etc)143.
It is; however, unclear as to what constitutes an internationally wrongful act. ILC did not define
wrongful acts, nor did it explain what should constitute state’s obligation towards international
community. These according to Chapter I, Article 3 of the ILC draft code are left for other
international legal norms to deal with. Furthermore, it is equally unclear if such responsibility
also exists with respect to wrongful actions by one state’s citizens against another state or foreign
citizens. If a stricter, more conservative interpretation of such responsibility were to be applied,
then the state would only be responsible for acts it directly authorizes or should assume
responsibility because an act was committed on its behalf144. Encountering similar dilemma,
international tribunals including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have generally adopted
two competing standards called effective control and overall control145 as a test mechanism to
establish state’s responsibility. Notwithstanding, with respect to cyber attacks, either or both of
these standards may not work well. The effective control approach requires much higher
standards of proof placing huge burden of proof on plaintiff. Indeed, the effective control
approach may turn out to be extremely difficult to prove given the elusive nature of the Internet
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architecture which enables anonymity. Under the effective control approach, thus, it is much
easier for states to conceal the real perpetrator behind an information warfare and getaway with
their responsibility.
Unlike effective control, so argue commentators, the overall control standard would ensure state
attribution in cyber attacks even when complete control is lacking or cannot be proven146. They
argue that holding states accountable for their citizens’ actions based on over all control
supported by existing obligation can be used as an analogy and extended to cyberspace cases.
This is also consistent with another approach that will base the decision of state responsibility on
the degree of due diligence or lack thereof exhibited by the State147. Accordingly, states may
have to exercise due diligence not necessarily to prevent cyber attacks entirely, but to at least
facilitate investigation and identification, as well as prosecution of a responsible party. So based
on this premise, as long as it can be proven148 that the state is or must have been aware of the
perpetration like launching cyber attacks by its citizens and its obligations under international
law, yet the state fails to prevent the actions, the state did not exercise the due diligence expected
from it. The state would also fail the due diligence test, if it did not cooperate with investigation
or did not enable such investigation, attribution. Here not the action or inaction itself but the
failure to perform due diligence by the state can be attributed to the State.
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Meanwhile, international jurisprudence in general has recognized few exceptions are attributable
to states no matter what. Such exceptions include traditionally high-profile criminal cases
(genocide, crime against humanity, etc) committed by individuals149. Under such exceptions,
state’s responsibility can be drawn from its general obligation to meet certain requirements
towards international community even if the state itself or its agents were not said to be acting.
For instance, such responsibility has been accepted in cases calling for cooperation from a
sovereign territory in bringing an individual accused of genocide or crime against humanity to
justice. On another example, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized duty of government with
respect to preventing money laundering. The court stated in United States vs. Arjona150 that the
state needed to conduct due diligence to prevent a person in its territory from counterfeiting
foreign currency. On the other hand, several countries already consider a cyber-crime as a
national security issue and treat as such, which suggests that for national security reasons, these
countries consider cybercrime as something that needs more emphasis and special attention from
the standpoint of prevention, control, and cooperation. Since nation-states cannot successfully
prevent such crimes on their own, the need for international cooperation becomes paramount and
necessary.

Based on all these considerations, one could infer that an application of the state obligation
principle to cyberspace born crimes may be possible under certain conditions. However, such
expansion of the state obligation will depend on whether one has a liberty to categorize cyber
attacks as a high profile crime in the traditionally recognized sense to justify state obligation. Yet
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a cyber attack when classified as cybercrime could be compared to at least money laundering
crime that draws similar societal attention due to gravity of its possible consequences, effects
that range from severe economic damages to loss of life. Likewise it can be argued that, given
the recognition of state’s obligation for a money laundering crime, which is of equivalent nature
in terms of gravity of the act and its cross-border effects, cybercrime too should be recognized as
generally falling under state’s obligation. In addition, given the technological capabilities today,
certain categories of cybercrimes can result in severe consequences ranging from crippling
public infrastructure to loss of multiple human lives which could be equated with murder and
under circumstances even genocide. Such gravity of consequences could warrant state
responsibility if proven that the crime has originated from a specific geographic territory
regardless of the actor. Cybercrime has cross-border characteristics, prevention of which requires
states’ active involvement due to the ability by most states to control the ICT infrastructure in
their territory, which enables cyber-activities. Cybercrime thus can be considered as one, for
which a state, under whose purview it could be committed, should be held accountable if it does
not pass the due diligence test. Another factor to consider for such justification is the fact that
cyber criminals often use state territories as a save heaven, usually since states intentionally or
unbeknownst to them harbor and protect such criminals. Criminals tend to use such state
territories as a safe sanctuary under the umbrella of sovereignty, where they cannot be located
and prosecuted. Any intrusion to those territories without explicit permission from the state
involved would constitute a violation of that state’s sovereignty rights. States also should assume
responsibilities of not only for imputable actions but for that of illicit residents because by
providing ICT capabilities and thereby also enabling connections to outside world, they willingly
participate in the global ICT. Through such participation they establish an international
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obligation to ensure that their portion of the global ICT (cyberspace) is secure and not used
covertly or overtly for illicit purposes including causing damage across borders151.

That said; however, the overall success of confronting cyber security challenges including
attribution and enforcement still depends on cooperation and collaboration not just among states,
but private sector, and international, as well as regional organizations152. That is because nationstates alone cannot make a difference in that respect. Nor do they possess a technological
capability paralleled with that of private sector to address cyber security issues through law
enforcement within their geographical boundary. Technology becomes another part of the
equation by effectively limiting states’ ability to control cyber activity in a given geographical
territory. Technology in the private sector continues to outpace the ability of governments in the
public sector thereby making every effort to enforce legal or other norms almost useless and
many governments remain incapable of keeping track of such technology153. Therefore, it is
unclear as to whether there is any justification in expecting states in general let alone those
jurisdictions with much weaker ICT capabilities to assume responsibilities and be liable for
threats posed by non-state actors, where they have neither political interests nor technological
abilities. Especially to expect an economically poor nation that has neither resources nor
technical know-how to fight against a cybercriminal lacks some plausible justification. Albeit
this inevitably amounts to a double standard, it seems reasonable to hold these states accountable
151
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only when they are prepared to or have the ability politically and technologically154 to effectively
account for such threats. There is no doubt that nation-states continue to be overwhelmed by
challenges even though they attempt to pervasively exert their sovereign power to control both
territorial and non-territorial cyberspace threats. No country seems to have been successful in
bringing cyber security threats in its geographical boundary under control. This limitation
arguably weakens the notion of state responsibility argument at least with regard to nations
which have little or no technical capabilities in supporting cyberspace. Thus, at a minimum the
technological factor plays a critical role in being an obstacle against a successful application of
the state responsibility doctrine on the realm of cyberspace.

III.

Cyberspace Laws and Policies: Adequacy, Challenges, and Effects on Offshoring

A.

Availability and Efficacy of Cyber Security Regulations

1.

The Need for Cyber Security Regulation in General

There is no question that cyberspace presents the new legal frontiers for many countries and
legal communities all over the world. The way various countries approach cyberspace, whether
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they deal cyber security with existing or new regulatory measures may eventually have positive
or negative effects on offshoring FDI. Although an FDI in general or Offshoring service FDI, in
particular, may either benefit or be adversely affected by many kinds of regulation enacted by a
host country, the focus here is on those regulations directly related to cyberspace. There have
been attempts to regulate some aspects of cyberspace through national regulations. But other
aspects remain to be addressed through national or international legal regimes to effectively deal
with issues in cyberspace. Particularly, national regulations have not been able to catch up with
the pace of technology to successfully cover cyberspace maybe because no one can control the
Internet or has the right to do so. Control of the Internet by any government is a hotly debated
issue. There are two camps that fiercely argue against one another: those that advocate free flow
of information and exchange of ideas, and those who fight for some accountability through
government control155. Those advocating for the freedom of the Internet argue that too much
control would discourage technological advances in cyberspace, whereas those against the
uncontrolled free flow of the information are concerned about all the security issues that
cyberspace entails as has been discussed so far. The arguments for and against government
control tend to be lengthy because of the term ‘control’ but have merits of their own. But one
must first differentiate between ‘government control’ per se and government’s attempt to
regulate behaviors on cyberspace at least within its territories, hence, its control of cyberspace
with its jurisdiction. So, when it comes to the former, given the global characteristics of
cyberspace, the Internet in particular, full control by a given state government of the entire
network of networks may not be practical, let alone such control is legally possible due to
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jurisdictional limits. It must be noted that even the historic and but necessary indirect control by
the U.S. government over the domain name registration through the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) agency, an NGO, has caused some tensions among
governments and independent organizations around the globe156.

Nonetheless, governments can and should be able to promulgate laws that govern cyberspace as
it relates to their internal ICT in order to ensure national security and provide security
frameworks for information exchange. Thus, the latter argument with respect to the necessity of
government control in so far as regulating cyberspace for security reasons is concerned, is
justified. But this is not to say information flow on cyberspace should be controlled through
over-regulation or otherwise, so much so that cyberspace is not only monitored but all
information is filtered by some unscrupulous government which operates under the umbrella of
controlling legal or policy regime. The middle ground between too much control through too
strict legal norms and too little control through too lax regulatory regimes or no regulation at all
should be attained.
Regulating cyberspace at national level will also provide some level of assurance as far as
consumer protection for cross-border flow of information is concerned. And depending on other
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Especially because administering even other sovereign states’ domain names to the extent that these
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factors that influence technical capabilities and international cooperation, appropriate national
regulations will also support international attribution for cybercrimes.
Moreover, today’s complex cyber security challenge, the attempt to contain growing cyber born
crimes and damages, which continues to prompt new regulations speaks for itself. There is no
convincing argument suggesting otherwise that today’s cyberspace can successfully be made
safe and secure without some control through regulations. Law makers everywhere, confronted
with cyber security issues, have realized the need for regulatory frameworks. They look into
ways to regulate various aspects of cyberspace to account for cyber security. As cyberspace
grows in complexity, so is the need for new regulation addressing new issues that must be
accounted for. For instance, there are multiple pending cyber security legislations in the U.S. not
to mention the ones already in effect, all of which are necessary to govern various aspects of
human conduct and business transactions associated with cyberspace. One such pending law (the
Cyber Security Act of 2009) will have a generic applicability over cyberspace. This legislation
eyes improvement in global trading through cyber security norms157.

Meanwhile, globally there is a legal uncertainty regarding applicable laws, evidence, and legal
redress for cyberspace born incidents. This uncertainty is particularly underscored in crossborder transactions involving the Internet, e.g. e-commerce. Consumers, law enforcement,
outsourcing clients, and Offshoring service FDI alike grapple with legal questions related to
applicability, jurisdiction, etc. of various fields of law, which include private, public, criminal,
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and tax law. Weak or non-existent cyber security regulation poses a broad potential risk to
cyberspace in general. In the same regard, globalization adds substantial level of complexities
and opportunities for exploiting the global ICT by bad guys. The risk for loss of data protection
on cyberspace caused by weaker regulation can be considerably exacerbated by the need to
exchange sensitive data long distances across international boundaries. This is usually the case
with IT Offshoring where not only security weakness in a given forum poses threats to investor’s
data, but such data has to traverse multiple networks through various secure and insecure nodes,
as well as gateways, which act as stepping stones. Thus, especially Offshoring service FDI
and/or its IT outsourcing service providers could be exposed to elevated level of security threats
in the first place resulting from weaknesses in cyber security regulation across the globe.
Sufficient legal instruments could be the underlying security measures and used as basis to
govern all aspects of cyber security and behavior of user community by establishing a variety of
security requirements. Lack of such an underpinning normative support via legislation means
that there are no legal instruments that could be invoked both in terms of substantive and
procedural sources of law. Lack of legal frames further means there is no strong backing for
enforcement in policy frameworks and security requirements. Legal and security policy
instruments could be used as deterring means besides their application in the event cyber security
breaches take place. This will benefit stakeholders by providing some assurance in protecting
proprietary information against internal and external threats. Regulation in cyberspace could also
help promote security awareness and back efforts to strengthen critical infrastructure through use
of a sustainable ICT technology. Effective regulations could lead to overall improvements in ICT
infrastructure, weaknesses of which could invite increased level of vulnerabilities within the
communication network/Internet backbones of a given forum, in particular. This will lead to a
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heightened level of risks for all cyberspace users including Offshoring business. When there is
no adequate protection for data and systems, Offshoring service FDI projects in IT and ITenabled services are less likely to take place depending on the investor’s awareness of such
weakness. That is because investors are much more likely to be financially impacted, inter alia,
by lack of security protections for their proprietary information such as digital intellectual
properties.

2.

Regulatory Responses to Cybercrime

Regulations aiming at cyberspace security are just one aspect of the possible strategic measures
available to law makers to ensure cyber security, but such regulations are in many ways very
effective in addressing issues faced by cyberspace communities. Cyberspace legislations in
general have deterring effects on unacceptable user behavior in cyberspace. For less serious acts
in cyberspace; such as, minor copyright infringements, civil actions can be pursued by
individuals or government agencies like the Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. usually
culminating in monetary fines or restitution. But most effective regulation in terms of again
deterrence and sanctioning user actions that are considered illegal is criminal law that can be
invoked for more serious acts. A criminal statute could not only define what is unlawful or a
criminal act on cyberspace, but also impose penalties for those defined criminal conducts. That is
to say there is the need to enforce criminal conducts on cyberspace with the help of substantive
and procedural laws in criminal jurisprudence, such as penal codes.
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Confronted with an unprecedented degree of expansion and frequency of illicit incidents in
cyberspace, many legal systems have done just that. National law makers in many parts of the
world have been constantly responding to threats on cyberspace with cyber security
regulations158. Surveys indicated that the focus has been on more potent, deterring measures,
responding with criminal legislation by making certain conducts they deem unlawful in
cyberspace punishable by imprisonment and serious fines159.

In the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 was the first federal legislation that
recognized certain computer based acts as a crime160. Other laws followed soon after including
those intended to protect children, financial assets, and intellectual properties, inter alia, whereas
a range of states in the U.S. have also adopted in some fashion a number of statues to outlaw
similar acts committed while using computers and on the Internet. The majority of the developed
countries have enacted laws to deal with cybercrimes while many developing countries have not
due to the fact that developing countries have many other pressing issues that they need to
confront first. In addition to dealing with poverty, many developing countries have other
traditional crimes that needed to be prioritized. On the other hand, it is not surprising to observe
such a huge gap between developed and developing countries in terms of regulating cybercrime.
Economically well off countries have ICT capabilities that allow cybercrime to thrive while
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For a list of countries with laws in craft or under development, see news on cybercrime legislation
around the world posted on: http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/Cybercrimelaw.html, (last visited June 11,
2011).
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International Responses to Cyber Crime, 37 (2001). But this is a good indication for a possible trend
between then and now that the number must have gone much higher, meaning more countries may have
by now either enacted their own legislations or ratified the European Convention on Cybercrime
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See GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER LAW: TEXT AND CASES 308 (2000).
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countries with primitive ICT infrastructure or no ICT161 almost lack relevance to cybercrime in
their priority list. Yet there are some other developing countries including very few in the SubSahara region162 that have either already managed or in process to enact cyberspace related laws
to fight against cybercrimes.
Regulators have been more engaged in sanctioning cyberspace conducts that they deem to be
criminal offenses through cybercrime legislation as compared to similar laws for other aspects of
cyber security. For many criminal jurisdictions, this was a lesson, where they have realized that
there is a need not only to accommodate unlawful conducts on cyberspace, but to shift away
from the traditional legal norms that outlaw corporal/physical environment based offenses to new
legal approach that should address intangible crimes/offenses in virtual environment163. Others
have realized that their traditional criminal statutes that are grounded in the territoriality
principles either did not apply at all or were insufficient to account for unlawful cyberspace
conducts. Hence, they faced the options of either amending existing penal codes or promulgating
new sets of legal norms to deal with the new cyberspace born criminal frontiers164. Some have

161
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cyber laws that tend to address both cybercrime and non cybercrime (e.g. e-commerce) aspects
of cyber security.165

National regulators have also encountered some normative challenges in promulgating laws for
cyber conducts. These challenges involve both trying to exhaustively cover cyber conducts that
can be elevated to criminal offense in the fastest changing technological environments, and
defining those conducts clearly to prevent unpredictable outcomes.
Though there are differences across legal systems as to what is considered a crime on cyberspace
and what the sanctions are, what is considered a cybercrime can generally be determined in two
ways166: (1) Cybercrime can be defined based on how computers are used to commit the act.
Since computers have to be used both as a tool and target by criminals to commit certain crimes,
crimes can be classified based on an action itself, e.g. transmitting illegal materials on a network,
or target of the action, e.g. a BotNet167 attack controlling a target system and causing financial
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For instance, “Indian cyber law is primarily designed to promote e‐commerce, but it has also
introduced key elements of cyber deterrence”; see Lan, et al, Global Cyber Deterrence: Views from
China, the U.S., Russia, India, and Norway, 9 (April 2010).

166
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damages or stealing important information, all by using the capabilities of computing
technology168.
(2) Criminal offenses in cyberspace can also be determined based on the protected target (e.g.
persons, businesses, government, tangible and intangible properties), where crimes are
committed against these targets while computers are used just to enable these crimes. Normally,
these are traditional crimes that can be committed without computers but yet computing
technology maybe used to either enhance the commission by increasing the chance of evading
prosecution or computers are used as alternate tools. In other words, these crimes are made more
sophisticated through the use or involvement of computer technology and the Internet169.

Nations may continue to attempt to address cyber security with regulations, but it does not take
long for any law maker to realize that cyber security needs a concerted effort at global stage.
Protecting digital assets, deterring criminal behaviors, and prosecuting offenders on cyberspace
turns out to be more than what a given nation-state could handle alone as most cybercrimes are
inherently transnational170. While that is the case, there are also wide differences among nations
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Such crimes can rightfully be defined as computer crimes since computers are both the tools and
targets.
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Hubbard, International Telecommunication Union , Harmonizing National Legal Approaches on
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in vulnerability171 as much as the gap in what is considered a criminalized conduct and protected
subject, as well as object. As a result, what may be protected or considered a criminal offence in
one country may not be treated as such in another. For instance, privacy is highly regarded and
protected by law in many Western societies, whereas the same may not be true in certain other
parts of the world. This can cause problems in the intergovernmental efforts that are underway to
harmonize cybercrime laws.172 These challenges coupled with the two most difficult problems
for law enforcement in cyberspace: identification and jurisdiction173 made collaboration and
cooperation both at supra-national and international levels an essential part of combating
cybercrimes. Cybercrimes not only thrive spreading across national boundaries very easily
utilizing the coalition of networks, the Internet, but the attack methodologies continue to evolve
making attribution and apprehension of perpetrators more and more difficult, especially for a
national law enforcement. Many types of cyber attacks are now automated or use open and
anonymously shared software products designed to make development and global spread of
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Some countries may be more vulnerable to cyberspace terrorism based on political or other
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viruses much easier174. This prompted some to call for regional and international cooperative
efforts which resulted in a few tangible results like multilateral agreements. The most notable
multilateral agreement in this regard to date that serves as a milestone for being a major step
towards a cybercrime convention at a global level is the Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime175. This convention may serve as both a model for similar attempts at international
and national levels, and as a major tool in combating cybercrime for the nations that ratify and
adhere to its scope, as well as willing to cooperate with others.

In the context of an offshoring FDI, it must be acknowledged that there is no doubt cybercrime
legislation at all levels will have some effects on investment decisions. Acknowledging criminal
offence with more potent cybercrime legislation has more deterring effects on criminals than
other cyber security regulations. Therefore, investors dealing with sensitive data belonging to
both customers and employees would definitely see cybercrime law as more encouraging and
lack of it as a threat since potential perpetrators won’t be discouraged by effective criminal
sanctions. Deterring cyber threats with legal means that outlaws certain behavior on cyberspace
will boost investors’ confidence, which in turn positively affects investment decisions as to
whether or not to do business in a certain region or forum. Thus, other things being equal, the
existence of protection with deterring legal norms will have correlative effects on a forum’s
ability to attract offshoring FDIs that rely on cyberspace.
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3.

Comparative View of Existing Laws (U.S. vs. EU): Anti-Offshoring

Implications

a)

Cyber Security Regulations in General (U.S. and EU)

The world community has a long way to go in terms of regulating cyberspace in an exhaustive
manner. Yet a number of countries, especially in Western Europe and North America have
promulgated various IT security related laws far more than any other part of the globe. In
particular, the EU and USA, among others, appear to have dealt more with cyber security related
regulations to curb cyberspace born threats than others. In the U.S., both state and federal
legislators have been engaged in addressing multiple aspect of cyber security. Several U.S.
states have laws dealing with cyberspace at a varying degree. Though there are variations in the
level of detail and focus areas, many states have their own privacy, health information, and data
security laws. States like Nevada, Oregon, and Massachusetts have laws that regulate
information security at a granular level.176 The federal government for its part has an array of
similar statutes177, which can be divided into two broad sets; namely, those covering government
data and information systems while being in some respects also applicable to private sector, and
those that deal with private sector information security. In regards to government information
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security, there are quite a few statutes: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, U.S.
Economic Espionage Act, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Privacy Act of 1974, and so on. U.S. Electronic Funds
Transfer Act, Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), GrammLeach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and
Copyright Act, just to name a few, are special regulations mostly applicable to private sector. All
of these laws require cyber security compliance one way or another. But whether or not they
suffice to address current and future threats in a comprehensive manner can be debated. That
because given the fact that these laws (both sets mentioned above) do not require private sector
to adhere to certain cyber security standards178, other than general mandates, it may not be
adequate to account for every aspect of security threats. EU on its part has enacted directives179
in the areas of data protection and electronic communication intended to be used as a model by
member countries. Although there are most likely variations in terms of coverage and depth of
cyber security issues, each individual country within EU also as its own sets of regulation in this
regard.

b)

Regulatory Protection for Personal Data and Privacy

178
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One notable area of cyber security regulation has been personal data and privacy within the EU
countries and the USA. Security for personal data and privacy in light of the digital age has seen
more attention, and as such has been a subject of hotly debated regulatory agenda within both the
EU and U.S. The U.S. for its part has enacted the GLBA and HIPAA targeting the private sector
- to address personal privacy issues within the healthcare and financial institutions. GLBA covers
protection of customer data used by financial firms. Perhaps the most important aspect of this
regulation is that it requires development of information security program and periodic
assessment of risks to account for the protection of customer data. HPPA, on the other hand, will
protect medical records of individuals. It is more stringent than GLBA in that it not only requires
the implementation of medical data protection mechanisms based on best practice, but it also
requires similar protection by organizations, which share patient information. One of the most
visible legislations on the EU side is the Data Protection Directive that, in the meantime, has
been vetted through and implemented by all 27 member countries180. This legislation has historic
roots in Germany where Europe’s first data protection law was enacted by the German federal
state of Hessen in 1970s181, which was later redefined by the German constitutional court182. The
refined version as interpreted by the German court was later adopted throughout Europe
including the enactment of the data protection directive by the EU183. Meanwhile, the EU’s
model act has emerged as more stringent in terms of personal data protection requirements
reflecting EU’s more protectionist approach compared to the more business friendly privacy laws
of the U.S. Only HIPAA on the U.S. side comes a bit close to the EU’s data protection laws in
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terms of third party protection requirements. HIPAA requires the same level of protection by
organizations, which share patient’s medical records, albeit it does not require patient’s
express/implied permission of data sharing with business associates (doctors, laboratories, etc) as
long as such sharing is for treatment, billing, and/or operations. HIPAA does seem to allow such
limited sharing regardless of the location patient data is shared or used. This means, unlike the
data privacy law of the EU, HIPAA doesn’t impose restrictions on sensitive data like patient
record to be shared with external or foreign entities as long as these entities adhere to privacy
rules, or implement standard data protection mechanisms. In other words, HIPAA doesn’t make
the requirements more stringent by adding, for instance a requirement for an express consent by
the patient unlike the E.U. law.

The EU’s directive has been criticized for being non-conforming with the information age
technology, inter alia, where it tends to almost freeze in time the technological advances of the
information age, which aims to make conveyance of data faster, easier, and cheaper184. It cannot
fully address the question of how ‘express consent’ should take place in transactions involving
the Internet, email, telephone, where messages containing protectable data may hub from node to
node in some cases including nodes (servers, networks, etc) outside the EU purview. It is nearly
impossible to control Internet based data transfer from being relayed through uncontrolled
territory or without involving “privacy invading”185 technology features. Of course EU
governments conveniently made exceptions for themselves under these restrictions. So too are
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some other non-profit, churches, etc exempt from this law as these organizations are allowed to
keep information of their members186. Therefore, since governments and other exempted
organizations are allowed to accumulate personal data and that continuously, there is no bullet
proof protection even under this directive. Meaning personal data can still be exposed to external
threats from locations of these entities depending on how such data is stored or protected. And
privacy is still subject to intrusions through government powers regardless since nothing, not
even this regulation stops government control and abuse of privacy.

Meanwhile, the protectionist nature of the EU’s directive is reflected in the fact that it actually
requires non-EU countries to provide equivalent protection when protected data is transferred
from an EU country to non-EU destinations. There seems to be a clear implication here, i.e. too
consumer friendly norms cannot at the same time be business friendly. Consequently, consumers
will benefit at the cost of business/investment promotion while this legislation surely has a
disincentive effect on foreign investors, especially on organizations dealing with active crossborder transactions. The impact is two-folds. First, Offshoring companies from countries with
better data protection laws will suffer less but have to abide by added, scrutinized processes/steps
for obtaining express customer permission. So countries like the USA have sought to alleviate
this burden for the benefit of their corporate citizens with some harmonizing measures such as
‘Safe Harbor’ provisions, a data safety framework. The Federal Trade Commission and the
European Union, as well as Switzerland have agreed upon provisions to bridge the differences

186

Id.
87

among the privacy and data protection laws187, in which eligible U.S. companies register and
self-certify. Secondly, there are those potential Offshoring companies, which are most likely
marginalized as they may be automatically excluded because they do not have or cannot rely on
such equivalent protection provided by their country of origin. Not every country has such
regulation or any type of enforceable policy (though highly unlikely without regulatory backing)
in place.
There is inevitably, a wide-ranging gab in definitions and conceptual understanding of privacy as
well in privacy laws even within those that implement E.U. regulations. The same is true for both
sides of the Atlantic (EU and U.S.) resulting in far reaching implications and sometimes
inevitably lengthy, as well as costly litigations.

Besides, EU has enacted another directive in the area of data protection as well. This directive,
known as the Data Retention Directive, has been in effect since 2005 with the aim to help
counter terrorism. It requires electronic data retention for a period of time to enable electronic
discovery whenever a criminal investigation becomes necessary.
The need for coordinated investigative efforts of international crimes, which include cybercrime
and cyber terrorism, had led to this directive. The wave of perceived terrorist threats on
cyberspace, inter alia, often necessitates restrictions on basic human rights. Such restrictions are
also justified by the so called ‘escape clauses’ under international human rights’ treaties, where
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states are basically allowed to restrict fundamental human rights if circumstances warrant such
an action188. Nevertheless, there is a tension between fundamental human rights and more
generous privacy protection norms under Art 8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
on the one hand and the data retention directive for purposes of criminal investigation on the
other. The main challenge is the ability to strike a balance between the need to limit data
retention, as well as access to retained data in the interest of basic human rights, specifically
privacy, and investigative cooperation. Member states are urged to incorporate the
proportionality principle at a minimum when implementing this directive and enforcing it189.
All in all, the advent of this directive for EU implies a departure from the EU’s own position of
privacy protectionism established under its more consumer friendly Data Protection Directive of
2002.
It is not a surprise; however, that this directive has encountered some protests in its
implementation. It has seen a fierce resistance from sources of human rights - as expected, and
national courts. Multiple court rulings in cases involving email and telephone communications
pretty much held that many aspects of electronic and telephone communications constitute
privacy and are protected under the ECHR, article 8, thereby implying that the directive may
violate the fundamental rights of privacy190. The implementation of this directive turned out to
face more scrutiny by national constitutional courts as both the legality and implementation of
the directive come under courts’ review. Meanwhile the German Federal Court in particular has
struck down an act intended to transpose the directive as unconstitutional. The court found that
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the transposition law would violate the privacy of communication provided by the German basic
law (Grundgesetz)191.

4.

Challenges of Global Cyberspace and Internet Governance
a)

The Regulatory Dilemma: Ubiquitous Presence of Cyberspace

Across Fragmented Jurisdictions

A recent UN report on the information and telecommunication recognized cyber security as one
of the most serious challenges in the 21st century192. According to this report, cyber security
could undermine both national and international security. The nature of cyberspace is both global
and national at the same time. It is global in a sense that it is ubiquitous and available
everywhere with no geographical limits because it rides on global network of ICTs. It cannot be
fully contained within national borders in order for national law makers to be able successfully
and reasonably regulate it. Yet, it also has national characteristics since its risk management falls
for the most part under the responsibility of an organization both from private and public sectors
within each country. The Nation-States also control the physical infrastructure of ICT within
their borders thereby being responsible for not only the make or break of such infrastructure, but
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for regulating it. The global ICT is susceptible to disruption by all sorts of actors, who have a
variety of motives. For instance, there is increased reporting for the fact that states are using
ICTs as instruments of warfare and intelligence193. And although a UN report suggested that
there was no indication of terrorist attempts as of July 2010, ICTs remain a viable target for
terrorist attacks194. There is no question that given the versatility of motives and technical tools,
there is always the potential for all kinds of cybercrime on cyberspace. Cyberspace, if not
adequately regulated from both national and international ends, will continue to be a breeding
ground for criminals, who will flourish and wreak havoc with the proper usage of cyberspace by
legit users (both organizational and individual users).
Thus, on the one hand, there is the need to identify and prosecute cyber criminals internationally
with whatever legal norm applicable across borders, while, on the other hand, there is the need
for individual nations to contain and control criminal activities within their borders with
appropriate regulations. However, it is fair to say that while national legal regimes have the
responsibility to account for pervasive cyber activities that are part of the realm of cyberspace
but taking place within their national territory, such regulatory containment maybe nearly
impossible under circumstances. National regulations could help design security requirements
that are more effective to deter and control cyber security breaches at least within the national
jurisdiction. Many jurisdictions have attempted, although still in a limited scope, to just do that.
But it turned out cyberspace is not an easy task for national regulators as the realm of cyberspace
goes beyond national borders. As stated above, all interactions with global cyberspace in a given
jurisdiction cannot be fully covered normatively by national regulations. This is due not only to
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the fact that technology changes much more rapidly than a keep up with regulation, but parts of
such interactions with cyberspace becomes none-national almost requiring new legal regime and
may not be governed by national laws. And even if regulations attempt to keep up with the need
to normatively cover ever changing technological advances, their enforceability becomes
questionable due to the cross-border nature of cyberspace and lack of international cooperation.
The global nature of cyberspace allowed the Internet not to be based on or controlled by any
single legal system. The lack of Internet governance coupled with the global nature of
cyberspace thus led to challenges with attribution for cyber attacks, as well as an influx of
jurisdictional questions for cases emanating from cyberspace. Therefore, no single national legal
system alone is currently capable of addressing all issues involving the Internet195 and
cyberspace. Neither does any other source, regional or international legal regime, currently
provide a self-contained and adequate legal regime to solve cyber security issues.

b)

Lack of Standards in Cyber Security Policy and Regulation

Existing legal frameworks affecting cyberspace generally dictate the nature of cyber security
policies and standards. In other words, security standards tend to reflect applicable policies just
as policies reflect governing regulatory environments. However, the global diversity in
regulations can easily be a good source of stark variances in policy frameworks, which in turn
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affect the development and content of cyber security standards. It is generally true that security
policies can impact standards as policies proscribe security compliance norms and user
behaviors. But new policies can also take advantage of more established standards to define
better and more effective policy statements. Security standards can be inherited from best
practices while such best practices may be influenced by other sources. Such sources more
established nations and intra- or international organizations, all of which are subject to different
regulatory and policy environments. However, such inheritance will, in turn, hinge on existing
legal and policy statements, in which case the policies and legal norms may or may not disallow
the inheritance. Governments often prefer to come up with their own standards, rather than
importing one from another country196 and it is not totally unusual that some jurisdictions may
disallow all or parts of even commonly used standards. So if for whatever reason no adoption of
external standards is allowed (rare but can happen) or no legal or policy based cyber security
regime exists, then, the only option is establishing an ad hoc but non-binding standard internally,
i.e. at an organization level. With no legal or policy framework mandate, essentially there won’t
be enforceable policy/regulation requirements, hence much weaker adherence to security and
therefore, weak or total lack of protection of sensitive information in a particular national
jurisdiction. Meaning, even if there are proactive organizations that may shop for commonly
used standards and best practices outside and implement them, not everyone will be doing the
same because there is no mandate to do so. Thus, those who are not willing to do more for the
security posture of their systems or network enclaves, or unaware of the need to do so will still
be the weakest link in the scheme of things. This weakness eventually will cross the national
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boundary and spill over to the realm of cyberspace thereby affecting more participants on the
global cyberspace.

Furthermore, not every legislator has similar concerns or priorities when it comes to cyberspace.
And not every legal regime is on the same page when it comes to understanding the notion of
cyber security or concepts behind what needs to be protected from whom, and how. For instance,
privacy could mean just personal privacy or both personal data and privacy depending on how it
is understood or interpreted in a given forum. Such understanding may be impacted by sociocultural pre-disposition of a society. Personal privacy may not be given as much weight as some
other information subjects and objects in one culture and vice versa in another. Or for that matter
cyber security as a whole may not be as important for one society as it could be for another, and
so on. This discrepancy creates uncertainty for businesses and paves the way for restrictions in
global economic activities197. Some legal systems may be far behind in catching up with
technology born legal concerns to be able to regulate unwanted cyberspace phenomena such as
cybercrimes while others are ahead but could not account for events taking place beyond their
territories. Ultimately, all these factors contribute to non-standard approaches in legal and policy
frameworks. And a report from the UN on the status of ICT indicated that the “varying degrees
of ICT capacity and security among different States increases the vulnerability of the global
network”198. The same report confirmed the fact that variations in national laws and security
practices may hamper efforts that may be underway to achieve a secure and resilient cyberspace.
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There are efforts under way from the stand point of international organizations to boost cyber
security awareness among nations with appropriate standards and common practices, as well as
to

help

harmonize

disparities

in

cyber

security.

For

instance,

the

International

Telecommunication Union – Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) has put
together cyber security recommendations/standards that can be adhered to or implemented by
member nations199. Many countries have not implemented such standards either because of the
weakness in their ICT level of complexity or because they are behind in legal and policy
frameworks addressing cyber security while such lag can also be attributed to lack of political
will by governments.
In the end cyberspace remains less secure and unreliable thanks to these variances, inter alia.
Finally, just as there are uncertainty and disparity in terms of developing, applying, or adhering
to certain legal and policy standards to help establish a resilient cyber security across national
boundaries, there is uncertainty among businesses to engage in investment activities at offshore
locations. Clearly, lack of forum legal and policy frameworks that are supposed to buttress
acceptable cyber security practices in a given forum can negatively impact business environment
for IT related undertakings. So do weaker regulatory and inefficient policy provisions that do not
take into account global market demands for IT offshoring in creating competitive macroeconomic conditions in the forum have negative effects on offshoring FDI.
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B.

Adverse Effects of Policy and Legal Frameworks on Offshore Service FDI
1.

Governmental Control over Offshoring and Consequences
a)

Conflict Between Host Cyber Security Laws and Investment

Incentives

i.

Sarbanes-Oxley Regulation in the U.S.

Some regulations that are supposed to address some other business aspects of the corporate
world sometimes end up producing unwanted results with regard to the same entities that are
subject to such laws or even others. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) appears to be one
such law. The SOX law was enacted with the intention that it fixes the internal control flaws
causing inaccurate corporate financial reporting. Internal control flaws would allow corporations
to produce overstated or understated financial data. This can be done with the aim to either
overstate profits thereby causing a bubble in company shares or understate profits to increase
non-taxable net earnings, hence the SOX act is meant to prevent corporations from cooking the
books. Based on the lessons learned from corporate scandals200, this regulation targets the
protection of share holders since inaccurate financial reporting with sometimes false or
exaggerated earnings lead to more investments (more sales in stocks), which in turn could result
in loss of investment assets for investors when the bubble in stock bursts. This is because once
the deficiency is detected, investors panic, which more often results in a stock sell-off. An
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inevitable outcome would be a market crash, i.e. stocks of the firm in question plunge with the
consequence that stock holders lose all or most of their investment stakes.

Before delving into the perceived impact of the regulation, Sections 404 and 302 of the Act in
particular, on FDI, it is important to look into its effects on non-FDI investments that have been
discussed by many in the legal as well as business literature201. Meanwhile, it is also important to
note that FDI, particularly Offshoring service FDI, as defined initially, ordinarily occurs when an
entity from one country goes offshore to do business in the form of capital investment to provide
services with its physical presence in another country. Typically, such an engagement involves
an active management of the FDI business process in the foreign destination. Active involvement
in the management structure of the business distinguishes an FDI from an indirect foreign
investment, notably, portfolio investment. Meanwhile, the latter is still mistakenly categorized as
FDI as well, when a multinational corporation (MNC) buys over 10% shares of an enterprise in a
foreign country202. However, such share ownership per se should not constitute an FDI unless
there is a significant shift in management structure as well for the benefit of the MNC, i.e. the
MNC must control the enterprise’s management to consider its 10% or more share itself as an
FDI.
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This distinction is necessary at this point with regard to the SOX legislation because from the
U.S. point of view this regulation may have had an adverse effect on both overall business
undertakings by national firms and portfolio/FDI engagements by foreign firms in the U.S. But
in terms of studies related to SOX currently available, neither FDI nor portfolio investment
related findings could be relied upon compared to an overwhelming study sources related to the
U.S. stock market listings by foreign firms. That is, when it comes to potential impact of section
404 on foreign investors, recent studies are more geared to stock market listings of foreign firms
and not to FDI oriented undertakings per se in the U.S. Hence, studies assessing SOX impact as
related to the exchange market listings are widely available compared to such studies associated
with SOX impact on FDI in the U.S. However, these sources and their findings can equally be
indicative of the overall corporate reactions occurred after this legislation came into effect which
could also be analogized with respect to FDI elasticity. Such observations suggest that SOX rules
have been seen to negatively impact U.S. portfolio listings by foreign firms. Studies targeting
corporate behavior associated with the U.S. exchange market pre- and post SOX regulation
indicated that this Act increased costs associated with the expected reporting and potential legal,
as well as regulatory compliances of portfolio listings by publicly traded companies203. An
exception to this tendency was evidenced, as the same study showed204, in the fact that some
‘quality’ corporations actually preferred credibility despite subjecting themselves to stricter
forum rules to countries with weaker legal frameworks and continue to list or did so anew after
such a stricter regulation. Despite the fact that few quality firms sought reliable legal platforms
and chose the U.S. exchange market even compared to competing forums but based on net
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benefit, it has been observed that the U.S. listing after the Act has declined overtime. This
finding suggests that the SOX Act has an overall negative impact on the U.S. exchange listing
(indirect investments) by foreign firms.

The same conclusion could be drawn with regard to foreign publicly traded firms having FDI
presence in the U.S., where these firms too may have been equally impacted with regulatory
compliance effects of the SOX act. Similar observation could lead to an analogy in a sense that
the stricter compliance requirements and cost generating factors stemming from this legislation,
which negatively affected the non-FDI investments may also impact FDI in the U.S. The
possible argument for this position can be drawn based on the applicability of SOX. Sections 302
and 404 generally apply to all publicly traded corporations within the U.S. which are subject to
SEC reporting requirements205. The main components of SOX requirements are disclosure
controls under sections 302 and 404, and assessment and disclosure of internal controls over
financial statements. From the auditing point of view, SOX changed the landscape of audit
assertion and reporting in two ways thereby helping drive audit cost much higher206. First, SOX
requires that the reporting firm’s management certifies its financial report thereby assuming the
responsibility for the validity and effectiveness of the internal controls in place to support the
accounting records and financial reports. This aspect of the regulation actually added another
scare for corporate CEOs or CFOs, or both as they now can be held accountable for any financial
misstatements caused by deficiencies in internal controls which they certify based on their
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assertion (also known as ‘in control statements’207) that they have evaluated the effectiveness of
those controls–. This may increase the potential for liability of corporate leaders and as such
could be another impediment factor for foreign Companies. Secondly, section 404 requires an
auditor of the financial report to express an opinion on the management’s evaluation of the
effectiveness of the internal controls. The central compliance factor of section 404 requirement is
the certification of the effectiveness of the internal controls. Both management and auditors want
to make sure internal controls are not only in place but effective, i.e. working as they are
supposed to in order to mitigate or eliminate financial reporting frauds.
Internal controls involve both computer and non-computer based safeguards. IT security plays
role with respect to computer based controls and that is where IT security and its audit comes in.
Security controls if correctly implemented in a financial system ensure, inter alia, that there is
accountability through traceability and a separation of duties, which is often an issue with
financial transactions. These controls also ensure that financial data at rest or in transit is secure.
IT security audits under SOX looks into the existence and effectiveness of security controls
within systems, mostly financial systems, that directly or indirectly process, store, and transmit
financial data208. Auditors, thus, spend lots of time to define business process, identify system
components, as well as controls in place or stated for audit, and test those controls for
effectiveness. The outcome of such scrutiny is what the auditors will sign off on and also what
the CEO and CFO may rely on to avoid liability and comply with the essence of the SOX
regulation despite the huge cost of the audit exercise.
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Both sections 302 and 404 requirements apply to public companies, such as multinationals,
which have a U.S. presence also in the form of an Offshoring service FDI. They are equally
subjected to the internal control evaluation and disclosure of material weaknesses, among others,
under this regulation. The cost of compliance with the Internal Control Disclosure (ICD)
procedure under section 404, in particular, is high for large Offshoring service FDI firms in the
U.S. as well. Therefore, the overall implication and possible conclusion that can be drawn from
this scenario is that Offshoring service FDI too may be discouraged by the SOX regulation as the
cost of compliance weighs more than the benefit of investing and doing business. Unlike non
FDI multinationals in the U.S., which are only involved in stock market listings; however,
foreign multinational FDI investors may offset SOX impacts with other benefits. That means
even though ICD requirements are said to have negative impacts in terms of cost of compliance,
foreign direct investors in the U.S. have other advantages over those counterparts that are just
stock-market listed. These advantages could turn out to set those with FDI presence in the U.S.
apart from non FDI multinationals in terms of net benefits. One of such benefits as some argued
would come from the linkage between trade and investment, which results in an increase in
positive trade balance for foreign multinationals due to potentially high affiliate sales in the U.S.
market209. Generally, foreign multinational direct investors utilize the foreign affiliates as a
platform for sales of service products locally and in the form of exports, but these service
products may come from either local production facility (e.g. computer programming center in
the forum) or from their home or other international subsidiary locations. It is suggested that
depending on market forces (potentials) and benefits, foreign parent companies may use the U.S.

209

See Catherine L. Mann, Offshore Outsourcing and the Globalization of U.S. Services: Why Now, How
Important, and What Policy Implications? - In the United States and World Economy, at 291 (undated).
101

market more for tapping into domestic market while cutting back on export options210. In other
words, they would use the host forum market for selling both locally produced and imported
service products or intermediate imports. This would allow the parent investor to enable and
promote affiliate sales locally more so than looking into options for exporting service products
from the host location to other countries. Multinationals generally tend to take advantage of host
market and increase sales if the market is attractive enough and profitable. In doing so, for the
U.S. forum, multinationals increase their net benefits thereby offsetting costs caused by
regulatory requirements like SOX and other overhead cost-factors. Besides, foreign multinational
direct investors in the U.S. are said to add less value in terms of FDI value as they have a high
share of affiliate sales and intra-firm trade in the U.S. compared to their U.S. counterparts
elsewhere211. Hence, such an increased use of investment platforms solely for purposes of
domestic sales has an added side effect from the macro-economic stand point. By way of an
intra-firm trade between a parent and an affiliate, the parent eludes an export oriented FDI
presence, which of course many developing countries hope for and expect from FDIs in their
forums in an attempt to often stabilize trade deficits. In the case of the U.S. too, thus, such FDI
ends up contributing little or none to export market with ultimate negative implications for the
balance of trade, and consequently for the overall U.S. macro-economy as well. Therefore, while
there is a negative overall impact of SOX on all publicly traded firms with foreign origin, some
foreign FDI investors on the U.S. soil tend to offset the cost of the SOX compliance with the
potentially huge benefit of tapping into domestic market by strategically aligning their U.S.
engagement with market oriented FDI.
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ii.

Privacy Regulations and Cost of Compliance (U.S. vs. EU)

The EU’s data protection model law has been criticized for being too stringent when it comes to
cross-border personal data processing by transnational entities. The personal data protection
requirements as enacted may reflect the EU’s more consumer friendly approach, but not so for
businesses compared to the privacy laws of the U.S. In addition to wide-ranging gaps in
conceptual understanding of privacy, both sides have rules that appear to favor either consumer
or businesses. The U.S. privacy regulations are said to be business friendly while these
regulations appear to leave consumers to some extent in a limbo. There are essentially more
rooms left for businesses in the U.S. when it comes to processing and transferring of personal
data including PII. Hence online behavioral advertisers and most recently even phone companies
have started to vacuum up consumers’ sensitive information with no restriction and sell this data
for huge profits212. The U.S. privacy laws also seem to have left courts struggle with the problem
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of determining harm when privacy breach is claimed. Several court rulings213 support this
tendency suggesting that businesses can own personal information belonging to data subjects and
transfer or sell the same to third parties, and yet could not be held accountable as long as there is
no visible damage, harm, or humiliation. In Smith v. Chase Manhattan Bank214, where the bank
was sued in a class action for selling customer data to third parties, for instance, the court was
looking for actual damage in the person of the claimant, instead of the security breach itself or
security interest of the plaintiffs. The court stated that such disclosure only affected
confidentiality or breach of such. And confidentiality does not necessarily involve any emotional
distress, instead according to the court it could only result in loss of trust. As a result, the court
rejected the claim since the plaintiffs could not prove the actual damage or personal injuries in
any one of the class action members.
This persuaded some to suggest, inter alia, that non-regulatory course of action like recognizing
personal data as private property by the judiciary may account for such confusion by eventually
contributing to inadequate protection of consumer privacy215. To avoid such derailment of the
possibility for legitimate injunction, instead, there should be regulatory means by which victims
are allowed to seek remedy through civil litigation or tort. In the end; however, neither nonregulatory nor self-regulatory measures (proposed by other commentators216) are entirely
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persuasive or without some drawbacks since these alternatives are costly, time consuming, and
could lead to conflicting standards for both consumers and businesses.

The EU’s data directive, on the other hand, provides consumers with more protection while
arguably hurting business community. From the compliance point of view, this has far reaching
implications, especially for business entities dealing with active cross-border transactions.
In particular, the data protection directive imposes restrictions on data processing and transfer
thereby granting data subjects more protections at the cost of, especially business to business
transactions217. The processing restriction has two implications at a minimum. Offshoring
companies are not free in handling their customer personal data, i.e. they are required to perform
extra precaution including obtaining explicit permissions from the subject before doing anything
with such data. Secondly, transfer to any other destination outside the EU will depend on the
destination’s adherence to the EU’s strict protection standards and thus such destinations will
undergo further scrutiny. This will result in some offshoring firms being automatically excluded
as they may not have equivalent regulations within their home countries. Hence, they cannot
comply with the directive since they cannot rely on anything to prove that the data they want to
process/transfer will be safe at destination. Many view this directive as a threat to business
transactions since firms regularly transfer personal data around the globe in the normal course of
their business transactions and such transfer often in the areas of trade, clinical research, and
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routine human resource management is inevitable218. Such routine business dealings are
underpinned by the exchange of personal information. Therefore, the inability to use such
information will arguably severely undermine offshore transactions. All of this can be a
challenge for offshore businesses in terms of time and resources when attempting to process and
transfer customer data to a destination outside the EU. Most importantly, the fact that businesses
are subject to such stringent scrutiny with respect to the requirement to follow added steps for
data transfer leads to more transactional costs. The overall implication is that offshoring entities
have less of an incentive to do business under such regulation, especially when doing so would
otherwise affect their bottom line, which is profit. Global market place demands competitive
advantages and companies grappling with such stringent requirements could easily see their
competitiveness being eroded. Thus, this directive remains to be one of the EU’s regulations that
tend to deter offshoring rather than promote doing business in Europe. U.S. business community
has resorted to another approach in an effort to ease this burden, which is essentially applying an
additional step and voluntarily undergoing a certification process to achieve ‘adequacy’ status for
data transfer. This process has come to be known as ‘Safe Harbor certification’ which is
designed to facilitate the transfer of personal information to the U.S. 219, while providing some
assurance to an extent possible to European parties involved.
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On the U.S. side, the fact that there are multiple body of rules and regulations may have led
under circumstances to ‘over compliance’ through over investment in security mechanisms, as
some have argued220. This may be true particularly in the healthcare field and could also be the
case in privacy sphere in general. As stated earlier, both states and federal government have
enacted privacy laws to protect personal privacy in general and health information, in particular.
Many healthcare providers have sought to protect themselves from lawsuits by requiring
permissions from patients for every aspect of treatments. For instance, they require patients to
explicitly allow disclosure of personal health information for treatment, billing, and health care
operations. This has been generally seen as an attempt to manage risks posed by possible
lawsuits for not abiding by any of those clear and ambiguous laws that may apply to them one
way or another. This can drive administrative cost for such providers high and ultimately
increase the overhead for this business sector. This could also be true for other business sectors
such as banks which have to also comply with privacy laws at multiple levels, some of which are
vague but could trigger unexpected liability or fines for non-compliance221. The Graham-LeachBliley Act of 1999 is the latest privacy regulation within the U.S. which imposes requirements
on business entities dealing with personal and credit data of individuals. It requires, inter alia,
that each financial institution complies with the following three privacy rules while transacting
with customers: namely, a) notification of customers about its privacy policy, b) full disclosure
of circumstances under which customer data will be shared with third parties, and c) providing
customers with an option to allow or not to allow such disclosure and sharing of data. This
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regulation gives the Federal Trade Commission the authority to police and enforce this law.
Banks and other businesses that need to account for the personal privacy and data protection
under the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act may be more scared of these rules, as well as regulations,
and try to implement stringent compliance process. This will make them overly cautious, where
they may end up spending more money in IT security. Thus efforts to comply with privacy rules
could also drive cost of doing business in the U.S. for those involved. Seen from a different
angle, an offshore investor; such as, a foreign healthcare service provider doing business in the
U.S. would have to think twice before engaging in any business undertaking due to such added
costs and may even be scared away. If potential investors are discouraged due to costs of such
legal compliance, as well as fear of liabilities derived from these rules, it means that such
regulations are actually negatively affecting both home country business and Offshoring. Yet
when it comes to foreign investors in the U.S. one can hardly postulate the argument that these
laws were enacted with promotion of inward Offshoring service FDI in mind in the first place.
But the implication is clear, i.e. some of these regulations can nevertheless act as counter
incentive measures regardless of any intentions inherent in enacting these legislations or for that
matter without regard to existence of any efforts to promote FDI in the U.S.

b)

Extraterritorial Implications of National Cyber Laws and their

Effects on Offshoring

108

Some national laws may find an extraterritorial de jure and de facto application, while this is
especially true in the digital age where cyberspace allows actors and victims, as well as actions
and consequences to be spread around the globe. Laws enacted to regulate certain conducts or
aspects of cyberspace related transactions nationally may have global implications. The same is
true with enforcing judgments in so far as a foreign subject/defendant is concerned, i.e. judicial
judgments entered nationally but seeking international recognition and enforcement can have
transnational impacts as well. Thus extraterritorial implication of law can be observed in terms of
enacted legal norms applicable to non-residents and non-national entities, and judicial
jurisdiction, where judicial judgments tend to contain res judicata effects across-borders. Some
norms while intended to regulate conduct of persons inside their national borders may have an
impact outside national borders, and vice versa. Some laws have the objective to directly address
conducts by a foreign person (juridical or natural persons).

The United States and other

countries have laws with similar effects. With respect to the U.S., specifically, there are not only
laws intended for domestic subjects yet have extraterritorial impacts, but laws enacted with
foreign subjects in mind entirely and so directly applicable to non residents. In fact, with regard
to many cyberspace events, the U.S. is said to unilaterally approach the issues by imposing
hegemonic sanctions across cyberspace222. The U.S. laws, which may or may not have impacts
on cyberspace, but directly impact foreign entities/individuals include the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, Alien Tort Claims Act, the Export Administration Act, and the International Trade
in Arms Regulations. All of these implied or purely extraterritorial laws have relevance in terms
of applicability to Offshoring service FDI for U.S. originated investors abroad.
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See Christoph Engel, The Role of Law in the Governance of the Internet Preprints aus der MaxPlanck-Projektgruppe: Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter (The Law of Public Properties), Bonn, at 13
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These and other not purely extraterritorial laws tend to expand U.S. courts’ extraterritorial
jurisdiction with a lasting implication for parties involved in cross-border legal disputes
including investors and the courts themselves. The U.S. is generally known for its extraterritorial
legislation, but the fact that courts also tend to extend their jurisdiction beyond the U.S. territory
in turn appears to inundate their dockets with potential cases coming from around the globe.
The Supreme Court case223 related to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act
exemplifies this. The U.S. Federal Circuit Court had adopted the most frequently used approach
known as ‘conducts and effects’ test, which has not only been inconsistently applied, but
provided wrong impressions as far as the extent of jurisdiction (in personam and subject matter)
to which Section 10(b) applies with regard to cases from around the world. This test may have
given a false impression to the Australian plaintiffs in the above Supreme Court case involving
Australian parties as well. While part of the motivation on the plaintiffs’ side of the case like
this, which is similar to the so called ‘foreign cubed’224 cases, could be attributed to lack of class
action laws for securities in non-U.S. jurisdictions, the possibility for higher judgments or
settlements too is said to encourage forum shoppers.
In the above case, the Australian plaintiffs brought suit against an Australian defendant for
allegedly fraudulent securities transactions that took place in Australia, pretty much with no
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Morrison v. National Australia Bank, where the plaintiffs had purchased shares of National Australia
Bank (NAB) in Australian securities markets, but sued NAB in federal court in New York under Section
10(b) alleging, inter alia, that NAB had misrepresented to shareholders its exposure to bad mortgages in
a Florida subsidiary. See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities
Law – Will the U.S. become the Default Jurisdiction for European Securities Litigation? 6 (August 24,
2010). Also available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664809, (last visited January 12,
2012).
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connection whatsoever with the U.S. forum jurisdiction other than the alleged U.S. participant,
the Florida subsidiary of the defendant. However, the subsidiary’s participation did not pass the
conducts and effects test because of the fact that buying and selling of the securities took place
outside the U.S. When the history of this act was later analyzed, it was determined that the entire
case fell outside the scope of the Act. A group of lawyers and legal scholars later did an amicus
curiae225 intervention requesting the Supreme Court, which ended up looking at the case, to
narrowly interpret the conducts and effects test and struck down the entire case. The argument
for dismissing this case and preventing the court system from being flooded by cases from
around the world was based on the historical analysis of the intent of the legislation itself by the
Congress, which arguably never wanted to expand the applicability of this law226.

The question with regard to the impact of such extraterritorial expansion of the home country
legal systems on Offshoring service FDI can better be addressed by looking at specific
legislations. Generally laws governing cyberspace tend to be exported to other jurisdictions for
practical reasons. That is to say, if the protection is afforded by national law but the same is
lacking elsewhere, and the occurrence of security breach or damage takes place elsewhere in the
world, the protecting home country legal norms need to come to the victim’s rescue. Such
extraterritorial expansion may especially be necessary and reasonable as long as there are no
legal and jurisdictional conflicts, and no other legal protection mechanisms exist.

225
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Id. at 3.
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From both the U.S. and EU perspective, there are cyberspace laws not necessarily geared
towards just extraterritorial entities, but towards both residents and non-residents, thereby being
good candidates for export and application abroad by default. And such application occurs
regardless of the potential for tension between national (U.S. or EU) and foreign laws227
applicable to cyberspace.
A good example is the EU’s data protection law that not only requires implementation of similar
data protection mechanisms for EU subjects pretty much anywhere around the world, but also
indirectly ends up being applied extraterritorially absent equally strong legal protection228.
Another important legal environment affecting digital world across cyberspace is intellectual
property right, copyright law in particular, which is ‘strictly’229 territorial in nature but yet may
have extraterritorial effects. In the digital world, though copyright laws regulate protected digital
assets within national boundaries, such protection still transcends geographical boundaries due to
the nature of cyberspace per se.

Extraterritorial application, as well as interpretation of national copyrights laws, any other laws
for that matter, may vary by country. While this will depend on normative variations of national
legislations, there is also the possibility that more markedly contrasting approaches are followed
by judiciary of various countries. An almost classical case of cyberspace based copyrights

227
Such tension exists usually due to legislative jurisdictions also known as jurisdiction to prescribe; see
Denis T. Rice, Jurisdiction and e-Commerce Disputes in the U.S. and EU, Presentation at the Annual
Meeting of the California Bar, at 2 (2002).
228
In fact, the EU’s data law will apply anytime personal data of EU citizens is processed and that is
almost always the case where the Internet is involved. See Kuner, supra note 96, at 4.
229
Graeme W. Austin, Importing Kazaa ‐ Exporting Grokster, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No.
06‐08, at 586 (April 2006).
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infringement that exemplifies such variance is the peer to peer (P2P) products issue resulting in
two extremes with respect to liability by at least two court systems: the new inducement doctrine
within the U.S. judiciary and an elaborate use of ‘authorization’ concept by the Australian
court230. Both approaches have been discussed in cases, MGM vs. Grokster231 (U.S. Supreme
Court) and, Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Shaman License Holdings Ltd., (P2P provider)
by Federal Court of Australia)232, inter alia. Although it seems more plausible and fair for
enablers like Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and search engines, when courts closely examine
the ‘authorization’ concept similar to what is specifically laid out by the Australian legislator,
P2P providers would find this approach harsh as courts often find that P2P providers should be
able to monitor file-sharing, lack of which could automatically be considered an authorization for
infringement233. And the authorization test itself could be interpreted broadly thereby impacting
defendants as it was the case in University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse, where the
Australian Federal court stated that authorization did not need to be express or actively
pursued234. While, on the other hand, copyright owners may find the inducement approach more
beneficial since the approach conveniently lets the owners rely on and apply their home country
law, they would soon realize how difficult it is to enforce liabilities based on this indirect
liability theory, especially when the infringement occurs not only in one forum abroad, but in
multiple foreign jurisdictions.
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Id. at 581.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); see also Austin, id. at
577.
232
See Austin, id, at 578.
233
It is technically possible for P2P providers like Kazza to discriminate between licensed/un-licensed
and copyrighted materials that could be shared by their users. And ignoring this capability is actively
enabling copyright infringement given also the availability of tool to filter copyrighted materials which
could be implemented by P2Ps.
234
Decisions of the High Court of Australia: University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse [1976] R.P.C.
1141 (Austl.); See Graeme W. Austin, Importing Kazaa - Exporting Grokster, Arizona Legal
Studies Discussion Paper No. 06-08, at 583 (April 2006).
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In sum, the data protection and copyright issues discussed above including the sample cases
indicating judicial treatment of such issues show the real possibility that not only national cyber
security, but other laws with potential impact on cyberspace will have extraterritorial application.
And this can happen regardless of possible tension or conflicts with foreign jurisdictions.

The extraterritorial reach of national laws may impact offshoring as well, and their negative
effects could be possible in at least two ways. First, national legislation such as copyright, data
protection, and SOX Acts can follow the home country investor abroad and proscribe certain
conducts or limit business activities abroad, whereby such extraterritorial reach could negatively
impact the investor’s business process. As in the University of New South Wales v.
Moorhouse235, for instance, if the P2P (Kazza) had a foreign subsidiary that has an FDI presence
in another country, the court’s judgment granting liability based on the home country copyright
law would directly impact the subsidiary as well. The foreign subsidiary may be forced to pay
substantial damage thereby being affected in its profit margin, as well as could be deprived of
business continuity the same way as it could well be the case with Kazza. Kazza may have faced
the option of going out of business considering the far-reaching consequences of the Australian
copyright law, which applies pretty much anywhere, where the copyrighted work is
‘communicated’236.
Similarly, the U.S. SOX legislation, which can also be considered another example with
extraterritorial effects, would have similar effects on foreign cross-listed U.S. offshoring firms
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An Australian high court case; see supra note 234.
Austin, supra note 234, at 571; also see Australian Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act, 2000,
Act No. 110 of 2000 (Austl.), inserting § 31(1)(a)(vi) and 31(1)(b)(iii).
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abroad. U.S. multinationals with subsidiary in a foreign country in an FDI capacity would also be
subjected to SOX requirements at home. Such an extended reach of SOX, may affect investment
decisions, though not often decisively because investment decisions in such cases again will
hinge on the net cost benefits from such engagements depending on host investment climate.

Secondly, extended application of home country legislation or court jurisdiction could have
implications for legal conflicts resulting in adverse consequences for home country investors
abroad. If, for instance, a home country law has certain requirement that applies to all home
country firms regardless of their place of business, and a host country has its own legal norms
applicable to FDI that may negate or contradict with the home country requirement, the FDI
investor in the host will face conflict of compliance. That could be the case with the EU’s data
protection directive, which has become national law in many member states, European
companies listed or cross-listed in the U.S. stock markets thereby voluntarily subjecting
themselves to U.S. laws, SOX in particular. These companies face the problem of information
disclosure requirements under the SOX Act, while such disclosure of part or all of which may be
prohibited under their home country legislations. The same is true for European multinationals
with FDI presence in the U.S., especially when these companies are dealing with sensitive
customer data from both EU and U.S. that should fall under the strict disclosure protection and
express consent requirements of the EU data protection laws. On the flip side, U.S. offshoring
companies with place of business in any of the EU member states too will face similar issues
with legal conflicts. The SOX Act on the one hand and the EU’s data protection act on the other
create the same conflicts that European Offshoring investors in the U.S. encounter. But U.S.
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based offshoring FDI investors in Europe may take advantage of the ‘safe harbor’ provisions
brokered by both EU and U.S. authorities to alleviate such conflicts.237
Again the real impact of the extraterritorial reach of both SOX and EU data protection laws is
that companies on both sides feeling that their home country laws significantly impair their
business process abroad would back out of their intent to conduct such business engagement or
discontinue existing FDI activities.

c)

iii.

Cyberspace vs. National Public Policy and Security

Effects of Host Public Policy on Offshoring Service FDI

Under the international law, it is no longer disputed that nations generally have the right to
defend themselves. This right has its roots in one of the oldest customary international legal
principles afforded states – the right for individual or collective self-defense238. This principle
while somewhat weakened by the fact that it may not be enforced against powerful nations
considered aggressor hence also known as ‘bully dilemma’239, could provide bases for every
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Bierce & Kenerson, P.C., supra note 178.
As it has also been recognized by the UN under the UN Charter, Article 51.
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The situation is often noticed in the UN Security Council when sanctions are invoked against such
bully states with a permanent membership on the UN Security Council, see Graham H. Todd, Armed
Attack In Cyberspace: Deterring Asymmetric Warfare with an Asymmetric Definition, in The Law
Review, 64 A.F. L. REV. (66), at 71 (2009).
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country to protect its national security interests. It is also highly debated whether this principle
applies to such aggression on cyberspace while it is also equally unclear as to if the self defense
response to a cyber attack can occur by use of physical (armed) force240. These security interests
may additionally be stipulated in treaties and/or adopted in national security policy documents. A
number of countries have developed an overall national security policy, as well as its
implementation plans in the form of a national security plan, albeit a few variations exist. So,
there are differences for instance in terminology use and context of such plans. These variations
could have an overarching impact on FDI policies as they could subject the underlying
investment policies (e.g. USA and France241) or even investment undertakings directly to some
scrutiny. Such security interests have also found recognition through provisions under various
international instruments including bilateral investment treaties242 and multilateral agreements,
(e.g. WTO incorporating Article XIV of the GATT, Chapter XXI, North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and EU treaty243, etc).
Provisions under these and more specifically investment treaties lay out certain conditions for
either exceptions or exclusions for contracting parties. Although the language used to recognize
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There is neither clarity in the definition of ‘armed attack’ in the UN charter per se nor does
international legal practice sheds some light in this regard; see Graham, id. at 72.
241
Such scrutiny is the case with the U.S. and France, where such plans state the importance of reviewing
investment policy in the interest of national security protection. See OECD, Guidelines for Recipient
Country Investment Policies Relating to National Security, Recommendation Adopted by the OECD
Council, 12 (May 2009).
242
Model BITs with such national security stipulations include those from the USA (Article 18, 2004
model treaty), Canada (Article 10, 2004 model BIT), and BIT between China and Philippines (Article 4,
Sep. 1995). For a complete list of similar BITs, see OECD, id. at 32.
243
OECD, supra note 241, at 17; see also OECD, International Investment Perspectives: Freedom of
Investment in a Changing World, 97 (2007).
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the need to protect essential security interests in the investment treaties often lacks coherence244,
state parties could be excepted from requirements to implement all or part of the treaty if doing
so would be contrary to their ordre public or threaten their national security. Meanwhile, not
only does the use of various terms in these treaties cause confusion, but the conceptual
understanding of some of these terms (e.g. ordre public, public order, ~ security, or ~ policy)
vary across various legal systems. Civil law countries’ use of the term ordre public differs
conceptually from that of the common law tradition because it is broader in meaning under civil
law. Under the civil law tradition, ordre public means public interest, which has broader
implications than the contextual meaning for national security245. Hence, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) may have sought to resolve such confusion and may have been forced to
differentiate between public policy and public security as its recent jurisprudence indicates246.
Under the U.S. legal system, public order does not have the same conceptual meaning as used in
European legal systems. Instead, the U.S. legal system has a longstanding common law rule
under the term ‘public policy’ that is somewhat equivalent conceptually to ordre public but
equally susceptible to broad interpretation247.

In addition to these variations, what is implied to be considered as national security, public
policy, or public security/order deserving exception or protection in a given forum could affect
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Terms used include ordre public (French = public order), public policy, essential security interests,
national security, though their meaning, in some cases, could overlap. Also see OECD, supra note 241, at
6.
245
OECD, supra note 241, at 7.
246
Id. at 8.
247
For instance, the concept of public policy is part of the test in determining validity of a contract,
especially when an agreement is suspected of being an illegal bargain due to restrain trade,
unconscionability, tortuous conduct, etc.; See RICHARD A. MANN, SMITH AND ROBERSON’S BUSINESS
LAW, 240 (11th Edition, 2000).
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an FDI directly or indirectly. National security may be relevant for an investor, as well as
investment promotion efforts from both home country and host country perspectives. Therefore,
whether it is a treaty or national security policy that specifies the normative stipulations essential
to protect critical national interests of the investor’s home and host countries, it is vital that these
norms seek some balance in order to both promote investment and protect security interests. In
particular, countries competing to attract Offshoring service FDI, will have to do due diligence
not to discourage Offshoring with too broad security requirements. Similarly, home countries
should not impose wide-reaching and unnecessary restrictions on their multinationals thereby
punishing both potential target forums and investors for fear of national security. For investors, it
becomes important that they seriously consider reviewing and understanding ahead the existence
and applicability of national security provided under treaties and/or national regulations on the
one hand, and what the tendency of contextual interpretation options the forum jurisprudence has
been following on applicable national security norms on the other. Investor states may use the
public policy in broader context as an excuse for violating obligations based on a treaty or other
investment regulations. ECJ in a number of its decisions recognized the need to interpret public
order and security narrowly to counteract these concepts’ being used as an escape goat.
Accordingly, reliance on ordre public is only accepted ‘if there is genuine and sufficiently
serious threat to fundamental interests of a society’248. ECJ does not seem to tolerate any
derogation by member states from its restrictive views in this regard though member states are
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OECD, Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, 8
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said to be free to specify the scope of public security or order as related to their own national
interests249.

Apart from the ECJ’s limitation on public policy, the international customary law250 under the
‘necessity’ clause test as recognized by the draft ILC allows such excuses from state
obligations251. Necessity under the draft Article 25 ILC could be invoked by states as a ground to
exclude their obligations stemming from treaties or any other provisions. This is another source
of exception on which a state could rely to support its claims when the state no longer honors its
contractual or treaty based obligations with the claim that performing such obligations would
threaten its national security. However, such exculpation is only possible, where the wrongful
action itself that a state seeks an exception for is not already disallowed under its agreement with
the investor or under any other binding provisions that the state can be subjected to. Furthermore,
the necessity invocation is limited to the extent that it has to be the only way remaining to
account for the national security concerns the state raises. The draft Article 25 ILC stipulates
additional limitations (contributory negligence and impairment test regarding other states) on
necessity claims, which are all generally even more restrictive than the ECJ’s interpretation on
ordre public.
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iv.

Effects of Cyberspace on Host National Security and Implications
for Offshoring

When it comes to nations’ voluntary or involuntary engagement to deal with cyberspace issues,
in particular, the interaction and conflicts between cyberspace and national security become
obvious. While this also leads to the realization that threats from cyberspace have repercussions
on national security, efforts to secure cyberspace will also have negative or positive implications
to national security. Both the USA and Russia have emphasized that cyberspace based conflicts
could significantly impact national security252. These days, more and more nations are cognizant
of the threat posed by cyberspace to their national security while others show willingness to
embrace cyber conflict as international issue or as a matter of international security253. Many of
the major players on cyberspace: U.S., China, Russia, and France, inter alia, have engaged in
information warfare both in terms of offensive and defensive attacks254. That is because they
have recognized that information warfare poses impending sources of threat for any country that
possesses ICT capabilities and no country with available resources wants to be left out in this
race. These threats are not confined to government actors. National security could be affected
due to cyber security risks caused by individuals, organized crime syndicates, and government
sponsored actors. These threats can also be based on active or passive engagements by sources
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Kanuck, supra note 147, at 1586. Cyberspace has been described by security experts as the new
frontiers of national security, see Gable, supra note 40, at 17.
253
Such was the case with the current U.S. government which along with the British government initially
declined an international treaty restricting military use of ICT but later (in 2009) resumed dialogue
regarding an international approach to resolve cyber security issues, see Kanuck, supra note 147, at 1588.
254
China, France, and Russia have even acknowledged establishing programs to deal with cyber warfare
in terms of both offensive and defensive capabilities, while about 33 other countries have capabilities to
conduct electronic intelligence or cyber espionage; See Christopher Joyner & Catherine Lotrionate,
Information Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of Legal Framework, 831 (2001).
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like foreign government agents acting on behalf of a government sponsor and those that pursue
some other independent, organizational, or personal goals. Active engagements from government
sources may include, for instance, use of electronic tools by one country to penetrate and
fetch/collect intelligence relevant data from another or other countries.
In regards to threats posed by Offshoring investors within recipient countries per se, both private
foreign investors and foreign government controlled investors - so called Sovereign Wealth
Funds (SWFs) play roles. In fact, FDI in general is considered by many as a threat to national
security of a host as the host government may cede control over certain resources.255 SWFs, in
particular, may pursue hidden political or other agenda while purporting to strictly engage in
commercial activities contrary to what is ordinarily specified in pertinent investment
agreements256.

States cognizant of these risks could do whatever it takes to curb such threats. In addition to
concluding treaties mentioned above, they attempt to counter such threats, inter alia, by
designing and implementing national policies, which should mandate monitoring and controlling
of use, as well as access to national critical information and communication infrastructure.
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In the U.S. for instance, one survey showed in 2006 that about 53% of the people surveyed exhibited
negative sentiments towards foreign investors in the USA, maybe caused by the recent terrorist incidents;
see Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the Dubai Ports Controversy: Has the U.S.
Government Finally Figured Out How to Balance Foreign Threats to National Security Without
Alienating Foreign Companies? 295 (2009).
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Such SWF agreement among U.S., Singapore, and Abu Dhabi, for instance, explicitly defines the
investment objectives in an attempt to mitigate the distrust any such engagement may cause. See OECD,
Foreign Government‐Controlled Investors and Recipient Country Investment Policies: A Scoping Paper, 7
(January 2009).
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Countries like U.S. have national security policy plans (security strategies)257 that impose
monitoring or review mechanisms over foreign investment activities at home to ensure that such
activities do not overstep the bounds of public policy and national security interests. Some wary
states may end up taking extreme measures which can be stringent enough to subject an ICT user
to more scrutiny, exclusion, or to ultimately even discourage such user. The question, thus, is
what, if any, would be the impact of national security related policies that may go far beyond the
real national security interests? What is the impact of such pervasive policies implemented for
fear of cyber security threats but used as a mandate to go against citizens as well as businesses
including Offshoring service FDI and censor their net activities?

No matter how loud some advocates and optimists of the Net (Internet) freedom voice their
intent for openness, it turns out the Internet is not so free at all or “not exactly a safe-haven for
activists”258. Thanks to all kinds of technical tools available today259, the Internet traffic can, for
the most part, be filtered, monitored, controlled, and blocked at will not only by mostly tyrant
governments, but private parties as well. Although some of these activities are legit, where data
is collected, analyzed, and reported for national security and crime prevention purposes, some
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As stated, for instance, in the United States (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2003); see OECD,
id, at 43.
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Both tools for censorship and circumvention, basically competing against each other have been
actively marketed and distributed. See, Hal Roberts et al., 2007 Circumvention Landscape Report:
Methods, Uses, and Tools, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 2 (March
2009).
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Although some filtered destinations use social and political methods as well, the most pervasive and
last means would be the use of technical tools that can be placed in either at server, client side, or in
between (network) since the Web is usually implemented based on client-server architecture. Such tools
include usually router based IP block, DNS block, key word block, and stateful traffic analyses (firewall
or router based). See Roberts et al., id, at 10.
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are not. Some countries have been observed to intensely censor Internet traffic coming and going
across their boundaries under the umbrella of national security through some battle-necks or
checkpoints. These checkpoints serve the purpose of tracking inbound and outbound traffic or
worse totally blocking such traffic both ways termed as ‘infoblockade’260 if necessary. Traffic
censorship has been the case with countries like Saudi Arabia and China, just to name a few.
Saudi Arabia is said to use an array of proxy servers to filter and block thousands of websites
that do not fit the Kingdom’s content profiling based on religious and political grounds261. China,
whose actions have often been criticized, has implemented complex mechanisms for filtering
foreign based websites, as well as pervasively censoring outgoing content by engaging Chinese
ISPs262. Various other countries which have created such checkpoints for intercepting and
analyzing Internet traffic often using Intelligence Support Systems (ISS) may have a variety of
motives including silencing human rights activists or political oppositions, or even to use for
ideological purposes. The recent political upheaval in the Middle East (as observed in Spring of
2011), for instance, pushed some Arab countries to do whatever they could to silence the
uprisings. To that end, many of Arab countries were said to look into available IT solutions.
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Joyner et al., supra note 254, at 838.
Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Documentation of Internet Filtering in Saudi Arabia,
Berkman Center for Internet & Society Harvard Law School, available at:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/saudiarabia/, (last visited June 13, 2011).
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China’s position and intent may have been evidenced in its proposal to the U.N. group of
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1591. Chinese Internet companies filter content published within the nation according to a report
available at:
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Among other things, they have engaged Western IT contractors which provide various tools to
capture, spy on, or track user activities on cyberspace263.
But on the flip side, such countries may have legitimate intentions to do so. Arguably they have
justifiable concerns when it comes to imposing such control for national security purposes. That
is, their actions are justified to the extent that whatever solutions or tools they implement in this
regard help them mitigate cyber threats posed against their own critical assets due to an
unlimited use of the Internet infrastructure they provide. The fact that not everything on the
Internet is harmless, may be a point of argument to justify some non-pervasive methodology to
block contents that otherwise pose harm to especially younger generation. The argument as to
what is good or bad on cyberspace can sometimes be difficult to delineate because it all depends
on either the interest group supporting the content or stakeholders consuming the content. But at
least there may be cyberspace based contents that tend to justify, promote, or disseminate hate,
genocide, or other criminal activities generally condemned by the international community that
could justify such censorship in almost every case.

Nevertheless, no matter what the motive is for such interference with the normal flow of
information over cyberspace, this could negatively impact some business activities more than
others. For instance, offshoring businesses relying on electronic data transfer can be adversely
affected by such elevated and unwarranted scrutiny. The data security concerns resulted from
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The recent Intelligence Support Systems (ISS) conference in Dubai, UAE, underscores just how
insatiable the demand for such control in the Arab world currently has become. The tool and devices that
are supposed to meet these needs are dubbed by some providers ‘lawful’ law enforcement supporting
tools, so named in an attempt to obscure their real functionalities. See the conference agenda and IT
solutions discussed: http://www.issworldtraining.com/ISS_MEA/index.htm, (last visited June 21, 2011).
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China’s censorship scare against some multinationals recently (the case of Google specifically)
264

exemplifies this to some extent. Chinese actions may very well be government sponsored,

where their national security policy could be used as a source of the mandate. Meanwhile, China
with no doubt is currently considered one of the most favored destinations for FDI in general due
to its market size265 and, thus, it seems that this type of scare may not always adversely affect
every potential offshore investor’s decision to do business in China. But the fact remains to be
such that Chinese actions on cyberspace in the end discourage IT Offshoring. China’s policy
measure implies at least three disincentives for potential Offshoring service FDI in IT and IT
enabled business process. First, the Internet checkpoints or hacking mechanisms may act as a
battle-neck for traffic thereby slowing down Internet access or causing service availability issues.
Even worse targeting big companies means not only scaring this companies away but also
antagonizing relationships with them thereby impacting any intentions these and other
companies may have to do business in China. Most importantly, this may discourage IT
investors, whose business model involves intensive cross-border electronic traffic (e.g. B2B ecommerce) that highly leverages the Internet. Secondly, the Government may engage force
through hacking/filtering methods or try to work with an investor to access sensitive data. But
the investor will more likely be wary of sharing potentially sensitive information belonging to
investor’s customers and employees with any government. The investor will also have no choice
264

See Google on its official blog stated that Chinese hackers accessed Google email accounts of human
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looking for not just local market advantages, but other equally decisive factors.
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but try to fend off such access by all means including ceasing to do business with China.
Otherwise, such forced disclosure will affect customer trust and relations thereby negatively
impacting the customer base of the companies affected. Finally, Chinese actions systematically
favor Chinese companies over foreign firms, thereby even acting as a “trade barrier”266, since
foreign investors won’t have access to outgoing information related to business environment;
such as, the nature of cyber security, investment climate, potential for profitability of products
and services, etc due to content blocking or filtering outgoing information from Chinese side. At
least internally, Chinese firms will have competitive edges compared to foreign investor firms
since they have access to wealth of information, understand business culture, language, as well
as customer behavior (likes and dislikes). Foreign firms will have hard time sharing information
with Chinese Internet companies who implement Internet traffic filtering/blocking/analyses
mechanisms mandated by the Chinese government, whereas Chinese companies have nothing to
lose since they have nothing to hide. Therefore, all in all, there is no doubt that Chinese
censorship will inevitably have an adverse effect on Offshoring service FDI. Because such
censorship invades sensitive digital data belonging to investors, while infoblockade discourages
potential new investors who may be less likely to get business relevant information from inland
or may again be fear being disrupted in the normal course of business due to such battle-necks.

In addition, countries may also target one or more of other hostile nations with policy
instruments. Or even if they may not necessarily or actively target other nations specifically, they
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China actually controls/monitors the web at its borders by means of intermediary (ISPs) control; see
Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, University of Ottawa law & technology journal, at
230 (undated); also see a report on the Web censorship: A Trade Barrier? Available at:
http://en.rsf.org/internet-enemie-china,39741.html, (last visited May 13, 2011).
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could have policies in place which threatens national security of other countries which could be
home states for Offshoring investors. Hostile nations may actively or passively pursue cyber
warfare against other targets. If an investor home country becomes a target of such a hostile
nation-state that is a potential destination for a home investor, then the hostile host becomes
highly concerning for the security of data belonging to the potential investor from the target
(home) state. It is equally questionable and scary for investors from other nations who are
passive targets by the unfriendly forum/host state. Many FDI decisions take into consideration
the possible lasting conflicts of interest in their home country’s national security since such
conflicts have been said to heighten risk elements267. Some investors may not always be aware of
national security consequences for their home states but some may already know this based on
also their home state policies against Offshoring targets or will become aware sooner or later,
and make adverse decisions.
In sum, it is unlikely that Offshoring service FDI will be encouraged to do business in forums
with restrictive or intrusive policy measures regardless of the policy measures having national
security rationale. Investors could also stay away from forums, with which their home country is
not in good terms or if the forum poses risks for data breach due to the forum’s active cyber
warfare and intelligence, censorship, or economic espionage activities.

2.

267

Issues with Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Effects on Offshoring

See Camp et al., supra note 72, at 190.
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a)

Jurisdiction and Cyberspace: What Makes Jurisdiction in

Cyberspace Different?

Whether a transaction is cyberspace related or associated with any other commercial activity,
disputes arising from cross-border transactions and use of cyberspace often lead to fundamental
legal questions as to: (1) which country’s courts should control the trial and enjoin parties’
conducts (issues with forum and jurisdiction), (2) whose laws should govern the case (choice of
law), and (3) how should any judgment issued by a tribunal or court be recognized and enforced.
Potential disputes whether civil or criminal, but emanating from cyberspace involve more
questions than answers when it comes to the authority of courts and law enforcement to identify
and subject parties to adjudication or to apply a particular law to the disputed matter. Thus, while
jurisdiction in general will be discussed in this and the following sections, the focus will be on
issues with adjudicative jurisdiction. Before delving into the various questions of jurisdiction
associated with cyberspace as it relates to Offshoring service FDI; however, it seems appropriate
to analyze the context under which cyberspace or use of it involves jurisdictional problems.

Under public international law, jurisdiction is defined as the state’s right to regulate conduct in
matters not exclusively of domestic concern268, which is a bit vague when the term ‘regulate’ is
literally translated. Thus, in more specific terms jurisdiction involves state’s rights to not only
regulate conducts, but to adjudicate cases and enforce domestic laws. While exercising these
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See Kuner, supra note 96, at 5. State’s jurisdictional power is generally understood as including power
to regulate, adjudicate, and enforce - for more on this see Henrick W. Kaspersen, Cybercrime and Internet
Jurisdiction, 4 (March 2009).
129

rights, since states sometimes end up dealing with matters not exclusive to their national
boundary or domestic concern, such states often run into some conflict or competition with other
states which claim similar rights and responsibilities to do the same. This means under
circumstances more nations may simultaneously have the same rights to assert similar
jurisdiction based on equally justifiable concerns. An attempt to regulate domestic affairs that
have international consequences and subject non-residents to national tribunals or enforce
domestic law internationally may result in not only jurisdictional competition, but will eventually
encounter resistance internationally. Such an attempt could also constitute interference under
circumstances in the internal affairs of other nations. Jurisdictional conflicts are more evident in
cases and business dealings that have effects on matters across a national boundary, beyond the
geographical limits on which a state exerts its sovereignty.
Thus, more often jurisdiction becomes a point of controversy in legal disputes arising out of
cross-border transactions more than any other issues. Worse yet, due to the very reason that
cyberspace and more specifically the Internet are involved, the question of jurisdiction, whether
it is for subject matter, in rem, or in personam, or even legislative, has been seen to become a
center of controversy and increasingly more difficult to address. Jurisdiction is as much of a
concern in civil/commercial matters as it is in criminal issues on cyberspace although at least on
civil matters, parties have the option to specify forum along with applicable laws. Forum
selection can be done through choice of law clauses, e.g. in an online contract usually provided
for an e-commerce transaction, which, if considered valid269, could resolve the potential question
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Validity might defeat its applicability just like any other contract, and its validity is tested using the
same standards applicable to a contract.
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of jurisdiction both over the parties and subject matter270. Absent such choice of law clauses, any
of the existing doctrines of jurisdiction will have to kick in and be applied as appropriate.

Jurisdictional doctrines for both civil and criminal matters are developed traditionally based on
physical world and geographical boundaries. Common law tradition for example considers all
crimes to be local that should be tried by the jurisdiction where it was committed271. But in the
realm of cyberspace, the location/jurisdiction of crime commission and the victim can be
different majority of the time, which essentially makes this common law position obsolete at
least as far as cyberspace is concerned. That is because, for instance, the jurisdiction where the
crime took place or initiated (e.g. a hacker from Russia launched a DoS attack on a U.S. based
network) may not be interested to pursue the criminal since the case may not have any impact on
national interests or is not economically worth it to allocate resources. As stated earlier, the
Internet as part of cyberspace272 is by its virtue borderless and fluid in nature with no apparent
geographical limitation despite an opposing argument stating it is technically feasible to
segregate the Internet into geographical limits with the help of an IP address itself273. This gave
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Such a contractual choice of law provision is possible for instance in e-commerce transactions,
whereby the choice of law clause and the underlying agreement provided in the e-commerce site are
subject to the same validity requirements as any other contract. But in terms of format, due to the fact that
the agreement is stipulated only by one party and the other party (usually a consumer) has no options to
change of adjust the language, agreements on e-commerce are subject to more scrutiny; see Rice, supra
note 227, 44.
271
Konoorayar, supra note 55, at 420.
272
Cyberspace can be defined as a space of interconnected systems including the Internet and all other
technologies and individual systems, as well as networks that make up such connections; however, some
consider it as a component part of the Internet; See Konoorayar, supra note 55, at 423.
273
This characteristic has not changed yet in part due to anonymity problems caused by e.g.,
spoofing/impersonating (see Konoorayar, supra note 55, at 415) even if some assert that there are “new
geographic mapping technologies, by which visitors to a website can be identified through local‐specific
identifiers embedded in their IP addresses or browsers”, see Jared H. Beck, A “Category‐Specific”
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rise to the peculiar nature of the Internet, which has not only made part of the existing
substantive legal norms obsolete, but it did complicate the problem of jurisdiction274, whereas
this also at the same time gave rise to the peculiarity of jurisdiction on cyberspace.

b)

Jurisdictional Complexities in the Context of Offshoring

Since the scope of this research is limited to IT or IT-enabled Offshoring service FDI, where
cyberspace plays a major role for cross-border transactions, jurisdiction on cyberspace becomes
an important aspect of debates under cyber law. Jurisdiction in cyberspace warrants some
analysis as it is often among the disputed legal elements in cases involving cross-border business
transactions. With respect to an offshoring FDI, one needs to address the following potential
questions, inter alia. First, under what circumstances are issues related to an Internet jurisdiction
relevant for such an FDI? Secondly, what are the possible solutions to resolve such jurisdictional
questions? And finally, what negative effects, if any, could cyberspace based jurisdictional issues
have on the FDI?
While the last two questions will be addressed in the next few sections, the first question can be
dealt with simply by revisiting the nature of such an Offshoring FDI per se. Looking into
possibilities as to how Offshoring activities might play out to cause cyberspace related legal
disputes, which in turn could bring about jurisdictional questions, might help in this regard. As

Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, at 4 (2004), for arguments
supporting the existence of possibilities to geographically segregate the Internet.
274

Konoorayar, supra note 55, at 417.
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stated earlier under various topics above, an Offshoring service FDI is apt to utilize computer, as
well as networking technologies in cross-border settings. This inclination implies that such an
FDI most likely takes advantage of cyberspace, the Internet in particular in an extensive manner.
And the fact that this FDI ends up using cyberspace to relay information, inter alia, back and
forth (e.g. between its forum FDI facility and other locations inside or outside the forum) or to
provide other services using the Internet more likely brings the FDI in contact with jurisdictional
issues that might result from potential cyberspace related disputes that the FDI may be part of.
If the Offshoring service FDI maintains a Web site in support of its Offshoring business process,
for example, depending on the dichotomy of its website, i.e. whether it is commercial (ecommerce) or none e-commerce275, the FDI will end up dealing with the question of personal
jurisdiction, inter alia, in litigations. The majority of Internet related cross-border disputes
involve questions with personal jurisdiction and that is due to the inclination of such transactions
to involve e-commerce. Meanwhile, a lot of e-commerce sites also include standard terms and
conditions that consumers can read and accept/agree by clicking usually a radio button feature on
the sites indicating assent, so called ‘click-wrap’276 agreements. These agreements usually
include choice of law clauses specifying applicable laws and forum as well, which are
enforceable as long as they are valid. Click-wraps are subject to the same or more stringent
validity requirements of law of contracts277. Enforceability of choice of law or forum can be
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The distinction between commercial and non commercial websites is essential for asserting jurisdiction
over out of state commercial websites in order to protect consumers, so argue the proponents of the new
approach of jurisdiction known as category specific jurisdiction; see Jared H. Beck, A “CategorySpecific” Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, at 12
(2004).
276
Rice, supra note 227, at 43.
277
So in addition to the standard contract validity requirement; such as, conscionablilty, click-wrap has to
show an option where the consumer has to explicitly accept and complete a purchase order, in a more
stringent process implemented by the website called ‘browse-wrap’; see Rice, supra note 227, at 365.
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resisted based on several validity requirements. Factors that can cause validity issues include
generic contractual defects that are common on agreements (e.g. fraud, duress, etc),
unreasonableness, and public policy278. Courts in the U.S. are; however, generally divided in
terms of upholding or not recognizing choice of law clauses partly based on differences in state
laws and partly based on the factors mentioned above. Public policy is a common reason cited
for such denial, e.g. in recognizing a consumer’s lack of prior ability to negotiate such clauses279.

In rem jurisdiction has also become relevant in cyberspace, which has been quite consistently
applied by U.S. courts in re domain name ownership disputes280. Domain name related in-rem
disputes too have some relevance in the context of an offshoring FDI that maintains a website as
well as owns a domain. Despite the intangible nature of domain names since in rem ‘has long
required that res/property at issue have situs’281 within the limits of a court that should exert its
powers, courts have held that there is an in rem jurisdiction as long as the domain name is

Thus, mere presentation of a click-wrap site with a radio button option alone, that does not necessarily
enforce the click-requirement, on the e-commerce does not suffice for a choice of law clause to be
validated.
278
See GARY B. BORN; INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS, 395 (4th Ed. 2006).
279
For instance, the California Court of Appeal invoking public policy denied the validity of a forum
selection clause in America Online, Inc v. Superior Court, original case: America Online, Inc v. Booker,
781 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2001 Ct. Appl.), while another U.S. federal court in Compuserve, Inc v. Patterson,
89 F. 3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) upheld a forum selection in a click-wrap agreement; see also Rice, supra
note 227, at 44.
280
This was exemplified and formulated in Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsch.Com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707,
712-13 (E.D. Va. 1999) brought under the Trade Mark Dilution Act (Sec. 1655), where the court rejected
the in rem stating this Act did not permit in rem proceedings. But most other courts including the U.S.
Supreme Court later adopted the in rem applicability under this Act. Most of the domain name related
disputes emanate from Cybersquatting, which means a "deliberate, bad faith registration as domain names
of well-known and other trademarks in the hope of being able to sell the domain names to the owners of
those marks; For details, see Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, Washington Law Review
Association, available at: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property00/jurisdiction/lee.html, (last visited June
11, 2011); also see Rice, supra note 227, at 1.
281
Id. at: http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property00/jurisdiction/lee.html, (last visited June 11, 2011).
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“within the control and dominion of an entity that is itself found within’282 the court’s assigned
administrative district. Such an entity is obviously not the domain owner but the registering
organization. This is clearly indicated in the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) 15 U.S.C. (§1125(d) (2) (c)). Accordingly, in rem proceedings can be commenced in a
judicial district "in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name authority that registered or assigned the domain name [at issue] is located."283 As can be
anticipated, since registrars are often located in the U.S., opposition to this regulation and court’s
conclusion from other non U.S. fora has become apparent. They contend that this approach
unilaterally expanded the U.S. adjudicative jurisdiction over domain names even if U.S. forums
could have little or no direct connection to the dispute or domain name itself284. However, it can
be argued more plausibly that the location of the root server or top level domain that contains the
domain registration in the distributed domain hierarchy should be given more weight precisely
because the root is the top and technically most important server in the hierarchy. And since the
root server is geographically located within the forum of the registrar in this case often the U.S.
situs, the U.S. can have at least a de facto jurisdiction285. Meanwhile, the de facto in rem
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Id.
And an entity here is a dealer (registrar) of the domain or authority who assigned the domain; for
details on ACPA related cases see Martin Samson, The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Key
Information, Internet Library of Law and Court Decisions, available
at:http://www.internetlibrary.com/publications/anticybsquattSamson9-05_art.cfm, (last visited June 8,
2011).
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This view further argues that such expansion would allow domain names to be unnecessarily
segmented by physical locations though it is unclear from the contention as to what functional or
technical consequence, if any, such segmentation would bring about to negatively affect domain names
per se except jurisdictional shift to some degree; see R. Polk Wagner & Catherine T. Struve, Realspace
Sovereigns in Cyberspace: Problems with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1, at 41 (2002). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=321901, (last visited January 12, 2012).
285
Id. at 3.
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assertion in turn faces some resistance since for one it could be held unconstitutional due to the
fact that the foreign registrant, e.g. a foreign cyber-squatter, may not have sufficient contact with
the U.S. forum286. Secondly, it is also argued that the U.S. approach to unilaterally prescribe the
in rem jurisdiction via the ACPA could entice other regulators to create or introduce ‘alternative
root servers’287 with the consequence that the domain name system becomes segregated and the
original purpose of technically more feasible and efficient centralized management of domains
gets eroded.
In any event, there is the potential that an Offshoring service FDI could maintain an e-commerce
website with the implication that the FDI also owns one or more domain names. Consequently, it
is highly likely that this FDI interacts with its clients globally in an e-commerce capacity, where
legal disputes can be expected. It is also likely that such disputes will involve questions of both
personal and in rem jurisdictions, which may often become a central point of contention due to
multiplicity of foreign parties and circumstances with which such disputes are entangled.
Although jurisdictional questions may be resolved with an appropriate choice of law clause288
that can be included in the e-commerce website, there is no guarantee that such clauses can
prevent the FDI from being subject to litigation elsewhere. Under circumstances, there is a
potential for the FDI to be subject to personal jurisdiction everywhere in the world.
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Id. at 2.
Id. at 3
288
This is said to be the best solution at least from the e-commerce operator stand point to limit this
potential; see GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER LAW: TEXT AND CASES 32 (2000).
287
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c)

Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace under U.S. Laws

The next logical question, specifically the second question raised in preceding section, is how
issues of jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction in particular, are addressed under the current
jurisprudence in light of the Internet technology and cyberspace which defy geographical
limitations. When the treatment of personal jurisdiction in cyberspace is viewed from the
perspective of the U.S. legal system, one can easily observe a legal plurality both in judiciary and
scholarly contributions. There is a variety of theoretical and judicial approaches to questions of
personal jurisdiction in general which more likely give rise to similarly varied solutions in
cyberspace cases. These approaches have been developed and adopted over the years by
commentators, as well as courts. Thus, resolving issues with personal jurisdiction will depend on
the parties, particularly defendant’s location in the first place and secondly on whatever
compelling theory or judicial argument is selected to better address the issue at hand.

To put this into perspective, from the U.S. forum point of view, for instance, the fact that an FDI
investor is physically located in the U.S. won’t be too much of an issue to determine a U.S.
court’s in personam jurisdiction over the investor or a U.S. resident for disputes between the
investor and the U.S. resident. However, such an outcome will change if the defendant (e.g. a
third party) resides in another forum while maintaining a business dealing with the FDI in the
U.S., where the transaction involves the FDI business process in the U.S. This means absent a
choice of law clause between the parties, any dispute between them related to this relationship
will more likely result in jurisdictional questions and that is where a variety of interpretations
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and doctrines of jurisdiction both from civil and case law systems’ points of view come into
play.
With respect to the treatment of an in personam cyberspace related jurisdiction in the U.S., there
are a few theoretical and case law instances that can be analyzed here.
American jurisprudence, which is based on long-arm statutes289 and case law for personal
jurisdiction has been hugely influenced by the constitutionally mandated due process clause of
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments both in terms of defining judicial jurisdiction over a foreign
defendant and limiting it.290 The due process clause requires two-pronged analysis: minimum
contacts and traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
When the due process test is applied to cyberspace; however, it is required that mere online
presence should not be taken as sufficient. This is evidenced in the fact that the judiciary,
notwithstanding its previous position with regard to due process, had later adopted what is now
called ‘sliding scale’ for websites as evidenced in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,
Inc 291. The sliding scale approach, obviously based on specific personal jurisdiction, categorizes
websites into three: interactive (e.g. e-commerce), partially interactive, and non-interactive, but
tends to exercise personal jurisdiction on websites that are interactive. Yet, even with respect to
interactive sites, since website providers cannot always foresee an active interaction with or use
of their sites in every forum, this test has raised some predictability problems. And the
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For example, the revised version of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and several states have
similar statutes; see BORN, supra note 278, at 69.
290
Due process clause limits also authorizations provided by the federal and states’ long-arm statutes; see
BORN, supra note 278, at 70; for details on two-pronged analysis, see GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER
LAW: TEXT AND CASES 20 (2000).
291
Id. at 2.
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predictability is “the sine qua non of the due process” 292 based minimum contact test. Turns out
Web based service providers/businesses are particularly vulnerable to assertion of personal
jurisdiction everywhere around the globe due to the web’s inherent ubiquitousness (regardless of
their being interactive), which can only be made fair through limits provided by the minimum
contacts test. Thus commercial activity and interactivity of the website per se would not suffice
to assert such jurisdiction, i.e. more in terms of level of contact is needed of the website. Hence,
the unpredictability of the sliding scale test itself has recently led courts to a slight shift in
position away from this approach. They sought other options, albeit inconsistently, partly in
favor of the due process consideration. Many courts have used Zippo’s sliding scale in somewhat
modified manner, where they not only tested the nature of websites in terms of commercial
activity and interaction, but also checked reasonability when jurisdiction is exercised in relation
to non resident aliens. The appropriateness consideration in using the sliding scale has become
apparent when courts realized that exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident aliens based on just
web based contact could be unreasonable. Such basic contact, although sufficient for and
consistent with public international law requirements293, could lead to an influx of cases. That is,
non-resident website operators from anywhere in the world could be called into the U.S. court
rooms without sufficient evidence of foreseeability, which is what the principle of fair play and
substantial justice demands to protect. Thus, one could say the minimum contacts test from the
two-pronged due process clause analysis formulated for International Shoe Co v. Washington
partially culminated in the specific jurisdiction but the notion of the due process itself is still
alive and well except in a refined manner as done by the Supreme Court in Burger King Corp. v.
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Minimum contact will ensure defendants’ liberty afforded under the constitutional Due process clause
based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; see Beck, supra note 275, at 3.
293
Mere contact per se, on the other hand, seems to suffice to meet one of the two basic requirements: link
or contact and reasonableness needed to justify jurisdiction; see Spang-Hanssen, supra note 308, at 6.
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Rudzewicz294. The Burger King case sought for a continued relationship (which by the way does
not seem to be problematic in re websites) instead of a single contact where the defendants must
have purposefully availed themselves of the U.S. forum state to establish the required minimum
contact.
Turns out neither the modified minimum contact tests nor the sliding scale have provided
plausible solutions for web based presence in a forum. Hence in an attempt to also affirm the
protection provided by the due process clause, courts have further introduced the ‘effects’ test.
This constitutes their shift in focus from the nature of the website to the analysis on the actual
effects the minimum contact through web-presence. The effects doctrine, generally accepted in
criminal law as well by even most restrictive, territorially based criminal law systems295, allows
courts to reasonably subject a foreign defendant website operator to personal jurisdiction. This is
based on the premise that a website operator must have known or had intention based on specific
actions that its website would have effects in a forum to be subject to personal jurisdiction, and
thus to pass the effects test296.
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Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); see Beck, supra note 275, at 8.
Courts of many countries have recognized jurisdiction based on effects of offenses without regard to
nationality or domicile of the offender; see BORN, supra note 278, at 497‐499; also see Robert
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Uerpmann‐Wittzack, Principles of International Internet Law, in the German Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 11,

at 1254 (2010).
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Rice, supra note 227, at 1.
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Generally; however, it must be noted that courts either do not apply the due process limits, which
is the case in civil law forums297 or are not consistent with due process consideration in the case
of the U.S. for website operators’ liability to personal jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction
varies as much as applicable substantive laws or other applicable laws multiplied by the overall
legal systems or number of countries. Given the fact that there are variations in culture, value,
customs, and yes legal systems, means that anything displayed on a website may or may not be
welcomed or received in good terms everywhere in the world. The ones (in many cases
sovereign states) that do not like it or consider it against their policy, law, or customs or value
could very well go against an alien as well. That is a daunting fact from an offshoring investor
point of view and scary in terms of the possibility and risks the investor has in terms of facing
multiple legal systems in potential lawsuits298. Therefore, it can be argued that the uncertainty
with forum jurisdiction more likely discourages web-based businesses. Seen from a different
angle, an Offshoring service FDI that relies on an e-commerce website to sell service products
both in an FDI forum and outside may fear the consequences of its being subjected to many
jurisdictions based on the web-based transactions. This may ultimately act as a disincentive for
such a business engagement not just from the host forum perspective per se but overall. Thus, the
possible argument and response to the last question above, the possible effects of jurisdictional
problem in an Offshoring engagement, is that depending on the nature of a service FDI, a legal
297

For instance the mere fact that a website can be seen alone could form a basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction, an approach that pretty much subjects the website operator to lawsuits in every forum in the
world. See Rice, supra note 227, at 2.
298
The famous French court order initially against Yahoo! enforcing the French penal code that prohibits
display of Nazi memorabilia exemplifies this; see Joel R. Reidenberg,The Yahoo Case and the
International Democratization of the Internet, Fordham Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11, at 5
(April 2001). This case helped pronounce the division between Internet ‘separatists’ who took the pro free
speech position that later helped Yahoo win the case (see The Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT), available at: http://www.cdt.org/grandchild/jurisdiction#2, (last visited July 6, 2011), for the
chronology of the case) and those who denounce the Nazi acts also argued that the state has every right
based on its sovereignty to legislate and enforce laws.
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system or approach that tends to expand assertion of personal jurisdiction over an investor as a
defendant will have a negative impact on either a decision to do business in an offshore setting or
maintain an e-commerce website as part of the Offshoring service engagement. Now such longarm exercise of personal jurisdiction does not have to come from the FDI forum itself. But the
fact that an e-commerce FDI is subject to various other jurisdictions alone suffice to discourage
this type of an FDI engagement or the business itself regardless of location.

d)

Who should have Prescriptive Jurisdiction over the Internet?

The question as to who should control cyberspace involves the debate about whether nationstates should regulate cyberspace, the Internet in particular, or join global efforts to create
international regulatory norms. While this debate continues, whether or not states should control
and regulate cyberspace including the Internet really depends on whether or not they can and
want to exercise sovereignty over cyberspace299. And there are several challenges which point to
the fact that sovereignty over cyberspace may not be achievable for many states. For instance,
states should not only be able to control their borders where their ICTs connect to international
gateways, but they should also be able to technically achieve the daunting task of identification
and tracking sources of incidents within their territories. Obviously this is not achievable for
especially developing nations for lack of resources. Yet, everybody else still has the technical
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Control over state’s territory and cross-border in terms of cyberspace traffic is decisive to exert
sovereignty but convincing states to own and exercise this right appears to be among the challenges of
control over cyberspace; see Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace, in The Law Review, 64
A.F. L. REV. (66), at 31 (2009).
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problem of attribution, identification, and successfully segregating cyberspace. Regardless some
states may still attempt to exert their sovereignty powers over cyberspace individually through
policy, as well as regulatory means. Such a sovereignty exercise may be possible through
applying the traditional principle of territoriality. The realm of cyberspace may have; however,
made it nearly impossible for nation-states to extend their sovereignty based territoriality concept
to the Internet. Indeed, the realm of cyberspace is said to have destroyed the traditional notion of
territoriality in the context of cyberspace by transcending physical geographic boundaries. But
this reality has resulted in heated debates by scholars, who propose a variety of solutions300.
Their arguments can generally be grouped into two extremes: those who still support sovereignty
and rely on the territoriality principle, and those who call for self regulation. The sovereignty
model will extend the territoriality principle from real-space to cyberspace arguing that if no
state sovereignty power is exerted in an expanded manner, cyberspace is bound to become an
uncontrolled/unregulated sphere that can be a source of all cybercrimes with no enforceable
norm and force against it. This argument has some merit when it comes to all the security issues
observed on cyberspace today. Neither currently known incidents nor future most likely more
complex issues seem to be fully controlled without formal, enforceable regulations that are
currently only possible at national levels as it can be more quickly promulgated by national
regulators301. However, the fact that cyberspace is both national and global at the same time
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Some insist that the state should maintain sovereignty also on cyberspace since cyberspace is not
immune from state sovereignty for many reasons including infrastructural/physical and legal support that
shoud be provided locally, for detail, id. at 12.
301
Practice shows that international law-making process takes much more time and even if norms become
in effect, it takes time for nation-states to adhere to, ratify, and incorporate the norms to national laws, let
alone any efficacy for timely enforcing such norms. In regards cyber security, due to diversity in terms of
values, customs, standards, and legal, as well as social systems, it is much harder to come up with
internationally acceptable and enforceable cyberspace laws without going through lots of vetting and
negotiations that may last for years. Hence, as it stands currently, especially universally applicable
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might make any regulatory norm applicable to it also both national and global at the same time
thereby causing jurisdictional conflicts. State’s power to regulate cyberspace, thus, will only be
justified or free from problems of conflict of laws when the regulatory norms address cyber
conducts within the national ICT portion of the global ICT in cyberspace. The extraterritorial
reach of such power should be limited and reserved for cooperative efforts using instruments like
treaty regimes, e.g. cybercrime convention302.

To those who advocate self regulation, it is clear that any attempt to regulate the Internet by
individual nation-states will create conflicting global jurisdiction, which each state tries to assert
and exercise beyond its territorial limits303. Self regulation model will support the idea that
cyberspace or the Internet should regulate itself just like some other business/industry sectors do,
e.g. credit card industry304. Regulating the Internet nationally will lead to an unwarranted control
by nation-states and will undermine technological innovations, which tends to be possible under
free enterprise as also has been the case so far for the most part with the Internet itself. The self
regulation model can further be justified to the extent that in addition to jurisdictional conflicts,
national regulation for cyberspace can affect some aspects of fundamental human rights; such as,
freedom of speech, rights to privacy, and it results in unnecessary censorship limiting thereby a

international cyberspace conventions or statutes will not seem to come to light to rescue the mostly
unregulated space of the internetworking anytime soon.
302
Signed by some OECD member countries to combat attribution issues, entered into force for the U.S.
in 2007, see a Department of Justice document, International Aspects of Computer Crime, available at:
http://www.cybercrime.gov/intl.html#Vb, (last visited June 4, 2011).
303
It must be noted that global jurisdiction is different from universal in that universal is available to all
nations whereas global is attempted to be exercised by one or more nations; also see Henrik Stakemann
Spang-Hanssen, A Just World Under Public International Law in Cyberspace: Jurisdiction, Annual
Survey of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, at 3 (Spring 2007).
304
See Jane K. Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: Direct Regulation, Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation,
CRID 30th Anniversary Conference, Cahiers du CRID, 4 (September 2010).
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free flow of information305. Self regulatory approach may promote free enterprise and encourage
innovation thereby contributing to advance in technology, which may become more controlled
and, thus, negatively impacted by regulation. Self regulation empowers those who tend to be
more adept at a given specific type of technology with decision making ability306. The self
regulation approach too is lacking because it has not answered the central question as to how to
effectively combat cybercrime resulting from the unregulated cyberspace. Self regulation is also
lacking in terms of enforcement and certainly cannot provide for effective deterrence
mechanisms since it cannot impose criminal punishment, inter alia, on perpetrators. Little or no
enforcement and policing are provided by self regulation options in both civil and criminal
cases307. Only the state can enforce criminal law norms using its criminal procedures and power
available through enforcement jurisdiction.

Contrary to these two extremes, a middle ground can be proposed where certain aspects from
both self regulatory and national regulation models can be combined to either augment globally
applicable norms that are yet to be enacted or may even be in existence already, or be used
without regard to any additional international norms applicable globally. It must be noted;
however, that the challenge clearly is first developing enforceable international norms beyond
“soft laws” that can be adhered to by the international community to effectively compensate
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Such control via regulation has clearly evidenced in countries like China and a few Middle East
Countries; See Kanuck, supra note 147, at 1591; Chinese Internet companies filter content published
within the nation: See http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=23924; http://en.rsf.org/internet-enemiechina,39741.html, (last visited June 14, 2011); see also Roberts et al., supra note 258, at 3.
306

See Richard M. Marsh, Jr., Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: A New Approach to Protecting
Personal Privacy on the Internet, 15 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 543, at 553 (2009).
307
Id. at 555.
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national laws. Soft laws, meanwhile, won’t address issues with cyberspace as much as what is
possible through national jurisdictions. Under this third option, states would regulate and control
cyberspace as it relates to national ICT, i.e. Internet infrastructure that falls within their national
geographical boundary. This would allow them to exercise all three types of jurisdiction
(prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement) in civil as well as criminal cases involving and
emanating from cyberspace within their territorial ICT. To exercise adjudicative and
enforcement jurisdiction over cross-border criminal cases; however, national courts would have
to rely on international cooperation. Jurisdiction outside national limits can be exercised by
global tribunals, which could apply international, as well as regional cyberspace laws.
Meanwhile, a universal jurisdiction using national or international legal norms has already been
practiced with international crimes like war crimes that qualify as delicit jure gentium for
universal jurisdiction. Expanding jurisdiction on cyberspace to global level as some suggest308
will need some justification since it means that cybercrime is being qualified as a crime against
humanity just like war crimes. For war crimes, the actor may theoretically be subject to all
jurisdictions in the world. Such expansion for a cybercrime is questionable as the cybercrime
may not equate with the war crime, again because cyberspace based criminal activities are not
equally considered or treated by international community as a criminal offence that needs severe
consequences everywhere in the world. And the rationale could be that due to difference in
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Cyberterrorism is recommended as suited for universal jurisdiction as it is as heinous an act as
traditional terrorist acts observed, for instance, in 2001, and in fact more so justified because of its being
hard to detect or prosecute; see Gable, supra note 40, at 43. Others propose use of the Internet for human
trafficking, a form of “modern slavery”, as another aspect for such jurisdiction; see Spang-Hanssen, The
Future of International Law: CyberCrime, 11 (2008).
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values, customs, legal norms, and other considerations with respect to cyberspace not every
society views cybercrime as egregious as war crime309.

On the other hand, it is also possible to compare terrorist acts with crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide and answer the applicability of universal jurisdiction to all these in the
positive due to the degree of heinousness they are all capable of inflicting into society310. By the
same token, equally convincing is the argument that if heinous crimes like traditional terrorist
acts that the world has observed particularly since 2001 can be equated with war crimes, not
every cybercrime, but cyberterrorism should be treated the same way311. Cyberterrorism is not
only capable of inflicting similar damages to society or humanity, but also the fact that it is hard
to trace, detect, prosecute, or attribute most cybercrimes, makes this elevated cybercrime
conspicuously worrisome. This characteristic, in particular, makes it a good candidate for the fact
that this crime too should be accounted for with the most extreme tool of jurisdiction, universal
jurisdiction. Nation-states should assert jurisdiction over cases involving cyberterrorism based on
universal jurisdiction in addition to other national jurisdictional rights they may possess. This
again is based on the same premise as that of similarly egregious crimes. Given the heinousness
of the effects of such a crime, states should have the tools to not only prosecute terrorists but to
use the deterring effects of this extended jurisdiction for terrorism.
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When it comes to cybercrime, countries think differently and have hugely diverging norms, thus, what
is a crime in Singapore may or may not a be a crime in Germany thereby raising further question for
example in terms of extradition; see Susan W. Brenner & Bert-Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime
Jurisdiction, 4 J. High Tech. L. 1, at 3 (2004).
310
Universal jurisdiction can be based on customary international law or convention and since acts of
terrorism are recognized by various treaties, it is a good candidate for universal jurisdiction; see Gable,
supra note 40, at 45.
311
See Gable, supra note 40, at 44.
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e)

Jurisdiction Based on Destination or Origin of Cyber Incident

The fact that there is a tendency to renounce the destination principle and resort instead to the
country of origin principle in cross-border e-commerce, as advocated by the Commission for
European Union312, may have to be limited to civil disputes. Otherwise it either doesn’t make a
lot of sense when it comes to transient incidents on cyberspace or may not always work for
cybercrime. But if this principle were to be extended to cybercrime, it would sort of change the
course of jurisdictional practice in cybercrime in that states would have exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed in their territory regardless of the crimes’ effects. This would seem to
suggest that countries which control the ICT where an issue might originate from should also be
able to assert an exclusive jurisdiction not just in civil and commercial matters at a minimum, but
in cybercrime. The problem with that is not every incident might be of interest for the forum to
allocate resources and pursue the incident. For example, if a cyber incident or criminal conduct
originates in forum A but has negative economic or criminal effects in forum B. It does not make
a lot of sense for A to allocate resources and exercise its jurisdiction to account for the incident
even if it has an exclusive jurisdiction as a country of origin. Thus, also contrary to the strictly
territoriality based outcomes, as exemplified in the U.S. Supreme Court’s emphasis on the origin
of conduct as evidenced in one of its older decisions313, it makes more sense in the information
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This approach appears to rely on an analogy of the Law of the Sea “which states that the Flag State
has exclusive jurisdiction on its ships on the High Seas”, see Spang‐Hanssen, supra note 308, at 8.
313
The court in the old case of American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347, 356
(1909), held that the lawfulness of an act must be determined by the law of the location of the act; also
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age to allow B to assert jurisdiction following at least the effects principle that from IT
standpoint has won some consensus within scholars314. This is more practical for B absent any
other competing jurisdiction. Even when there is competing jurisdiction, countries generally
have the right to prosecute a criminal for the same act since effects of the same crime might be
different in various fora. So in the example above, if the incident was a virus created in forum A,
its damages/consequences may vary in different forums (B, C, D, etc) depending on protection
mechanisms in place, types of systems, and criticality of information housed in the systems
affected, etc. Therefore, it is not fair to expect C and D not to pursue criminal proceedings
against the perpetrator in A if B or A has already filed suits. From this, it follows that in the case
of cybercrime, regardless of whether A makes use of its jurisdictional power, B, C, or D should
be able to apply its power without regard to the exclusivity.

In the end, it must be conceded that jurisdiction as related to cyberspace should also be assessed
and asserted based on various factors the same way as it can be determined for other noncyberspace matters involving cross-border transactions. Though the unique characteristics of
virtual space embodied in cyberspace can complicate and multiply the question of jurisdiction, it
should not by itself lead to a conclusion that nation-states should be entirely excluded from
entertaining their jurisdictional rights and applying their laws on cyberspace. Regardless of
see Susan W. Brenner & Bert‐Jaap Koops, Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction, 4 J. High Tech. L. 1, at 6
(2004).
314
This is based on the well established international principle allowing states to regulate any offence
that adversely affects domestic interests; see Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War:
Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Berkeley Journal of International Law Vol. 27:1, at 210
(2008); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(1)(C) (1987) for the treatment of this
theory in the United States.
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whether it is personal, subject matter, or in rem jurisdiction, nation-states can rely on prescriptive
measures to assert jurisdiction, or apply effects test depending on circumstances like political and
diplomatic, as well as legal (based on agreements) relationship with other counterparts involved.
Indeed, jurisdiction for enforcement presents the most challenge again caused by national
differences in cultural and social settings, as well as legal standards, e.g. conflicting laws, lack of
treaties, or absent double criminality - with respect to extradition. But for the most part there is a
possibility that even problems with enforcement can eventually be resolved with appropriate
cooperative agreements (bilateral or multilateral) for cyberspace. The worst case scenario might
lead to diplomatic means as an additional resort in exceptional cases involving countries that are
at least in good terms with each other.

IV.

Chapter Two Summary

This chapter presented, inter alia, the nature of service FDI, offshoring, the technical details of
information security as related to offshoring service FDI, and legal and policy frameworks
available or missing to protect cyber security related to offshoring business model. Part of the
discussion involved cyber security affecting IT enabled offshoring service FDI, whereas the
focus was not on counter measures from technical point of view as much as it was on the
problems of threats and vulnerabilities posed by the global cyberspace. The emphasis in terms of
counter measures that should help protect cyberspace was on the analyses of effectiveness and
adequacy of existing legal, as well as policy measures geared to counteract those threats. In
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particular, the challenges of cyber security and attempts to address cyber security issues with
existing or new, cyberspace specific regulations were analyzed.

The central problem of

cyberspace and the Internet: their being transnational/global and territorial simultaneously, which
resulted in legal and technical challenges of securing cyberspace was discussed.

Based on these analyses and evidence presented, one must conclude the following. Cross-border
transactions involving Offshoring service FDI often utilize global cyberspace as part of the
business process. The use of cyberspace by an offshoring service FDI may be in the form of
forum based e-commerce or direct use of cyberspace, the Internet in particular, to transmit
information assets back and forth between the FDI forum facility and other locations around the
world. These transactions are vulnerable to all the discussed cyberspace threats. Any legal
disputes involving civil and criminal laws with regard to cyber incidents emanating from
compromised investor digital assets will result in litigation costs for the investor, jurisdictional
conflicts, and legal as well as technical issues with attribution and identification of illicit actors.
Legal, policy, and cultural, etc. diversity within the global community result in variation in legal
and ethical standards. And this variation is the road block in the attempt to standardize cyber
security, develop standard cyberspace regulations globally, or enforce national cyberspace laws
elsewhere. Cyberspace is not well defined in law, but legal conflicts arising from cyberspace
may implicate several aspects of law: contract, criminal, intellectual property, and jurisdiction.
Yet legal conflicts cannot always be resolved with existing legal norms in ways which satisfy all
parties involved. In terms of jurisdiction, in particular the disparity in legal standards causes legal
uncertainty as to which principle or approach to apply to resolve cyberspace related jurisdictional
disputes.
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Certain countries have attempted to protect cyberspace with regulations that have extraterritorial
reaches thereby creating potential legal conflicts with other jurisdictions, which may neither
recognize such prescriptive jurisdictional rights nor enforce such laws.

Attempts to regulate cyberspace by both home and host countries may interfere with efforts to
promote offshoring service FDI as some regulations are either too restrictive/protective (pro
consumer) or too lax, and thus discouraging for potential service FDI investors. National security
can be affected by cyberspace and vice versa. So some legal regimes are wary of this
circumstance and thus attempt to protect their national security by approaching cyberspace with
restrictive measures mostly at the cost of technological innovation, privacy, and Internet
freedom. In the name of national security, some of these nation-states even have implanted farreaching measures on cyberspace within their national limits, where they filter, analyze, and
censor the Internet traffic. Such far-reaching national security measures both from home and host
countries can have a negative impact on offshoring FDI. On the contrary, some legal regimes do
not adequately address cyber security issues in their regulatory and policy instruments which will
also negatively affect the potential to attract offshoring FDI.
Overall, both home and host countries must do due diligence to promote and protect digital
assets of offshoring FDI by taking into consideration all relevant factors and necessary steps
when dealing with cyberspace. Regulatory and policy measures need to address security aspects
of Offshoring service FDIs while at the same time promoting investment in digital economy. In
other words, governments should ensure that these measures support cyber security and do not
adversely impact innovation, offshoring, and IT service FDI in particular, in their economies.
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Chapter Three
The Impact of Lack of Policy and Legal Frameworks for Cyber Security on Offshoring: The Case
of Sub-Saharan Africa

V.

Introduction

The preceding chapter looked at countries that have more or less regulated cyberspace but
exhibit some deficiencies in terms of coverage and promoting offshoring. The analyses presented
the challenges countries still face in regulating cyberspace and countering cyber security threats,
as well as jurisdictional and other legal conflicts created by cyberspace itself and its regulation.
This chapter will deal with the other extreme, namely, with the absence of policy and regulatory
frameworks, as well as technical capabilities that must address the challenges brought about by
cyberspace. The situation with Offshoring service FDI under circumstances where there are little
or no cyberspace regulations and policies will be reviewed and the consequence of not
approaching cyber security with appropriate regulation on offshoring will be analyzed.
Preliminary assessments indicate that countries with no cyber related regulation are mostly those
in the developing world. Developing countries may strive to win more international capital to
improve economic conditions in their territories, but lack of regulations or weakness in
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regulatory and policy regimes might have successfully hampered their efforts. Countries with
existing legal and policy frames for cyber security may be doing far more in terms of
contributing to their economy based on information technology than those without.
Developing countries including Sub-Saharan nations in Africa have made available various kinds
of incentives to promote investment. Many have realized that the existence or non-existence of
certain legal norms may work against such promotional efforts. In general national regulators
make sure that FDI is protected with legal instruments against expropriation, nationalization, or
any other unfair treatment
Providing regulatory incentives is just one piece of the necessary puzzle that must be in place to
attract more offshoring service FDIs. As stated in preceding chapters, Offshoring service FDI
involves a varied degree of use in information technology and cyberspace, the Internet in
particular, as criteria for its success. Availability and use of cyberspace technology in turn
require that there exists an adequate ICT315 infrastructure in place to do any type of information
technology intensive business in a given forum. The existence or non-existence of ICT will,
therefore, have a direct consequence in the ability of a country to attract offshoring service FDI.
In fact, there is an indication that perhaps a direct correlation exists between the number or size
of the offshoring FDI undertakings that a country may be able to attract and the nature of that
country’s ICT facility. Various observations will evidence the characteristics of ICT in a few
Sub-Saharan countries along with their for the most part failing attempts to benefit from the
booming offshoring service FDI. Many countries may still be doing little or nothing to improve

315

The scope of the term ICT here is limited to the technical infrastructure such as broadband services
(e.g., cable and satellite) that directly supports cyberspace and the Internet and does not include mobile
phone service.
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their part of the global ICT so that their citizens as well as businesses; such as, offshoring FDI
have access to the global information highway from their territories. On top of that, the existing
ICT in the developing world may not be up to par in terms of being reliable for data and network
security. This will result in the fact that the IT offshoring may eventually be adversely affected
by the safety and integrity of data, as well as networks available to investors in the developing
countries.
However, availability of legal protection and reliable, as well as secure ICT alone may not be
sufficient to attract service FDI as can be evidenced in a few Sub-Saharan countries. When
compared to developing economies in other parts of the globe that have been successful in
attracting IT offshoring services, but have similar legal and ICT capabilities, Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) may still lag far behind. As investigations in this chapter will reveal, it seems that other
factors that are perhaps peculiar to this region may be playing additional roles as impediment
factors when it comes to IT offshoring in those African countries, and this will be investigated as
well in this chapter.

VI.

Offshoring Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa and Determinant Factors
A.

Offshoring Service FDI Trends and Technological Constraints

1.

Flow of Service FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Different underlying factors may be responsible for economic decline or at least stagnation, in
particular with regard to the dismal situation in the overall FDI flow in SSA. Such factors
include poor governance, political instability, and geographical conditions, inter alia316. But,
apart from the historically negative image and suggested socio-political factors, poor macroeconomic policies affecting information and communication technology may have been the
major players in contributing substantially to the decline in technology driven service FDI. There
is a general consensus that technology, especially ICT and infrastructure along with skilled labor
force when fully embraced and integrated into the large-scale development strategies, can
positively influence the ability of a country to attract more service FDI317. The increasingly
global market place that has been the driving force for the economic expansion of the developed
world and emerging markets may not have been fully accessible to SSA due to lack of
technological capabilities such as an efficient ICT infrastructure. A mere existence of or
improvement in the ICT is said to play a decisive role in providing the potential to be connected
to the global ICT. ICT enables a country to be part of the current technology oriented
globalization, to fully utilize the cyberspace technology, and to participate in and receive the
highly expansive IT enabled service FDI. The current economic growth trends in the most
prominent countries in terms of being a favored destination for the IT and IT enabled service FDI
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Danielle Langton, U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African
Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress,
CRS-3 (Updated October 28, 2008).
317
UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment, 67
(2005).
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(IT offshoring): China and India318 suggest that the nature of ICT and the ability to attract
technology services as an FDI will help drive the economic expansion in the destination.
In the case of SSA, though the overall development may have also been affected by one or more
of the factors suggested earlier, there is no doubt that the disappointing decline in the volume of,
especially technology driven FDI inflow may have also contributed to such economic downturn.
The economic stagnation or decline as the 2008 Congressional Report suggested might have
ended for many countries in the region before the fiscal year 2000, after which many of those
countries have actually experienced growth319. But the real question is did anything change as far
as the FDI in general is concerned? If yes, then the next logical questions would be (1) whether
or not there was an uptick in the FDI and (2) if the change in the pattern of the FDI inflow
involved information technology oriented FDI (IT and IT enabled service FDI). Regrettably, the
answer to those questions is in the negative. The most recent data has shown that the FDI trends
in SSA in general is marginal and those few FDI destinations that were able to attract some
foreign capital have not seen much of investment activities in IT enabled service FDI except two
countries: Mauritius and South Africa320. The inflow pattern of FDI to SSA has not changed
much and is still concentrated as can also be anticipated in the primary sector, especially mining.
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Two of the most favorite destination for IT offshoring and they are also among the few developing
countries that have doubled their spending IT infrastructure over the last few decades; see Catherine L.
Mann, Technology, Trade in Services, and Economic Growth; OECD Trade Committee Conference:
Trade, Innovation, and Growth “Global Forum on Trade" 15-16, at 1 (October 2007).; both countries
now lead the world as a destination and source of ICT-enabled services, also see UNCTAD, Information
Economy Report 2007-2008; Science and Technology for Development: the new paradigm of ICT, at 123128.
319
Danielle Langton, U.S. Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: The African
Growth and Opportunity Act and Beyond, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress,
CRS-4 (Updated October 28, 2008).
320
While Mauritius and Seychelles (both islands), and Nigeria, as well as South Africa on the mainland
have the highest use and penetration in terms of the Internet, see UNCTAD, supra note 318 at 25, only
these two countries (Mauritius and South Africa) from SSA have been able to attract more IT offshoring,
see UNCTAD, Information Economy Report 2010: ICTs, Enterprises and Poverty Alleviation, at 49.
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Such concentration in mining seems to have been driven by demand for crude oil321, whereas
Africa as whole accounted for only 4% of the total offshoring activities as of 2011322.

Therefore, when it comes to the driving factors for FDI inflow in SSA, the natural resource
seeking investment clearly stands out from the rest. Turns out, but nothing unexpected, demand
for natural resources still pre-dominates the investment activities due to abundance of precious
metals; such as, gold and diamond323. An insignificant volume in FDI inflow involves market
seeking investment where investors look for potentials in accessing more consumers. However,
even that has not been substantiated with plausible evidence for SSA under African conditions
contrary to what some have suggested324 since more populous countries have not been seen to
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UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications
for Development, at 45.
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Again even out of this dismal share only three countries (S. Africa, Egypt, and Morocco) stood out as
current destinations and also with potential for future expansion in IT based offshoring and outsourcing,
see the UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and
Development, at 137.
323
Hence countries like Ghana and Botswana have seen more FDI inflow for gold and diamond
respectively; see Ajayi et al., Foreign Direct Investment in Sub‐Saharan Africa: Origins, Targets, Impact
and Potential, African Economic Research Consortium, 3 (2006); While precious metals have greatly
influenced the FDI inflow, petroleum pre‐dominates the overall inflow. For instance, 77% of the total
U.S. investment in Africa in 2008 was in mining according to a 2010 CRS report, see Vivian C. Jones, U.S.
Trade and Investment Relationship with Sub‐Saharan Africa: The African Growth and Opportunity Act,
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress, 11 (February 2010). But another report
revealed that the U.S. investment in the mining sector accounted for 47% of the total in 2006, while the
largest U.S. total FDI stock (31%) in SSA went to Equatorial Guinea and was utilized in petroleum
exploitation, see Langton, supra note 319, at CRS‐9, which indicates that the majority of the U.S. based
FDI stock flow to SSA went to oil reach countries.
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Some scholars see a correlation between market size and attractiveness for market seeking FDI, see
Elizabeth Asiedu, Foreign Direct Investment to Africa; The Role of Government Policy, Governance and
Political Instability, at 10 (2003), which may hold true in many cases but not always.
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enjoy an uptick in market seeking FDI325. African markets just like those in other developing
countries are less significant determinants for investment decisions as investors are more
interested in saving production costs and export of natural resources than utilizing local
markets326. Quality and consumption capacity of local markets in SSA are not sufficient enough
to attract investors who are more interested in utilizing local markets for their products that are
either locally or internationally produced. Thus neither market size (measured in GDP) nor the
potential for local market has been observed to drive investment in SSA. Nor is there a credible
source of empirical evidence to suggest that the existence and use of information and
communication technology have been a driving force for an inward FDI flow in SSA.

2.

Technology Factors Affecting Offshoring Activities

a)

Lack of ICT Capabilities for Cyberspace and IT Offshoring

Cross-border transactions involving IT and IT-enabled services including foreign investment in
those services will definitely require use of cyberspace. With regard to technological factors
affecting IT offshoring, thus, the ability for any given forum to accommodate IT offshoring will
depend on the existence and efficiency of technological underpinnings supporting cyberspace.
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A good example for market size potential is Ethiopia, one of the most populous countries in the
continent, which has not proven to attract or is yet to prove that it actually attracts more market seeking
FDI than any other type.
326
Ivohasina Razafimahefa & Shigeyuki Hamori, "An Empirical Analysis of FDI Competitiveness in
Sub−Saharan Africa and Developing Countries." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 20, at 1−8 (2005).
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By the same token, for anything that demands use and access to cyberspace, there is no doubt
that the existence and efficiency of underlying information and communication technology is the
key requirement. So the ultimate question for a forum attempting to partake in the benefits of IT
service FDI or IT outsourcing is whether or not the forum has the required ICT capability in
place. While lack of ICT capability maybe obvious for many of the Sub-Saharan countries, it
must be recognized that the absence of ICT can seriously inhibit the availability of and access to
cyberspace, inter alia. Indeed, the absence of ICT can totally shut the door of the potential FDI
inflow in IT enabled services including IT outsourcing activities. Lack of efficiency in ICT can
also seriously undermine the availability of cyberspace, which in turn affects the quality and
quantity of inflow in IT service FDI. ICT capabilities are not limited to IT services. Critical
infrastructure providing water, power, government and public safety services, transportation,
telecommunication, and other emergency services may currently exhibit not much of a well
coordinated interaction and interdependence in many Sub-Saharan nations due to the overall
weakness in infrastructure development. But this will eventually change where all these types of
infrastructure services rely heavily on and be intertwined with each other with the help of
underlying information channels enabled through the ICT capabilities. Meanwhile, such ICT
based interdependence introduces the risk of failure multiplication where one single failure will
result in the failure of multiple other infrastructure services. Hence there is the need to not only
design an ICT support for these services in a resilient manner that doesn’t spread a failure
incident but to also ensure that the ICT facilities have built-in security features to repel intrusions
and other security violations. For a digital investor, ICT capabilities entail not just functionality
features provided by the ICT facility, but reliable security features that successfully protect
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service facilities relying on ICT against disruption, unauthorized access to data, and data leak, as
well as destruction.
Availability or non-existence of these capabilities will preempt the potential for areas of
investment as many business services require use of such ICT capabilities, lack of which in turn
will undermine a forum’s ability to compete against other nations in winning IT enabled foreign
investments.

Not surprisingly, observations do not suggest that many of the Sub-Saharan countries have
efficient ICT infrastructure in place to supports an inflow of IT offshoring327. Like many other
developing countries, the SSA region exhibits a huge gap in ICT penetration and thus
participation in digital economy is marginal. The gap between developed and developing
countries is wide in terms of the degree of use or availability of digital economy. While this
disparity, also referred to by some as digital divide328, is even greater between SSA and
developed societies, it must be attributed to the weakness in the penetration of ICT in the SSA
region. In fact studies show that the degree of availability and efficiency of ICT has been the
reason for the fact that the rate of penetration in Internet access is tremendously low for SSA329.
The level of existence in ICT infrastructure may have been the root cause for the lowest level of
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The Sub-Saharan countries lack not only ICT but transportation infrastructure that has contributed over
the past 50 years to the decline of the global trade and most likely also to the minimal flow of FDI; SSA
has the poorest transportation infrastructure, see Robert Z. Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade
Report 2008, World Economic Forum, at 13 (2008).
328
Means lack of equal access to computer technologies – ‘the gap between those who have and those
who have not’, see Sushil K. Sharma, Socio-Economic Impacts and Influences of E-Commerce in a
Digital Economy, in the Digital Economy: Impacts, Influences, and Challenges, 5 (2005).
329
While lack of awareness on what these technologies are and how to use them may have also
contributed to low penetration in PCs and the Internet, poverty may have been the major cause for the
problem; see also UNCTAD, The Information Economy Report, at 21-22 (2010).
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access by poor countries. But access to personal computers and use of the Internet appear to also
correspond with the level of poverty for those countries. Hence, poverty inhibits access to
personal computers and anything else that requires use of computers330. The 2008 data reported
by the World Economic Forum showed that the thirteen (13) countries ranked last based on
availability and use of ICT out of one hundred eighteen (118) countries assessed are from
SSA331. Clearly lack of improved ICT may not have allowed the Sub-Saharan countries to be
more attractive for IT offshoring. Thus, IT offshoring and outsourcing are not on the list for most
of these countries to appear as a good destination for potential IT offshoring or IT services FDI
let alone the fact that offshoring can be considered a driving economic activity in the region.
Sub-Saharan countries have not been proactive in terms of prioritizing investment in wired or
wireless forms of ICT, and allocating resources to mobilize access to global ICT. Meanwhile,
high-speed wireless technologies based on wireless broad band services and the latest wireless
3G or 4G networks have become more promising for covering remote regions and said to narrow
down the yawning broad-band access gap for many countries that are lacking wired forms of
ICT332. While there is a strong likelihood that wireless technologies eventually dominate Internet
access in Africa, so far there has not been a visible sign of implementation efforts for such a
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Surprisingly, very few people in Africa are said to know anything about the Internet, see UNCTAD,
The Information Economy Report, at 22 (2010).
331
None of the remaining Sub-Saharan countries ranked below eighty (80) except Mauritius (54th) and
South Africa (at 60); see Robert Z. Lawrence et al., The Global Enabling Trade Report 2008, World
Economic Forum, at xxii-xxiii (2008).
332
See Rory Macmillan, Connectivity, Openness, and Vulnerability: Challenges Facing Regulators,
Trends in Telecommunication Reform, at 31 (2009).
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promising broad-band option of ICT in most of Africa. The only exception is that there is a huge
up-tick in a simple mobile phone services333.
Of course affordability again becomes a pressing issue. Indeed, there are reasons for not being
able to give a high priority to ICT implementation - the long list of immediate needs. Among the
most important needs are those efforts primarily geared towards feeding the poor more than and
prior to anything else. That would mean for many that they have to first exit the vicious circle of
the poverty, food shortage in particular, by establishing sustainable economic activities in the
primary sector, agriculture,334 before being able to partake in the feast of the modern information
age and reap the benefits.
A few other developing countries have already taken steps to build technology parks just for the
purposes of attracting IT offshoring services, while countries like India335 have set an example
by putting this into practice and creating a state-of-the art technology enclaves equipped with
broad-band, high bandwidth, and secure Internet access. Still others are focused on building
more generic economic territories called Specialized Economic Zones (SEZs) as part of the
overall FDI promoting efforts to provide improved business infrastructure. SEZ can be initiated

333
While the penetration rate in other forms of ICTs has been very slow, the wireless phone service has
seen an exponential adoption and growth in SSA in particular, see the UNCTAD, Information Economy
Report: ICTs, Enterprises and Poverty Alleviation, at xi, xii, 36 (2010).
334
Lack of sustainability in agriculture, which leads to such stagnant shortage of food is primarily caused
by the dependence on natural rain, hence many parts of the SSA region suffers from famine due to
recurring conditions of shortage of rainfall and severe drought, see Hailu Abatena, Globalization and
Development Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa, Presented at the 18th Annual Conference of the Global
Awareness Society International, 5 (May 2009).
335
The Indian approach to create technology parks in an attempt to attract more investment dollars is
geared mainly towards outsourcing overall but this can also be true for service FDI in IT; for details on
India’s efforts, see Madhu T. Rao, Key Issues for Global IT Sourcing: Country and Individual Factors, in
Information Systems Management Journal, 17 (2004).
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either by countries themselves using national resources or by FDIs sources336. The competitive
global market of the IT service FDI demands that a host has efficiency in ICT not only in terms
of functionality but also in terms of security.

With regard to SSA, the reality is that the region has not only been left far behind in terms of use
and access to both cyberspace and ICT infrastructure, but there has still not been a visibly
proactive movement to improve both wireless and wired ICT infrastructures that could support
high bandwidth networks. The region is way behind in espousing the idea of building specially
equipped technology enclaves within their territories to accommodate IT service FDI and do
more on the technology front to attract service FDI. Any discussion regarding network security
will only make sense when there is a functionally robust ICT environment that supports network
connectivity, which is lacking.
Moreover, the ability to support e-commerce, e.g. cross-border online transactions and epayment system (credit cards, bank transfers, etc.), which play a major role in IT services
market, relies on existence, efficiency, and security of ICT. Hence the absence of such reliable
information and communication networks in SSA is another obvious barrier for companies that
maybe willing to introduce e-commerce and e-Payment capabilities to potential customers.
Therefore, in the case of SSA, the absence or use of inefficient ICT is primarily the driving
factor for discouraging IT service FDI. Lack of priority in improving access and use of
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Such SEZs are being established even in a few SSA economies (countries like Egypt, Ethiopia,
Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia) due to mainly China’s intensified natural resource seeking investment
efforts, whereby Chinese investors also help build specialized zones to boost industrialization and foster
their investment efforts; see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low-Carbon
Economy, at 37 (2010).
164

cyberspace, as well as ICT have also been a major inhibitor for most of the Sub-Saharan
countries. These factors continue to hamper the ability of these nations to be competitive in the
world of highly competitive service FDI promotion efforts among mainly developing economies.

b)

Human Resource with Minimal or no Access to ICT Resources

Technological factors affecting IT services offshoring can include the fact that there is lack of
qualified personnel to utilize technological tools essential in supporting the offshoring business
process. Many developing countries generally suffer from shortage of qualified people with
sufficient exposure to college education. But more importantly there is a general tendency in the
developing world to have a shortage of qualified work force with adequate access to and
experience in more recent advanced technology like cyberspace technology. Perhaps the most
obvious reason for such shortage, especially in IT field may be lack of access to communication
and information technology resources such as computers, software, peripherals, and networks.
The SSA nations just like many other developing countries rely on import to meet technological
needs although a few of them may afford producing some of these resources. Access to
technology may also be affected by import restrictions through legal and policy measures on
imported goods and services. If there is a regulatory or policy based import restriction in the
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form of taxes and duties337, this will drive prices for computers and accessories thereby
extremely limiting the ability of citizens to afford such technological tools.
Where there is a weakness in ICT, there is a limited access to global ICT and cyberspace, which
in turn limits citizens’ access to the Internet338 and everything related to cyberspace thereby also
effectively curtailing their ability to experience the ever changing world of information
technology.

Within the professions especially prone to affect IT offshoring, there is a shortage in skilled
engineers and scientists in the fields of computer science and information technology. However,
there is also shortage in personnel skilled in various IT hardware software products. But more
importantly even if there are engineers, scientists, and others with some exposure to IT world,
such professionals are easily outpaced by the current technology, as well as IT products that
demand new skills. With regard to positions in IT and IT enabled services, since certain business
processes need specific skill sets, e.g. experience in one specific software or application, many
IT related positions are hard to fill with existing IT professionals. That means even if there are
enough graduates in certain fields, the fact that these graduates lack specific skill sets will make
them essentially unfit from the outset with regard to certain job requirements. Specific job skills
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Many African countries impose taxes as high as 50% on imported computers, which certainly deters
such imports and also negatively impacts access to, as well as use of computer technology, the Internet,
and computer technology based business processes like e‐commerce; see an unpublished report from
the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, Electronic Commerce and Developing Countries, 6 (2000).

The rate of penetration for the Internet is the lowest in the whole continent of Africa compared to the
rest of the world based on the most recent statistics, and this despite the relatively high rate of increase
since 2000; see Internet World Stats, Internet Usage Statistics for Africa, available at:
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm, (last visited July 22, 2011).
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(e.g. programming in a specific language, new software, or an application system based on a
certain vendor requiring vendor specific support capability) require specific training in addition
to college education. And developing countries do not generally have capabilities to supply
enough personnel with such backgrounds. Neither does SSA have the luxury to meet these
capabilities. More than likely, students in this region have very limited exposure to recent
technological devices, tools, vendor specific software products, application systems, and
associated terminology, as well as concepts. Another disadvantage that many host countries in
the SSA region experience with regard to the ability to attract offshoring is lack of skilled
resources in foreign language. Countries like India benefit from an abundance of human
resources, who are, for instance, not just able to communicate in English but speak it fairly
fluently. As a result, India has become the most important destination for offshoring call centers,
inter alia, by U.S. companies339. These centers albeit not heavily IT-intensive involve some
degree of software and computer technology usage including technology help desk services340
and thus require not only language skills but some exposure or training in computer application
systems and software. It is evident that depending on a type of technology used, any IT
offshoring activity in a host country within SSA will have to consider providing additional
training to support its needs for foreign staff. So any offshoring activity will have to weigh
benefits and cost to determine net benefits in terms of human resources. Specifically there is the

339
Depending on the complexity of the system being supported, help desk tasking or call centers
specializing in system support of course may rather be more IT intensive requiring good IT backgrounds;
for more details on types of offshoring including call centers, telemarketing, etc., see Aspray et al., supra
note 9, at 20.
340
For instance some call centers are used to process credit cards or support other business processes for
U.S. companies where various application systems are used in the process; see Aspray et al., supra note 9,
at 49-53.
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need for investors to consider the cost of such training and the time it takes to produce
sufficiently trained personnel before making an investment move.

While the absence of properly educated and qualified human capital presents an overall
challenge to fill technology intensive job positions, another equally pandemic issue is the
problem with the ability to retain qualified work force341. Under a political upheaval, highly
educated professionals tend to be targeted by political persecution with the consequence that they
be forced to flee their countries. Repressive political regimes that usually thrive under unstable
political conditions are the main causes of such exodus. Unstable regimes are more worried
about strengthening their political power. Hence they usually spend more in defense than in
developmental projects thereby misallocating the already scarce resources342. They neither
actively promote and train work force nor implement retention programs for the fleeing
professionals. The flight of professionals and the brain-drain present another impediment for
SSA in particular. Lack of human resources thus becomes one of the key FDI constraints for
many developing countries, SSA being a very good example.
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Hailu Abatena, Globalization and Development Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa, Presented at the 18th
Annual Conference of the Global Awareness Society International, 4 (May 2009).
342
Id. at 4
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B.

Impediments in Regulation, BITs, and Policies Covering Cyberspace
1.

Lack of Cyberspace Regulation, Bilateral Treaties, and Favorable Policies

a)

Lack of Cyberspace Regulation and Favorable Policies

SSA exhibits an overall weakness in the regulatory process, as well as legal practices albeit this
weakness may vary from country to country. Of course systemic weakness in the overall
jurisprudence means that nothing can be expected of the same broken system to be any better or
different with regard to the legal treatment of cyber security in the region. Overall weakness in
the legal system reflects weakness in cyber security specific legal frameworks as well.
While some progress is being made in modernizing ICT and enabling access to cyberspace for
millions of people in SSA, the governments in the region still have not fully embraced the
urgency of cyber security and, hence, have not responded decisively with effective cyberspace
specific regulations. Regional efforts to harmonize regulatory measures, for instance, to fight
cybercrime have been lacking. With the exception of a handful countries (South Africa,
Mauritius, and Zambia), regulatory efforts at individual country level have been slow and
disappointing343. Also there seems to be not much of attention paid by governments to frame
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Not many countries have been able to forge ahead with cyber security legislation like those few
nations mentioned in the 2008 strategic report by ITU, see ITU Global Cybersecurity Agenda, High-level
Experts Group, Global Strategic Report, at 20 (2008), also available at:
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/global_strategic_report/global_strategic_report.pdf, (last
visited October 22, 2011).
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policies with respect to cyber security. This can in part be due to the overall restrictive policy
agenda that the Sub-Saharan governments maybe pursuing, as well as their reluctant attitude
towards FDI in general. There are national restrictions traditionally imposed over certain
economic sectors to exclude foreign investment and capital. Meanwhile, such restrictive policies
still persist in many countries, both developed and developing economies alike. The trade
liberalization efforts of the GATT and later WTO have not entirely persuaded many to eliminate
such restrictions344. Many Sub-Saharan nations for instance are still reluctant to give up control
over telecommunication infrastructure by retaining state monopoly over telecoms. In fact, such
static policies and investment regulations that allowed states to retain control while unable to
modernize telecom are to blame for the rotten or non-existent ICT infrastructure in those
countries345. These countries are neither willing to change policies to privatize the telecom
industry nor able to modernize the ICT infrastructure by themselves due to lack of resources.

Conversely, when there is no urgency being felt for the security of cyberspace due to deficiency
in ICT, designing security policy may take a back seat. Therefore, it can be argued that lack of
relevant legal and policy frameworks for cyber security within the majority of the Sub-Saharan
countries can be attributed to the fact that the region is lacking efficient ICT infrastructure. And
the fact the region has been unable to provide efficacy in terms of ICT capabilities has also been
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Jurgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and
the OECD, Multilateral Agreements on Investment, in the Journal of International Economic Law, 23:4, at
724 (2003).
345
The Ethiopian government for instance has made changes in investment law to minimize state control
over several sectors including Telecom, but the last amendment will allow telecom investment only as a
joint venture with the government; see the Investment Climate Statements by the U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs; Openness to Foreign Investment, 2006/2007 Highlights:
http://www.state.goveeebifd2008100861.htm, (last visited July 27, 2011).
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behind the region’s inability to experience an uptick in offshoring activities. Wherever there is
no ICT, there is no other effective tool to foster IT service offshoring, and thus no motivation for
investors to engage in business models relying on cyberspace. Consequently, since not much is
happening in terms of IT service offshoring activities, there is much less of a motivation to enact
cyberspace regulation or worry about cyber security altogether.

The majority of the SSA region may have no choice but still rely on obsolete legal norms to
address cyberspace issues, but it is not surprising that their existing legal systems are no match
for the ever changing environment in the frontiers of cyberspace. As evidenced by many other
nations, even relatively modern but traditional legal norms enacted before the advent of the
information age have not been fully capable of dealing with cyberspace346. Not surprisingly, the
already obsolete legal systems within many of the Sub-Saharan countries are not capable of
dealing with cyberspace born legal issues. As a result, there is uncertainty in addressing issues
with cybercrime and legal disputes arising from transactions on cyberspace.
Many of the Sub-Saharan countries are yet to respond to challenges of cyber security with
appropriate legislative courses of action. But they should first layout cyber security strategies,
which would require embracing the concept that any effort to secure cyberspace involves
cybercrime legislation347, one of the five pillars of the global cyber security agenda developed
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GERALD FERRERA ET AL., CYBER LAW: TEXT AND CASES 301 (2000).
Marco Gercke, International Telecommunication Union – Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for
Developing Countries, Draft, 83 (2009).
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and recommended by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)348. To succeed with the
legal and strategic measures suggested by the ITU, the Sub-Saharan countries will need to
revamp existing laws. That is there is the need to overhaul and update existing legal norms; such
as, substantive and procedural criminal laws to allow their applicability to cyber security and
cybercrimes. Utilizing the ITU’s toolkit for cybercrime legislation349, inter alia, they should also
strive not only to enact laws specific to cybercrime to ensure safety and security in cyberspace,
but also account for legal transactions in commercial and contractual laws, as well as disputes
involving cyberspace.

b)

Promoting Investment Climate with Bilateral Investment Treaties

It has been one of the hottest areas of economic measures for developing economies in particular
to pursue a variety of incentives to attract more FDIs. Such incentives include designing
favorable policies, enacting investment laws with minimal restrictions, concluding Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs), and establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs)350, inter alia. When

348
Which include: international cooperation, legal measures, organizational structures, capacity building,
and technical & procedural measures; see the ITU five strategic pillars and seven goals, available at
http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/cybersecurity/gca/pillars-goals/index.html, (last visited October 22, 2011).
349
ITU Toolkit for Cybercrime Legislation, Developed through the American Bar Association’s Privacy
& Computer Crime Committee Section of Science & Technology Law With Global Participation, Draft,
6f (February 2010).
350
SEZ can be initiated by countries themselves using national resources or by FDIs sources. Such is the
case even in a few SSA economies (countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Nigeria and Zambia) due to
mainly China’s intensified natural resource seeking investment efforts, whereby Chinese investors also

172

it comes to investment agreements, there are also multilateral and International Investment
Agreements (IIAs), which come into play when considering investment promotion. Unlike BITs;
however, multilateral and international investment agreements could have double-edged effects.
These effects are best exemplified by the recent dispute between Vattenfall and Germany351. On
the one hand, these agreements may boost investor confidence by providing protective legal
frameworks, while on the other hand they can derail a specific country’s prerogative to
promulgate investment laws according to their particular needs and provide suitable policy
measures towards incentives. Such a policy derailment could in turn become a road block for a
country’s effort in FDI promotion whereby this eventually may have a discouraging effect on
potential FDI investors (e.g. TNCs)352. By contrast, BITs are more geared towards home and host
country specific interests, and thus tend to have more positive impact on FDI decisions. A few
observations, albeit beset with some inconsistencies, show that BITs generally exhibit some
correlation with the increase in FDI inflow thereby supporting the argument for the positive
impact353. This has also been evidenced in the current trends in international treaties where
bilateral investment agreements have become increasingly important with the number of BITs

help build specialized zones to boost industrialization and foster their investment efforts; see UNCTAD,
World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low‐Carbon Economy, at 37.
351

The Vattenfall v. Germany arbitration case best reflects the dual effects of such agreements; also see
Nathalie Bernasconi, Background paper on Vattenfall v. Germany arbitration, International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD), (2009).
352
Climate control related agreements are a good example, which seem to affect trends in cross-border
technology transfer with respect to carbon, see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a
Low-Carbon Economy, at 136.
353
For studies showing positive correlation, see Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?. World Development, Vol. 3, No.
1, pp. 31-49, at 34 (May 1, 2005), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=616242, (last visited June
11, 2011). Opponents don’t see such correlation or BIT’s increased influence in FDI inflow, see Jason
Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, the Virginia Journal of International Law Association, Volume 51 — Number 2 —
Page 397, at 426f (2010).
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signed spiking year by year starting from 1990s354. The rules stipulated at interstate level are best
tailored and usually the most effective ones to meet investors’ needs in protecting their property
rights in host states. In contrast, international law that could be invoked through an IIA often
offers foreign investors little effective protection and lacks binding mechanism.355

While BITs may prove to entail some advantages, there has also been some reluctance on a few
countries’ behalf to adopt them. Some countries may either try to drastically limit the level of
protection provided for FDI or stay away from BITs altogether. For example, countries
predominantly in Latin America try to restrict the content of BITs with the normative view
embodied in the ‘Calvo Doctrine’356. It has been claimed that BITs are playing only minor roles
in attracting FDIs or driving FDI decisions by corporations357, while others dispute the growing
importance and flexibility of BITs358. Such denial of the BIT’s importance in promoting FDIs
can be attributed in part to the fact that investment decisions are highly dependent on natural

354
See figure 1 taken from UNCTAD 2003, Neumayer et al., supra note 528, at 41. For most recent
trends, see figure 111, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, Non-Equity Modes of International
Production and Development, at 100.
355
Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Impact on
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries; In Int’l Lawyer, # 24, at 655 (1990).
356
Id. at 660.
357
That because, according to Yackee, studies suggesting otherwise (those supporting BITs role as an FDI
decision driver) did not correlate BIT’s effects with political risks insurance, for details see Jason Webb
Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, the Virginia Journal of International Law Association, Volume 51, #2, page 397, at
422f (2010). But Yackee’s suggestion assumes that all FDI decisions take into account or take advantage
of political risk insurance does not account for many investors who rely solely on BITs. He also suggests
that BITs are said to be less of a driving factor in investment decisions based on surveys of corporate
counsels, see Yackee, id. at 426f.
358

For instance, the non-existence of BITs wouldn’t discourage FDI as observed in China where more
than 350 U.S. companies have invested since 1978 even though there is no BIT between the U.S. and
China; see Salacuse, supra note 530, at 673.
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resources, market size, as well as political and social conditions than treaties. However, although
these differing factors may play major and sometimes decisive roles, depending on a country’s
specific circumstances, in determining the rate of FDI inflow, the BIT’s role in almost all FDI
decisions cannot and should not be overlooked.

2.

Applicability of the Full Protection and Security Standard to Digital

Investment

In the absence of adequate legal frameworks to protect digital assets, the question as to whether a
digital investor is protected under the full protection standard is in order. International
investment treaties and bilateral investment agreements in most cases contain provisions aimed
at protection of investor and investor’s assets often using varying languages. Many of these
provisions articulate such protection using clauses like “full protection and security359”,
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E.g., a NAFTA provision in Article 1105 uses the same phrase, but no explanation as to what this
standard should constitute; also see Juergen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO?
Lessons from Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD: Multilateral Agreements on Investment, in the
Journal of International Economic Law, 23:4, at 738 (2003).
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“constant protection and security” or “continuous protection and security”360. Despite such
divergence in terminology, many treaties envision providing a full protection and security
standard (FPS) but with little or no guidance as to what specifically the standard stipulated under
provisions like the above phrases should constitute. Others either equate FPS with fair and
equitable treatment (FET)361 or use FET for circumstances not covered under the physical safety
provided by FPS362. In addition, investment agreements include a reference to international law,
such as the international customary law, albeit again with varying languages, in some cases
somewhat limiting the scope of the applicability of international law. Such limitation in scope is
believed (at least by the signatories) to be the case with NAFTA363. In the case of NAFTA, this
has compounded the interpretational difficulty of the provision. While the original language of
the NAFTA provision has left much room for more interpretation, which resulted in an expanded
construction by quite a few arbitral tribunals in various cases364 favoring investors, the NAFTA
parties: Mexico, U.S., and Canada have attempted to limit the scope of the provision. The
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See the Kluwer Arbitration Blog, The Full Protection and Security Standard in Practice, available at:
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/16/the-full-protection-and-security-standard-in-practice/,
(last visited July 27, 2011).
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Sometimes treating both as the same as in National Grid vs. Argentina, Award, 3 November 2008,
paras 187, 189.
362
For instance, the tribunal in PSEG v Turkey took this position which appears to contradict with the
current view that expands FPS essentially placing both standards in concurring positions; also see
Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, pp. 1–17,
at 13 (2010).
363
Article 1105 under NAFTA, for instance, states: ‘Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of
another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security’, available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp, (last
visited August 12, 2011). But the NAFTA parties later issued an official interpretation in an attempt to
limit the scope of this provision, see David A. Gantz, Investor‐State Arbitration Under ICSID, the ICSID
Additional Facility and the UNCTAD Arbitral Rules, at 34‐35 (2004)
364

E.g., Pope & Talbot v Canada, 31 May 2002 (2002) 41 ILM 1347, paras 17–69, see Schreuer, supra
note 362.at 11; and for detail on a similar case: Mondev v. United State, see Gantz, supra note 363, at 37,
where the claimant questioned the applicability and requirements of customary international law.
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restriction language applied in the amendment later stated that “…full protection and security did
not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.”365
Notwithstanding these interpretational and contextual difficulties reflected in various investment
agreements such as NAFTA, FPS is commonly applied in investment jurisprudence today. This
is especially the case under the arbitral dispute resolution including the very first ICSID case,
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) vs. Republic of Sri Lanka, where an ICSID tribunal
rendered an investment treaty award under this standard366. Meanwhile, the current trend in the
international investment jurisprudence reveals that arbitral tribunals have always interpreted the
FPS in stark divergence. This is either due to variations in the formulation of the standard in
various BITs or due partly to different interpretation of whether or not its applicability extends
beyond the circumstances, where the physical security of the investor or investor’s assets is at
stake. The latter is more controversial as has been observed in some FDI litigations. For instance,
the tribunal in Saluka Investments vs. the Czech Republic367 did not construe the standard to
include other kinds of impairment in investment activity, while another tribunal in Azurix vs.
Argentina368 expanded such interpretation holding that “it is not only a matter of physical
security; the stability afforded by a secure environment is as important from an investor’s point
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See Gantz, supra note 363, at 36.
Over 30 investment awards have involved this standard since then, but arbitrators have varyingly
construed the standard, in some cases the same clause in the same treaty was applied differently by
different tribunals; see the Kluwer Arbitration Blog, The Full Protection and Security Standard in
Practice, available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/16/the-full-protection-and-securitystandard-in-practice/, (last visited August 8, 2011).
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Saluka Investments (The Netherlands) v the Czech Republic (Partial Award, 17 March 2006), see
Collins, supra note 60, at 11. The tribunal stated the standard was “not meant to cover just any kind of
impairment of an investor’s investment, but to protect more specifically the physical integrity of an
investment against interference by use of force.”; see the Kluwer Arbitration Blog, supra note 366.
368
ICSID Case no. ARB/01/12 (14 July 2006); also see Collins, supra note 60, at 14.
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of view.”369 Such divergence in interpreting physical security also arises partly due to the context
originally understood under FPS, which originally is supposed to provide the guarantee of the
‘physical security’ for investors and their investment assets370.

Physical security is supposed to cover the wellbeing of investors and investors’ assets from direct
physical attacks resulting in some imputable damages. Such physical security breach can occur
due to, for instance, civil disturbance or confiscation.
Meanwhile, it may be a common occurrence that an attack against physical safety caused by civil
disturbance or employee protest incidents could inflict damage to personnel and tangible assets
of an investor and thus qualify for a physical security breach. But it is unclear if a similar
incident leading to loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, as well as
information systems, qualifies for physical security breach. Whether or not any possible
disruption of cyberspace caused by such a civil disturbance can qualify as a physical security
breach will depend on whether one has the luxury of expanding the concept of physical security.
At first since physical security will protect against incidents like civil disorder or employee riots,
justifying a cyber attack as such is in order. By the same token, equating a cyber attack with an
attack; such as, an incident of civil disturbance or employee protest that, for example, severely
undermines FDI activities, in the context of physical security may need some analysis. First there
is a need to qualify a cyber attack as incident commonly accepted in the context of physical
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See the Kluwer Arbitration Blog, supra note 366, available at:
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/16/the-full-protection-and-security-standard-in-practice/,
(last visited August 8, 2011).
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Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, pp. 1–
17, at 16 (2010).
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security, e.g. a riot or an incident of civil disturbance. Secondly, even if cyber attack qualifies as
a riot similar to civil disturbance, an incident of civil disturbance can be different in real world
from that in the world of cyberspace. For instance, should a cyber attack be caused by multiple
participants to be considered as a physical security breach? How about a single cyber attack that
targets more FDIs in a given forum? Technology has made it possible to initiate one or more
simultaneous and concerted attacks against one or more targets in cyberspace. However, the fact
that such concerted attacks can also have just one perpetrator in the backend, does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of a group of people whether large or small to be behind such
coordinated attacks. Thus, if a group of employees have the ability to initiate a coordinated
attack; such as, a denial of service that can easily disable a server or system belonging to an
investor, there is no question that such an attack too could qualify as an attack of a riot. In the
end the fact that the attack takes place in cyberspace or using cyberspace cannot change the
central question of whether or not assets belonging to an investor have been damaged by people
participating in a non-isolated incident. And the fact that such attacks can be caused by at least a
group of people with the intention to undermine the FDI project as a whole can qualify as a riot.

On the other hand, even if a cyber attack qualifies as a riot that could be covered under an FPS
clause, this does not mean that the concept of physical security directly applies to digital assets.
That is because the scope of the physical security was originally intended to cover only physical
assets. While there are more questions than answers when it comes to the applicability of the
concept of physical security to cyberspace, there is a tendency in scholars to broaden the concept
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of FPS as a whole to the overall impairment of FDI activities and not just the physical wellbeing
of tangible assets and personnel371.
Thus, from a digital investor’s point of view, there is the question of coverage under this
standard. At first the question of whether or not the concept of physical security should be
expanded to cover damages beyond tangible assets should be addressed. The answer to this
depends on whether the full protection of assets clause actually is meant to cover non-physical
assets. Digital investment comprises for the most part of non tangible assets belonging to an
investor and located in the forum enclave or considered part of the investment assets used in the
FDI business process. Digital assets include information assets (web sites, data, computer
systems, software, etc) used as part of investment projects. Electronic or digital assets are best
protected with electronic means of protection mechanisms that are not necessarily physical.
Although there are physical and environmental mechanisms, which help protect digital assets,
physical security is neither the only means nor sufficient by itself to provide protection for
information assets. Thus the physical security afforded under the FPS standard if construed
literally or narrowly will not account for an adequate protection of digital assets. This would lead
to an unfair and unreasonable conclusion of the digital investor not being protected by an FPS
clause, e.g. under a BIT. As in Azurix v Argentina372, in order to provide sufficient coverage for
information assets and the investor for such investment, the full protection standard needs to be
construed in such a way that it envisions an overall secure environment that can be possible with
physical and non-physical means.
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Some suggest that any cyber attack even when coming from a single source but aimed at more
companies could be covered under FPS, see Collins, supra note 60, at 1.
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ICSID Case no. ARB/01/12 (14 July 2006); also see Collins, supra note 60, at 14.
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As it stands currently, the general tendency is to apply the FPS standard in BITs broadly, beyond
the scope of the minimum required by the customary international law. This makes sense
especially when investment is defined by the BITs to include tangible and intangible assets. One
reason is that not only is a specific action against the person in an FDI investor and investor’s
assets, but conditions making such attacks possible are often considered covered under the FPS
provision. So, for instance, a certain regulation that paved the way for a local partner to terminate
a contract with the investor in CME v Czech Republic373 was claimed the basis for the lawsuit
brought under this standard where the tribunal agreed. However, there is no clear consensus to
some degree among tribunals considering the diversity of outcomes in such cases. For example,
another tribunal assessing a different claim but a similar issue based on the same regulatory
condition in Lauder v The Czech Republic came to a different conclusion374.

On the contrary, such treaties do not limit the FPS scope by reference to international law per se.
The rationale is that the minimum under the customary international law is considered a residual
standard below which any such FPS scope cannot fall and be interpreted375. The threshold of
minimum under FPS is higher as long as there is no additional stipulation explicitly limiting the
scope of the FPS similar to the subsequent official interpretation of NAFTA, Article 1105376.
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Id. at 8.
375
Id. at 12; see also Collins, supra note 60, at 1.
376
At least the parties’ subsequently provided interpretation limits the scope of the provision under
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note 373, at 11; see also David A. Gantz, Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID, the ICSID Additional
Facility and the UNCTAD Arbitral Rules, at 34-35 (2004).
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Even with limiting provisions, the treaty should be more specific since there is the tendency
among arbitral tribunals to extend FPS clauses. Especially those provisions that qualify the terms
‘protection and security’ with the term ‘full’ to matters worth protecting by measures not limited
to those safeguards that are limited to physical security377.
As the technology and conditions in the global market place evolve, so should the legal
environment, as well as the minimum treatment of aliens under the customary international law.
In reality though technology and global business environments evolve much more rapidly than
the legal frameworks, hence there is a catch-up problem for the law. However, this doesn’t mean
that existing legal norms should not be construed in conformity with real world demands, other
things being equal. FPS too should embrace the challenges of the information age to
accommodate digital investor and must be constructed accordingly so its protection sphere
encompasses information assets.
FPS should, thus, be able to cover the non-physical nature of infringement on these equally
valuable assets. The rationale again is that from the digital investor standpoint, it is crucial that
the information asset residing in a non-physical state on cyberspace is protected by any means.
Hence, only when a broad construction of the standard is possible will the digital investor be
protected against cyber attacks targeting digital assets. Therefore, following the expansive view,
it seems more plausible to argue that at least a concerted effort by private (non-government
sponsored) cyber attackers against one or more investors should also be equated with any
interference (civil disturbance, riots, or protests) recognized by the clause, ‘physical security’
with the consequence that FPS can be extended to such attacks.
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The tribunal in Biwater Gauff v Tanzania affirmed the holding in Azurix Corp. v The Argentine
Republic, Award, 14 July 2006, see Schreuer, supra note 373, at 8.
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A different situation worth considering is the determination of damage and nature of
compensation. There is no a clear cut answer to the question of damage and compensation under
the full protection standard in cases of cyber attacks, especially when poor countries are involved
as a host. This is relevant to SSA in particular, of course. While there are more questions than
answers when it comes to the application of any FPS provision in the first place in developing
economies, one issue in particular stands out. That is the question of whether or not poor nations
can justifiably be held fully accountable for damages caused by cyber security breaches. On the
positive side; however, one can argue that, first the existence of the FPS provision can generally
be viewed as an important legal source of protection for any FDI assets including digital
investments. Secondly, wherever there is an agreement with an adequate FPS clause embedded,
there is an increased likelihood for legal coverage of protection for investors and their assets,
which fall under such provision or are considered investment assets. This is true even when there
are no other applicable legal norms in the forum. Unfortunately, in regards to liability for data
breaches, FPS may not suffice to hold poor nations accountable. In other words, there is no
guarantee for compensating damages caused by lack of cyber security under FPS. The problem
with applying FPS to damages in cyberspace in the case of SSA is two-folds. On the one hand
there is the possibility that poor nations cannot be expected to fully account for cyber security
anyways given the prevalent problem with the lack of efficient ICT. Poor ICT infrastructure can
easily contribute to cyber security breaches. Many Sub-Saharan countries do not have resources
to modernize their ICT infrastructures with built-in security capabilities, which could help secure
their portion of cyberspace and minimize data breaches. The liability determination under FPS
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requires the existence of due-diligence and lack of reasonable measures378. By not providing
secure backbones in their ICTs, these countries may consistently breach due diligence, but
whether or not they also fail the ‘reasonable measure’ test is questionable. Reasonable measures
include providing secure infrastructure that they most likely control. Such measures would also
include enabling attribution, identification, and prosecution of perpetrators located within their
national boundaries with appropriate substantive and procedural laws – ‘the obligation to detect
and prosecute cybercriminals’379. Even if these countries have no or very rudimentary provisions
related to cyberspace, they may still be held responsible for lack of legal measures in this respect
as it can be reasonably expected that these countries have the obligation generally to enable
prosecution of criminals within their territories. Providing secure ICT, on the contrary, may not
be reasonably expected from them given the immense problem with poverty and lack of capital.
These countries have to mobilize their already scarce resources to fight poverty, food shortage in
particular before anything else. That is there is no way they can modernize the capital intensive
technology infrastructure. They cannot be reasonably held accountable and thus be fully liable
for a security breach facilitated by inefficient ICT. However, one caveat that could be drawn here
is a possibility of state involvement. That is if a cyber attack is state-sponsored or can be
attributed to a government agent acting on behalf of the government, then there is the possibility
under the international law of state obligation380 that the state is held accountable for the action.
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That would in turn mean that the same state could justifiably be held accountable for a full
compensation of the loss of data or other damages on digital investment.

Conversely, the requirement for the exercise of due diligence could also be expanded to an
investor per se. When it comes to cyber security, the responsibility to safeguard digital assets
primarily falls on the stakeholder, a digital investor in this case. The investor is expected to
implement the basic security measures, lack of which could result in a contributory negligence.
So, if the digital investor, who sustained data breach due to lack of cyber security, did not
implement the necessary security mechanisms; such as, firewalls, encryption tools, and
antivirus/intrusion detection software in the investor’s data center or network, the investor is
equally responsible for damages sustained. The contributory negligence in this case could either
exonerate the host or minimize the amount of compensation the host may be liable for.
Thus, on the flip side, despite the extended protection of digital assets that may be considered as
provided by a particular FPS, the ability of the digital investor to fully or partially recover
damages under the FPS totally hinges on the country specific circumstances.

C.

Political and Macro-Economic Impediments

1.

Lack of Political Stability

185

Political risk is often sited among the main constraints in SSA affecting the level of inward flow
in foreign capital. Studies suggest that political instability is one of the factors that multinationals
often site as a reason for not willing to do business in a particular country381. While political
upheavals may or may not target specific FDIs in the forum, FDI business activities can be
directly impaired by political incidents like civil unrest, coup, or assassinations, which are all
common risk factors in parts of politically instable SSA382. Many governments in SSA are
formed often with a forceful military intervention; such as, coup d’e-tat or refusal to relinquish
power as opposed to a democratic process based on fair and transparent elections383.
Political stability allows a government to craft suitable legal and policy frameworks, establish
appropriate macro-economic or developmental programs, and implement lawful governance.
With regard to the ability to attract IT service FDIs in SSA, the same impeding factors caused
directly or indirectly by political unrest come into play. There should be appropriate laws and
policies governing commercial and investment activities, addressing cybercrime, and facilitating
law enforcement, all of which require political stability in the first place. One of the major issues
with the Sub-Saharan governments is that many of them do not have public support and hence
are neither democratic nor stable. The consequence is that these governments are not in a
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Other factors whose availability or quality will also impact FDI decisions include natural resources,
market size, physical infrastructure, human capital, the host country’s investment policies, and reliable
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Resources, Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability, at 65 (2006).
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Abatena, Globalization and Development Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa, Presented at the 18th Annual
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position to provide a more conducive atmosphere for updating existing laws or enacting new
laws. On the one hand, they are not prepared or willing to liberalize their political agenda and
legal system. As a result they cannot design legal and policy frameworks suitable to promote
better business environments, to attract foreign capital, and to address the challenges of the
information age. With respect to FDI, for instance, investment laws must have been liberalized
in such a way that technology and capital intensive sectors are open to foreign investors to allow
capital inflow. However, for fear of loss of control, many are reluctant to liberalize investment
laws or they provide only marginal incentives that are usually hampered by a bureaucratic
system of administration. For instance, some governments will not fully privatize
telecommunication because if they do, they would not be able to scrutinize or censor
communications among their citizens and political dissidents within or outside their countries.
Some may do this for justifiable reasons such as national security. But given the immense need
to modernize telecommunication infrastructure and boost economy, even the fear for national
security may not necessarily outweigh economic benefits of improving ICT through privatizing
an outdated telecom.

Meanwhile it is worth noting that a government maybe politically stable while lacking good
governance, which could likewise impair the FDI inflow since bad governance implies rampant
corruption, embezzlement, and bad policy, as well as legal frameworks. On the contrary;
however, lack of political stability within the context that this involves any number of incidents
associated with political upheavals will likely result in bad governance. Issues with lack of
democratic transparency as has been observed in China is a form of political instability, but
compared to the degree of such instability, for instance in SSA, political issues in countries like
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China are less critical. This is because no similar political turmoil, e.g. coup d’e-tat, is expected
in economically well-off countries and investors seem to disregard the politics as compared to
other benefits perceived to exist at destinations like China. Therefore, while bad governance may
or may not equate with political instability, bad governance may not always affect business or
investment environments as countries have proven384. It seems puzzling, but countries like China
also feature the same issues with bad governance (corruption, scandals, and quality of
institutions) in addition to issues with democracy which is more political issue385 as can be seen
in many other developing nations. Considering the Chinese economic boom, the fact that China
continues to receive huge flow of foreign capital and experience an unprecedented economic
expansion despite its negative record in human rights and digital transparency, implies that
businesses are not necessarily deterred by those factors, at least not in the case of China.
From SSA’s perspective, things are different as the region does not enjoy the same degree of
non-political benefits that seem to override political concerns in China. Political concerns in SSA
outweigh other factors which are favorable for FDIs. All in all political pressures impede liberal
legal and policy frameworks, which in turn impair economic progress by discouraging private
capital flow from national and foreign sources.

2.

Macroeconomic Determinants
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As outlined above, macroeconomic conditions generally help determine the degree and type of
FDI flow that a host can manage to pull. Favorable macroeconomic fundamentals, ceteris
paribus, contribute to improved inflow of FDI386. There are certain economic factors that play a
distinct role as FDI deterrents. Foreign currency and distribution considerations, balance of trade
problems, inflationary pressures, and exchange rate volatility are among the most important
factors that have the potential to inversely affect the rate of FDI flow387. In addition, rampant
corruption often undermines enforceability of commercial contracts thereby contributing to
weakness in macroeconomic dynamics that support FDI inflow. Thus under circumstances not
only crafting new economic policies, but certain adjustments in existing macroeconomic
fundamentals are required to induce investments. Policies have to be designed in such a way that
they directly and positively reinforce FDI promotion efforts. Policies should contribute to the
overall economic development. FDI promotion in general involves efforts geared towards
improving national image, identifying and mapping potential investor to investment areas,
servicing investment projects, and incorporating policy adjustment as needed388. But none of
these efforts can prove effective when it comes to FDI in services involving IT intensive
business process model without support from a dependable ICT infrastructure. FDI in service
sector nowadays demands access or use of cyberspace using ICT infrastructure, improvement of
which could be targeted with proper policies. Macroeconomic policies thus need to take into
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consideration ways to implement and improve such infrastructures. In essence there is the need
to provide an economic policy direction and support geared towards a development or
improvement of ICT in addition to meaningful promotion strategies. In the “new economy389”
countries have to embrace the need to access global economy and market place taking advantage
of ICT. This of course requires investment in ICT to enable digital economy as the new economy
takes an extensive use of ICT and computer technology. The problem; however, is that many
developing countries lack either sound macroeconomic policies or consistency in designing
economic policies to induce such ICT diffusion, as well as reduce digital divide both
internationally (among countries) and domestically (among groups within a country).
The strength and weakness in various macroeconomic fundamentals in Sub-Saharan economies
vary from country to country. However, there is an overall weakness in macroeconomic
performance across the region. Many factors, both external and internal, help hold back
economic performance in the region, the major ones being lack of trade and investment policy
liberalization, inappropriate policy considerations or ‘policy mix’390. Poor ICT, as well as
transportation infrastructure, and inadequate private sector participation, inter alia, as well work
against FDI promotion. These factors are common to many Sub-Saharan economies while many
others are peculiar to each country. These factors also generally lead to multiple volatilities
including problems in balance of trade, foreign exchange, inflation, and ultimately to the overall
macroeconomic stagnation or decline. Macroeconomic deterrents in SSA are exacerbated by
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other factors that may or may not be controlled by Sub-Saharan hosts. With respect to offshoring
service FDI, additional factors may play equally decisive roles. Geographical location (timezone, proximity)391, cultural and ethical settings, e.g. language barriers and different ethical
sensitivities392, and pool of talents393 can all make a difference. MNCs often consider these
factors as well to make a decision to do or not to do business in certain destinations. Perhaps
among the disadvantages that Sub-Saharan destinations face are also these determinants since
many Sub-Saharan countries neither have proximity advantages nor linguistic pre-disposition to
better serve investors especially from the U.S. In sum, all of these factors or lack of proper push
factors (from the home country perspective) and pull factors (host based benefits) with regard to
SSA eventually discourage FDI including those in service sectors.
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become more attractive for U.S. investors, see Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), supra note 94, at 66; Distance can impede collaboration and difference in time zone
can affect for instance meeting schedules, see Madhu T. Rao, Key Issues for Global IT Sourcing: Country
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by China, there is no doubt that Sub-Saharan countries lack this qualification due to the rate of
expatriation among educated people from the region, inter alia.
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VII. Chapter Three Summary

Chapter three presented in detail the challenges the Sub-Saharan region in Africa generally faces
in terms of, inter alia, regulating cyberspace, providing technical capabilities to accommodate IT
and IT-enabled FDI, and crafting appropriate policies to promote FDI in service sector in
particular. In conclusion, this research finds that although there are country-specific variations in
the ability to attract offshoring FDI, the region stands far behind other developing regions. An
overwhelming position among the literary sources investigated supports the fact that the
challenges SSA encounters in an attempt to attract and benefit from IT and IT-enabled offshore
undertakings by MNCs, as well as other foreign investors are multi-fold. The challenges that
impede efforts to promote FDI are multifaceted but can be categorized broadly as political,
economic, regulatory, historical, and technical. When it comes to offshoring FDI, these
constraints are nothing new except that almost all of these challenges become more prominent in
SSA. Many other nations (developed or developing) around the globe face some or all of these
challenges to a degree, whereas SSA sadly seems to exhibit more of every impairment in this
regard. That is SSA still has more political turmoil, more poverty issues to deal with, more
outdated or dysfunctional legal and policy frameworks, and more volatile macroeconomic
fundamentals, all of which have contributed to the overall image problems as well. What is
peculiar to SSA too is the fact that in many instances the historical factors associated with the
colonial era still find prominence. With regard to SSA, foreign investors tend to still maintain a
mindset of doing business just as it was done during the colonial period where investment
projects are aimed solely at returns and not collateral benefits (e.g. employment, capital flow,
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technology transfer, etc.) the forum should be getting. Such mindset contributes to an overly
cautious optimism or even pessimism and holdback by governments in liberalizing investment
opportunities of certain sectors for foreigners.

The Sub-Saharan region also houses countries that are perhaps the least technologically enabled
countries in the world to support cyberspace. These countries have the lowest penetration rates in
ICT and Internet usage. Since many of the SSA nations are also among the least developed
countries economically, they tend to have the lowest rate in terms of citizens’ access to
computers and computer technology. While the importance of ICT and access to global
cyberspace may have been understood by some governments, these governments are out of luck
as they do not have enough capital to invest in technology other than to continue to fight the
prevalent poverty with whatever resource they have. Hence there is an elevated degree of the
lack of functional and secure ICT networks being a primary deterrent factor for investment in IT
and IT-enabled services by foreign and national investors alike.
In sum, SSA on the one hand has these many and more acute FDI impediments to account for in
order to be able to attract offshoring. On the other hand, there is a yawning capital resource gap
to account for the majority of these problems. Exiting the poverty vicious cycle with sustainable
agriculture, providing improved infrastructure, transportation and ICT in particular, modernizing
legal and policy frameworks, overcoming the acute shortage in human capital to staff legal and
technical professions, inter alia, and campaigning against bad overall images all require funding,
which is scarce. The ability of the SSA nations to provide a better than expected investment
climate against all odds and score a breakthrough in attracting FDI in general does not seem to
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exist right now but possible. Their ability to compete against and outperform other offshore
destinations may not only be difficult, but given their negative images much more is needed on
their part to even be at the same level with other non Sub-Saharan nations in terms of being an
attractive destination. The sad truth; however, is that IT Offshoring market is nearly out of reach
for many of these countries because they are neither able to adequately support the growing
technical demands of the modern cyberspace with efficiency nor successfully fight cybercrimes
with appropriate legal and technical means.

Chapter Four
Availability and Adequacy of Options for Alternate Dispute Resolution to Promote Offshoring in
SSA: The Case of Ethiopia

VIII. Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the question as to whether or not there exist adequate means
of alternate dispute resolution in Sub-Saharan Countries taking the Ethiopian specific legal
regime into consideration. To address this question, the investigation will take into consideration
a few empirical examples showing how investment disputes are resolved using ADR, as well as
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what options there are for an arbitral means of dispute resolution under the Ethiopian legal
regime. Of special interest are those legal norms within the country that apply directly or
indirectly to arbitration of investor-State disputes originating from FDI transactions. The focus is
on the investor’s ability to rely on the Ethiopian legal regime regardless of whether that is the
only option or there are additional sources; such as, BITs and institutional arbitration for access
to ADR, arbitration in particular. The availability and effectiveness of such dispute resolution
mechanisms under both Ethiopian investment law and institutional arbitration will be looked at
from investors’ standpoints.

An investor-State dispute can be referred to judicial proceedings of either ordinary local courts or
special courts of a host or home nation, or even to a third country's judicial system394. Such a
dispute may also be referred to an alternate means of dispute resolution, the most important of
which is arbitration established under BITs or multilateral treaties. Meanwhile, enforcement of
contractual or legal rights of investors in local judicial institutions often proves to be difficult and
is a significant impediment to the inflow of FDIs, particularly, in developing nations. These
nations’ formal legal instruments are in many circumstances weak and less developed. Their
court systems are inundated, poorly staffed, less familiar with commercial and cross-national
cases, and less independent395. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is the need for investors to
consider arbitration with appropriate clauses as part of their investment agreements or treaties so
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that the availability of arbitration as an ADR is guaranteed. Moreover, ADR provides additional
benefits compared to litigation. Investment disputes are frequently submitted to arbitral tribunals
since such tribunals have proven to be neutral and less time consuming, as well as cost effective
in resolving disputes compared to litigation396.
Adopting national and international arbitration regimes within a forum will provide investors
with more options to choose from when selecting tribunals, which in turn also bolsters forum’s
ability to enhance FDI incentives. Meaning the availability of a reliable ADR mechanism will
bolster investors’ confidence, enhance the degree of effectiveness in incentives available for FDI,
and ultimately determine the forum’s ability to compete against other nations in providing
conducive environments for the highly competitive type of FDI, the service FDI.

IX.

Dispute Settlement under the Ethiopian Investment Law

A.

Settlement of Disputes through Mediation and Judicial Proceedings under Article

22 (1), (2.1) of the 1996 Investment Code

Article 22 of the Ethiopian investment code reads:
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(1) Where any dispute arises between a foreign investor and the Government in respect of an
investment, all effort shall be made to reach an amicable settlement through mutual discussions.
(2) A dispute not amicably settled may be submitted to the competent court of the country or to
an international arbitration within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement to
which the Government and the country of which the foreign investor is a national are
contracting parties.
1.

Mediation as a Pre-Condition for Judicial or Arbitral Proceedings

Judicial or arbitral proceedings are the ultimate means a party to an investment dispute may
subject itself to. International practices in a variety of cases have shown; however, that
complexity of claims sometimes makes it nearly impossible to resolve disputes through
arbitration or judicial adjudication. So too does the cost not only in judicial, but also arbitral
proceedings make it sometimes equally unbearable for the parties involved to pursue
tribunal/adjudicative options. While international commercial arbitration in general maybe less
expensive, host countries run a risk of paying much higher fees in investor – State arbitration397.
In the case of developing countries, this can often make the question of public policy more
amenable because these countries more likely end up having to pay more than what they
economically afford.
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See UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II, at 38 (2011).
197

An alternative in such cases is to seek mediating efforts (mediation, negotiation, consultation
through diplomatic channels398) and alleviate hostility by means of mutual discussion between
investors and the government or by concluding so-called “lump sum agreements”399. Mediation
and lump sum approaches can help resolve disputes between contracting states and also those
with regard to individual claimants. Various bilateral treaties recognize this and stipulate
mediation as an acceptable and viable option to amiably resolve possible disagreements between
parties, both contracting states on the one hand, and an investor and a contracting party on the
other400. A good example for a lump sum agreement was the claims settlement (compensation)
agreement between the U.S. and Ethiopia of 1986401, which culminated complex and costly
judicial proceedings in the U.S. District Court. This agreement finally led to a settlement for a
total payment of $7 million as compensation, which was a fraction of what actually was owed by
the defendant per the claim402. Whereas the lump sum approach results in financial
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Use of diplomatic channel is warranted especially when two contracting parties are involved in dispute
regarding the interpretation of the agreement, see for instance Article 9 (1) of the BIT between United
Kingdom and Ethiopia of 2009; Articles 10 (1) and 11 (1) of the BIT between Germany and Ethiopia of
2004
399
Often less than full compensation, see Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 579, at p. 204f; See also sample
agreements on pp. 69-80, AJIL, Vol. 82 (1986).
400
Several BITs concluded by Ethiopia include the mediation option, see Article 12 (1) of the BIT
between Austria and Ethiopia of 2005; Article 8 (1) of the BIT between United Kingdom and Ethiopia of
2009; Articles 10 (1) and 11 (1) of the BIT between Germany and Ethiopia of 2004.
401
In the District Court for Western District of Michigan: Eth. Spice Extr. Share Comp v.
KSE Co, Kalsec, Inc., and Kalsec Intern Inc. (No. K79-400 CA) and KSE Co. v. PMGSE (No K81-17
CA); See AJIL, Vol. 80, at 344 (1986). For the agreement itself which was entered into force in December
1985, see the United Nations Treaty Series, Treaties and International Agreements filed/recorded with the
Secretariat of the UN, Volume 2129, #37116.
402
The original claim was for $11 million; See an appeal case: 729 F. 2d 422 - Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist, details available at:
http://openjurist.org/729/f2d/422/kalamazoo-spice-extraction-co-v-provisional-military-government-ofsocialist-ethiopia, (last visited October 22, 2011). United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit by the
way denied the treaty exception for the act of state doctrine that the district court said precluded an
inquiry into the validity of expropriation thereby dismissing the Appellant’s (Kal-Spice) counter claim.
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compensation, many cases within the mediation schemes result in no financial awards403, which
is why it is increasingly becoming more attractive for, especially governments in developing
economies. It is, therefore, not surprising that Art. 22 (1) of the investment code too rigorously
pursues the concept of negotiated settlement hence giving priority thereto before proceeding to
judicial or arbitral adjudication.404 The goal is to avoid inconveniences, disruption of ongoing
relations, delays, and cost resulting from any legal or arbitral proceeding, and settle disputes
involving either inter-State or investor – State amicably.

It is; however, unclear if mediation under Article 22 (1) and the first option of Article22 (2) of
the investment code is a mandatory precondition for arbitral proceedings before the ICSID and
any other agreed upon arbitral panel (if applicable at all). Unlike many bilateral agreements
which recognize the need for reconciliation but do not set the same as a precondition for
pursuing other options405, the mediation provisions in Article 22 may entail a mandatory
requirement before seeking any other option. This provision is open for interpretation, but if
construed in a way that favors the mediation exhaustion, investors and contracting parties alike
will have no choice but to seek and exhaust meditative channels before embarking onto more
formal legal proceedings. This is also in agreement with the ICSID Convention’s provision under
Article 26, according to which a State may, as a condition of its consent to ICSID arbitration,
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A 2010 ICSID statistics indicated that a majority of about 40% ICSID cases resolved via mediation
resulted in no financial awards, see UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to
Arbitration II, at 39 (2011).
404
Similar provisions found in investment laws of many African countries, see Antonio R. Parra,
Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, BITs and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment, 12 FDI Journal, 287 (1997).
405
See BITs between Ethiopia and three other countries, Article 12 (1) of the BIT between Austria and
Ethiopia of 2005; Article 8 (1) of the BIT between United Kingdom and Ethiopia of 2009; Articles 10 (1)
and 11 (1) of the BIT between Germany and Ethiopia of 2004.
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require prior exhaustion of local remedies406. Meanwhile in contrast to BITs concluded by
Ethiopia, but similar to ICSID, many other BITs don’t overlook the requirement that claimants
resort to amiable means and exhaust the same before taking other actions, while sometimes even
insisting on satisfaction of reconciliatory efforts.407

2.

Submission of Investment Disputes to Forum Courts

While the second option under Article 22 (2) is explicit enough in referring investment disputes,
at least with regard to those between the government and investors, to international arbitration,
the first option (Article 22 (2.1)) addressing the local ‘competent court’ reference is less so. It is
especially far from being specific or clear if ‘competent courts’ are any different from other local
courts or whether such competence is determined based on jurisdiction or some other grounds.
Perhaps it means that such a court will need a special appointment to handle
investment/commercial matters. By the same token, as mentioned earlier, it is unclear if such
local courts are bound to use substantive laws chosen by parties or specified under a treaty.
Among further issues that will inevitably arise when one considers the nature of referring foreign
investors to local judicial proceedings of the host could include the following. From the
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See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of
ICSID and MIGA, at 10; See also a risk comparison based on investor perception (Ethiopia ranked 4th
under the riskiest regions in the institutional investor rating, but 10th after 3 years in 1997 within East
Africa), FIAS Occasional paper No. 9, at 13 (1997).
407
See Freyer et al., BITs and Arbitration, 53 Dispute Resolution Journal, at 74-76 (May 1998).
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investors’ standpoint, first there is the question of whether an investor will be willing to submit a
dispute to a local court that potentially uses forum laws. Secondly, there is a question of how
successful the investor will be when the investor avails itself of the local judicial system,
particularly when going against the government as a party. Judicial settlement of commercial
disputes between States and private investors is beset with tremendous difficulties that result
principally from the fact that one is a sovereign and the other is a private person. Foreign
investors are not infrequently reluctant to subject themselves to the laws of host states since these
laws can also become potential weapon to impose unilateral sanctions on investors. Forum laws
could be the source of unilateral legal and commercial mistreatment for foreign investors rather
than being neutral legal frameworks408. Thus, there is no surprise that bargainers on investment
contract consider it absolutely important that they include choice of law and "stabilization
clauses"409. The first will prevent the danger of being treated unequal by government parties
under forum legal regime while the latter will ensure that any future change, abrogation, or
amendments of legal frameworks by the state parties will not impair the content of the
agreements.

As noted earlier, investors’ reluctance to do business with state parties, let alone to subject
themselves to forum laws of the state parties, seems to also stem from the fact that a private
person and state party are generally observed not to be treated equally before international fora.
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See BORN, supra note 278, at 132.
F. El R. Abdalla El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in the Sudan and Saudi
Arabia, at 241; see also, Cyntia Day Wallace, FDI in the 1990s, at 107.
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This can, in part, be attributed to the states’ frequent claim to rely on their absolute sovereign
immunity410, especially in international litigation. Sovereignty claim has often helped them
circumvent obligations of commercial contracts with private individuals.411 The fact that one is a
sovereign and the other is a private person was reflected, traditionally, by regarding the state as a
subject and the private party as mere object in international law.412 This resulted in the denial of
access to international law for private persons. The tendency to regard the state not as an equal
party in a judicial proceeding is generally observed in countries with weaker legal systems where
there is no checks and balance control through a clear distinction of the balance of power among
executive, judicature and legislative branches. This was particularly true in the former
communist countries as they generally adhered to the absolute immunity approach413. Judges in
these states may very well be politically biased or more influenced by executive branches where
they either for fear of political repression or on their own free will may end up reviewing cases
subjectively. Due to such an undue pressure or own ideology based negative sentiments, they
may not treat private foreign investors or any alien for that matter with fairness thereby acting
with no objective and unequivocal legal reasoning.
Generally, these characteristics can also be attributed to the Ethiopian judiciary, not only because
of the country's past communist ideological predisposition that influenced the legal system as a

410

U.S courts recognizing, see Shooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812); Also see BORN,
supra note 278, at 202; For different practices and waiver through consent to arbitration in some
European countries and the U.S., see American Journal of International Law, Vol. 79, 340 (1985).
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BORN, supra note 278, at 199.
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See El Sheikh, supra note 409, at 281.
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See SHAW, supra note 144, at 499.
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whole, but also because the judiciary has been unable to free itself from being government's
political instrument414.

Meanwhile the fact that states couldn’t be sued by private individuals because of a possible
absolute sovereign immunity claim revealed another loophole in international law. A persuasive
argument has invoked the idea that, since States are participating more and more in international
business transactions with private persons, it is not rational and fair to insulate the states from
legal proceedings against private parties simply because states are sovereign entities. Thus, the
immunity of a state is no longer a state’s absolute right in contemporary international law. This
restriction has long been justified by innumerable involvement of states in international
commercial activities with private parties.
Consequently, it is plausible to apply this currently predominant restrictive approach415 to even
situations with respect to transition economies (former socialist states) including Ethiopia.
Another situation closely related to the sovereign immunity claims of states is the common law
concept known as the act of state doctrine according to which national courts should respect
other states and may not reexamine the validity of acts of other states416. In the past this principle
particularly gave rise to situations where foreign investors could not have any possibility to
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As also assessed by the U.S. State Department - see a 2011 Investment Climate Highlights entitled
‘Openness to Foreign Investment’ issued by the U.S. Department of State, available at:
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2010/138801.htm, (last visited October 21, 2011).
415
As the principle and the need for its restriction, meanwhile, have been adhered to by the majority of
states; See SHAW, supra note 144, at 499; also see U.S. FSIA of 1976.
416
However, ‘act of state` means not necessarily acta jure imperii (in a sense of an administrative act),
but state’s sovereign act; For main differences between F.S.I. and Act of State Doctrine, see BORN, supra
note 278, at 701.
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proceed against, for instance, expropriating measures of states. That is in part because
expropriation has become a recognized sovereign act of states based on the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States under the UN Resolution No. 3281(XXIX).
Nonetheless, contemporary views see, inter alia, the so-called “treaty” or “international law”
exceptions as observed in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Sabbatino417 case, thus, giving no effect to
this doctrine if there are international or other unambiguous agreements regarding a controlling
legal regime. This exception is reflected in Kalamzoo Spice Extraction Co. (a U.S. corp.) v.
PMGSE418 of Ethiopia. The PMGS expropriated Kalamzoo’s property by reducing Kalamzoo’s
ownership interest in the Ethiopian Spice Extraction Company (ESEC)., an Ethiopian based
corporation operating in a joint venture with Kalamazoo, from 80% to 39%. Kalamzoo sued the
PMGSE in the District Court of the Western District of Michigan, where the court dismissed the
claims on the basis of act of state doctrine. The U.S. Court of Appeal, however, overturned
District Court’s decision concluding that the treaty exception, in this case the 1951(3) “Treaty of
Amity”419 between the U.S. and Ethiopia, bars application of this doctrine to at least some of
Kal-Spice’s claims420.
Another case with an impact on the longstanding act of state doctrine was the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v. Republic of Cuba.421 Based on the court’s
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See BORN, supra note 278, at 738
U.S. court of Appeals 6th Cir., Mar. 9, 1984, Kal. S.E. v PMGSE, see pp. 902-903, AJIL, Vol. 78,
1984.
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See BORN, supra note 278, at 740
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1984/; Contrary to that, U.S. D.C., W.D. Mich., July 6, 1982; A different outcome for a similar dispute,
see AJIL, Vol. 77, 1982, pp. 144-146, where it was held that ‘such treaty cannot be a bar to the
application of act of state doctrine’; See also BORN, supra note 278, at 739.
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See Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301,
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position on this case, foreign nations cannot shield themselves with the help of this doctrine and
the U.S. courts would have to give full legal effects to disputes between foreign states and U.S.
nationals if their act is considered non-public or commercial in nature422. The state’s claim for
such an exclusive right is no longer reasonable and should be restricted while being subject to the
following differentiation. Any act of state falls into two categories: acta jure imperii or acta jure
gestionis. In the latter case a state neither enjoys sovereign immunity nor relies on the act of state
doctrine if its activity in an international transaction is of a commercial or private nature (acta
jure gestionis).
In sum, neither immunity nor act of state doctrine is without restrictions in the current
international jurisprudence. Hence an act of state defense will have to be given effect only when
the state’s act is considered public (acta jure imperii). Moreover, courts would have to defer
adjudication over claims involving expropriation as an act of state only when neither
international treaties nor parties’ specific agreements establish bases for governing legal regimes,
as well as parties’ conducts with respect to fulfilling contractual duties or obligations.

B.

Settlement of Investment Disputes by Means of Arbitration

422
The Supreme Court elaborated more in paragraph 28 of its analyses regarding the need for restricting
this doctrine in Alfred Dunhill of London Inc v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48
L.Ed.2d 301, No. 73-1288, see also OpenJurist for the full text of the decision, also available at
http://openjurist.org/425/us/682, (last visited October 14, 2011).
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1.

International Arbitration under Article 22 (2.2): Submission of Investment

Disputes to the ICSID

Article 22 (2.2) of the Ethiopian investment code reads:
A dispute not amicably settled may be submitted to […] or international arbitration
within the framework of any bilateral or multilateral agreement to which the Government
and the country of which the foreign investor is a national are contracting parties.

As can be observed, this provision alternatively refers investment disputes to an international
arbitration based upon bilateral or multilateral agreements. Since the country is party to the
convention of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), this
reference qualifies an investment dispute for ICSID arbitration as well even though this center is
not clearly mentioned. Since ICSID is an arbitration institution created by the multilateral
agreement of the Washington Convention of 1965, the inclusion of this center under the meaning
of the provision impliedly exists. Use of this center by an investor party does not seem to be
controversial in regards to Ethiopia since the country with its access to the convention on
September 21, 1965 recognized the convention423, albeit its ratification remains outstanding as
part of the long to do list for the country. The fact that this treaty hasn’t yet been ratified by the
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The country is one of the original signatories, but never ratified the convention; See the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID/3; List of contracting states and other signatories of
the convention as of May 5, 2011; also available at:
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument
&language=English, (last visited October 16, 2011).
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country may certainly contribute to some skepticism in potential foreign investors. However, in
reality this status per se may not be a major hurdle for an access to the ICSID arbitration.
Then, to begin with, ratification of the ICSID is arguably only an expression of a contracting
state’s willingness to make use of the machinery and doesn’t constitute an obligation to do so424.
And under Article 25 IV of the ICSID, in order to effectuate such obligation, the Ethiopian
government will anyway need to make extra consent on each specific dispute for ICSID
arbitration within its sole discretion.

That being said, every investment dispute submitted to the center is subject to jurisdictional
limitations. In order for an ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction, such a dispute should be between
a contracting State or its agencies and a national of another contracting State, Article 25(1), (2)
of the ICSID. A finding of lack of jurisdiction for instance prompted an ICSID tribunal to
dismiss the arbitration request by Vacuum Salt Productions Ltd.425.
In addition, a failure to consent by a contracting state may also constitute a lack of jurisdiction.
Since the country’s membership has remained so far only in a signatory status, this would lead to
further uncertainty as to whether the reference in Art 22 (2) of the investment code is effective
and binding for the Government. Article 22 (2) is silent in this regard except requiring
membership of the State and a home country of an investor for submitting any dispute to the
center. Arguably; however, jurisdiction could also be established solely on the basis of
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See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The roles of
ICSID and MIGA, in ICSID Review, Foreign Investment Law Journal, at 4.
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Vacuum Salt Production Ltd. v. Govrn. of the Rep. of Ghana, in Mealey’s International Arbitration
Report, Vol. 9, No. 4, at (1994).
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provisions under the domestic legislation. So the provision in Article 22 (2) removes the need for
an additional consent by the Ethiopian Government, for the provision may indicate that the
government’s consent could have been envisioned originally by the drafters of the code426. This
means, in other words, any investment dispute falling under the meaning of the provision in
Article 22 (2) could be brought before an ICSID tribunal regardless of even the Government’s
further consent or ratification save the requirement in Article 25 IV of the ICSID. Finally, the
government’s consent can also be asserted where such consent is implied by a provision in a BIT
with another state. Similarly, an ICSID tribunal has based its jurisdiction on the U.S. – Zaire
BIT427.
Even in areas where provisions of the current investment code don’t apply, for instance,
regarding the exploitation of natural resources such as petroleum and minerals in Article 3 of the
code, access to this center has not been made impossible. There is still some leeway for the
government and investors to make use of this center through separate contractual arrangements.
All in all one doesn’t necessarily need to consider the country’s failure to ratify the convention
alone as an impediment for access to the ICSID center, quite on the contrary since the investment
statute can also be relied upon for referring disputes to the center. At least theoretically, the door
to access arbitration panels based on the above provision and under the auspices of rules of the
ICSID is more or less open for investors.
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See SPP v. Egypt, in Mealey’s International Arbitration Report, Vol. 12, No. 11, (1997), an ICSID
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In AAP Ltd. v. Dem. Rep. of Sri Lanka, in Mealey’s IAR, supra note 649, at 3.
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2.

Arbitration Clauses under Ethiopian BITs

With regard to arbitral provisions stemming from BITs concluded by the country, it is safe to say
that most if not all BITs we have access to today for the most part address dispute resolution by
means of arbitration428. That being said though, with respect to the volume of BITs concluded
and/or ratified by the country so far, the country’s share does not meet expectations, especially
considering the role of BITs in FDI promotion. The situation, meanwhile, is disappointing from
the country’s standpoint since most scholars agree that other things being equal, BITs help drive
FDI decisions429.This country could just as easily help itself with concluding more BITs as
embarking on many other fruitless paths. Other things being equal, bilateral agreements could
push the country to have an edge in the fierce competition among developing countries to attract
FDIs. That is because BITs’ convenience lies in its ability to provide a platform for not only
targeted negotiations, inter alia, with as many home countries as possible, but it also makes the
negotiated terms very specific to accommodate the interests of home and host countries, as well
as their nationals. Such BITs could boost confidence in investors since these investors may be
more inclined to rely on terms agreed upon by their home countries. Given the inability of the
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See arbitral dispute resolution clauses within the BITs concluded between Ethiopia and four other
nations: Chapter 2, dispute settlement, Articles 11f of the BIT between Austria and Ethiopia of 2005;
Articles 8f of the BIT between United Kingdom and Ethiopia of 2009; Articles 10 and 11 of the BIT
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Developing Countries? World Development, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 31-49, at 34 (May, 2005). Available at
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Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from
Alternative Evidence, the Virginia Journal of International Law Association, Volume 51 — Number 2, at
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country to rid itself of the recurring situation with shaky microeconomic policies430 and political
instability, investor confidence is needed more than anything else. Without such confidence, no
promotion or promulgation of investment laws alone will work. This is not surprising when the
situation in SSA as whole is observed. The sub-Saharan region, which has the least quota of FDI
inflows, shared an average of only 4.6 BITs about a decade ago431, while this share may have
slightly changed for the better today.
The country’s share of that figure was above the average again about a decade ago, to be sure. In
recent years the country has made some progress by concluding bilateral investment agreements
with at least twenty nine countries according to the UNCTAD investment report432. Contracting
parties include United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, Kuwait, Malaysia, China, etc.
The country’s past history with expropriation measures is said to impact negotiations with
certain countries, e.g. Germany and France. That because although both of these countries
eventually agreed and signed BITs, they were reported to have initially declined such an
agreement due to differences in compensation of the formerly confiscated properties of their
nationals. 433
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X.

Chapter Four Summary

The Ethiopian investment law provides for both judicial and arbitral means of dispute resolution.
However, there are some unanswered questions as to the scope of a few provisions within the
regulation. Not only is this legislation open for interpretation, but it leaves too much room for
ambiguity in its reference to local judiciary and arbitral tribunals with regard to dispute
resolution. The scope of the provision under Article 22 of the investment code is limited when it
comes to international arbitration. Most notably, the provision makes it possible to use the ICSID
arbitration system by default since this center is the only multilateral agreement the country has
adhered to. But, to be sure, it doesn’t encompass an unequivocal statutory reference of such
disputes to other international arbitral instruments. Rather, it leaves a room for an inference that
such options are excluded due to the very fact that the country is not a member to any of them.
The provision itself doesn’t explicitly prevent submission of disputes to any other international
tribunals based on any other institutional arbitration rules. However, it impliedly confines the use
of other institutional arbitration venues to be determined under BIT negotiations.

Chapter Five
General Conclusions
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This dissertation touched upon the vast array of important issues associated with offshore
undertakings dealing with digital assets, cyber security for such digital assets, and the
ability/inability to provide regulatory protection to these assets. The research extends studies and
inquiries surrounding the most controversial issues in global Cybersecurity – the questions of
whether or not it is possible to effectively regulate and secure cyberspace, and deter cybercrime.
It also offers a new perspective on FDI activities with a focus on IT and IT enabled services
involving offshoring business models. The topic invoked interdisciplinary approaches to
investigate underlying problems, discuss opposing arguments, and present alternatives. Most
current and hotly debated issues that have won relevance in information security, international
law, and economics literature have been analyzed and looked at from various angles.
However, it cannot be claimed to the extent that this work exhaustively raised, presented, and
discussed all relevant issues brought up in the course of this investigation due to limitations that
must have been imposed on the scope. Yet an attempt has been made to identify and discuss the
most important items that should also call for and inspire further research, readings, and
discussions. Problems with national cyber security measures have been compounded by the
multitude of elements involved in the global market place along with the ubiquitous presence of
cyberspace globally. In light of what threats cyberspace poses to digital investors in the global
market place, the central question of whether such investors can be legally protected became an
essential part of the research.
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Therefore, the emphasis was on the existence, effectiveness, and adequacy of law, as well as
policy measures geared to counteract those threats, rather than technical solutions. As digital
assets utilize cyberspace, their security is as good as the security of cyberspace itself. Thus, the
discussion of protecting these primarily intangible assets with possible legal and policy measures
centers around the security of cyberspace.
While the use of global cyberspace poses security challenges, these challenges are specially
pronounced in the technical capabilities for attribution and identification of illicit actors. Legal,
policy, and cultural diversity within the global community result in variations in value, legal and
ethical standards. Consequently, it becomes difficult to standardize cyber security, to develop
standard cyberspace regulations globally, or enforce national cyberspace laws elsewhere.
Cyberspace is not well defined in law, but legal conflicts arising from cyberspace abound, which
implicate several aspects of law: contract, criminal, intellectual property, and jurisdiction.
Oftentimes some of these conflicts cannot be resolved with existing legal norms in ways which
satisfy all parties involved.

This research has proven that national regulations have for the most part failed to account for
illicit cyber events across the globe due to attribution and enforcement challenges and there is no
viable solution from international sources in sight. I also find that regulations; such as, those
aimed at national security, cyber security, or privacy by both home and host countries interfere
with efforts to promote offshoring service FDI as some regulations are too restrictive and thus
discouraging for potential investors. Overall it is worth noting that, while it seems difficult to
strike a balance between incentives for digital investment and cyber security measures,
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regulatory and policy measures need to address security aspects of investment in digital economy
while at the same time ensuring that those measures do not adversely impact innovation or
efforts to attract Offshoring.

While there are nations that have cyber security regulations, albeit with some loopholes, there are
those which do not have any, e.g. a few countries in the Sub-Saharan region.
The Sub-Saharan region also houses perhaps the least technologically enabled countries in the
world to support cyberspace. These countries have the lowest penetration rates in ICT and
Internet usage. I find that these countries have neither the resources to implement well
functioning and secure ICT networks nor the need to regulate cyberspace since wherever there is
no ICT, there is little incentive to regulate it. In sum, while lack of ICT capabilities has been the
primary deterrent factor for IT offshoring, SSA on the one hand has more acute FDI
impediments to account for in order to attract offshoring. On the other hand, there is a yawning
capital resource gap to account for the majority of these problems.
The question as to whether existence or non-existence of dispute resolution mechanisms has any
effects on FDI promotion has a relevance in terms of offshoring as well. Clearly, inadequate
investment regulations and judicial systems, as well as BITs with ADR provisions have a direct
effect on the ability to attract foreign investment in IT services.

It is my sincere hope that this contribution has pointed out important problems and identified
ponderable, as well as critically assessed findings. Yet the findings also point to an unfinished
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research agenda. First, there is the need to do more research to help nations cope with securing
their portions of cyberspace with appropriate legal and policy measures thereby being more
attractive for digital investors; secondly there is a research need to address the yawning digital
divide that continues to grow and set the developing world apart from the rest thereby limiting
their ability to access global market place using global cyberspace. Eliminating such a digital gap
and ensuring active participation of developing nations in digital economy will, inter alia, allow
them to take advantage of international electronic trade and investment.
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